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ABSTRACT
Psychoanalysis and Feminist Scholarship: Toward A Women's
Studies Curriculum in Counseling and Psychology
(September 1979 )
Bonnie Smolen, M.Ed.
, University of Massachusetts/Amherst
Directed by: Dr. Peter H. Wagschal
In past decades we have witnessed a great upsurge in the
popularity and popularization of psychotherapy and "personal growth"
experiences. There has been a concomitant proliferation of training
models and training sites. Though undergraduates are increasingly
interested in this career area, no clearly outlined course of study
exists in order to prepare students to work in the field or to go on
for a graduate degree. Recent attention paid by minority groups and
social theorists to the sometimes hidden political implications of
psychotherapy and its assimilation into American culture suggests
that an interdisciplinary curriculum would best address the needs and
concerns of the students and the social problems they ultimately may
be working to alleviate.
And yet there is no adequate theoretical base on which to build
such an interdisci pi inary program, though there have been theoretical
and practical attempts, in the field of education and psychology, to
effect a 'synthesis' of political and psychological theory. Perhaps
most prominent of these efforts in recent years is feminist therapy,
which, again has failed to adequately demarcate the interrelationships
vi i
of psychology, counseling, and political theory. Hence while this
research originally intended to provide a Women's Studies curriculum
as a prototype for an interdisciplinary program of study in counseling,
it soon became clear that a lengthy process of conceptual clarification
would have to precede program development.
The aim of this dissertation is to begin to provide the theoretical
foundation for a Women's Studies major in counseling and psychology.
It proposes from the outset that the theory should evolve from both
political and psychological frames of reference, that is, should be
interdisci pi inary in nature. This goal is subsumed under two broader
tasks: 1) to explore the relationships between, respectively, political
and psychological theory; psychological theory and therapeutic practice;
theory, therapy and political activity; and 2) to elucidate a pedagogical
framework that is reflexively coherent with these concerns.
Chapter I is an in-depth exploration of the problem in two parts:
first, a concrete explication of the difficulties facing students in
the field of counselor education, and an examination of the ways in which
present educational practices fail to meet their needs. Following
that, the same themes are explored with particular reference to feminist
concerns and Women's Studies curriculum. The suggestion is offered that
a program built on the principles of Freudian psychoanalytic theory
would best address the failures that currently pertain in counselor
education, and would be most amenable to an interdisciplinary focus.
Chapter II endeavors to determine whether feminist therapy, which
would appear the most likely choice for the basis of an interdisciplinary
Women's Studies counseling program, can address the problems regarding
v i i i
the politics/psychology nexus which were raised in Chapter I, and
whether the feminist therapy alternative to psychoanalysis is truly an
advance, politically or psychologically, over the Freudian theory and
method.
Chapter III sets forth the psychoanalytic theory of mind in order
to establish a standard by which to judge what any psychological theory
has to offer to feminist political analysis and feminist pedagogy.
Chapters IV and V represent an exploration and critique of the psycho-
analytic theory of psychosexual development, with a dual purpose in
mind: first, to provide a foundation on which to base a collaboration
between feminist and Freudian theories by demarcating between essential
and derivative components of the theory, and second, to demonstrate
what may be forthcoming from an application of psychoanalytic principles
to some of the most urgent research questions posed to feminist scholars
by the women's movement.
The Conclusion takes the theoretical exploration of general
psychology and psychosexual development back to the problems of
feminist counselor education. The Conclusion also suggests some
problems left unresolved by the research, and some areas for continued
study.
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CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
Part One: Alternative Education from the
Students' Point of View
Overview
When this research was begun several years ago, even before
the focus was narrowed to Women's Studies curriculum, it appeared that
it might be possible to start immediately with the task of program
development. This seemed without question an exciting project: most
lay and professional people with whom I had discussed the idea were
stunned to discover that a counseling program for undergraduates did
not already exist. The impact of this realization may be staggering:
students who are interested in the "helping professions" and who,
until now, have gone without training constitute a vast untapped
source of clinicians and/or social change agents. Thus far, these
students either have been deterred from such work altogether, or
have entered the professional field with few clinical skills and an
unsophisticated political understanding of social problems and their
own role in social change. With the increased popularity and public
acceptance of therapy, and the recent trend toward exploring the
political aspects of both institutional and individual therapeutic
experiences, the development of such a program would indeed be well-
timed.
1
2The project appears all the more exciting because on the surface
it seems a relatively easy one to put into operation. There is no
shortage of training models from which to draw, including several
developed in recent years (radical therapy, feminist therapy, micro-
counseling, re-evaluation counseling, and organizational development,
to name a few) which already focus on "political" aspects of therapy.
These latter, while they are widely divergent, may be grouped together
for three reasons. First, they are unified by the adjectives they
use to name and define themselves: radical, humanistic, and so forth.
Second, they may be seen as a unit in terms of their nuclear organizing
issues; demystification of therapy and the authority relationship
through skills acquisition and peer models; attention to issues of
sex, race, and class discrimination in the social services, etc.
They would no doubt be open for use in an undergraduate program as
they are philosophically committed to deprofessional izing the social
services and social service training. Third, they are based on similar
underlying assumptions drawn from classical liberal philosophy and
supported by positivist methodology.
While none of these systems identifies itself specifically as
interdisciplinary, probably their proponents would see themselves as
closely allied with the goals and values of this project. In the
manner in which interdisci pi inary organization has been recently
popularized, it can be loosely understood as calling for any integration
of psychological and political disciplines. This is exemplified by
the over-use of phrases like "politics of therapy," wherein juxtaposing
3politics" and "therapy" automatically connotes interdisciplinary (or
dialectical) methodology.
If an easy alliance with the proponents of current so-called
radical and humanistic therapies and education were assumed, then the
tasks of this project would indeed be accomplished easily: a radical
approach to the tensions between theory and therapy would abandon psycho-
logical theory in favor of immediate therapeutic or pol itical /social
needs, and concentrate on developing therapeutic and social change
strategies and on disseminating skills. The implications for education
are clear: a "therapeutic" classroom in which learning happens mainly
through self-exploration, a model which uses the students' inner
experience as the primary text and stresses that inner experience,
combined with skills that almost anyone can learn, constitutes adequate
counselor education. This fallacy is accompanied by a general disdain
for theory as being elitist and of little practical value. Such
educational strategies are labeled radical largely because they
represent departures from traditional classroom (blackboard and text)
and formal therapy (Dr. and couch) models. The obscurity of their
theoretical roots makes it difficult to assess in what other ways
their advocates consider themselves to be radical, and, therefore to
ascertain what is meant by radical.
This theoretical obscurity makes, in fact, for a very uneasy
alliance (between this project and radical therapy/humanistic education
projects currently underway), if one holds to a genuine hope for
politicizing the social services. Critical theorists have long since
shown the politically-motivated interdiscipl inary approach, as seen in
4the proliferation of "politics of X" slogans, to be suspect. They are
writing about the popularization of the dialectic in the New Left and
its heirs, and here Paul Breines draws attention to the original
impact of the "politics of therapy" phraseology.
The meaning of the Movement's 'politics of the unpolitical'
lay in its recognition that nothing in modern society is
unpolitical; that every detail of daily life is saturated
with and reproduces the hegemony of the ruling system; that
the object of critical thought and action is 'the system'
as a totality.
. . its recognition that a coherent and
unitary critique of modern society begins with a critique
of individual existence. Thus the Movement's 'politics
of the unpolitical' is not a matter of taste but a shift
in the 'strategy of liberation'.
. .
.1
The analysis of the New Left echoes earlier writings of Marcuse
and other critical theorists who were working with contemporary uses
of the Hegelian and Marxist dialectic. Marcuse writes "... since
the adjustment of Reason to oppressive social institutions perpetuated
unfreedom, progress in freedom depends on thought becoming political."*
And again, the caution:
Today this dialectical mode of thought is alien to the
whole established universe of discourse and action. . . .
The established reality seems promising and productive
enough to repel or absorb all alternatives. Thus acceptance--
and even affirmation--of this reality principle appears to
be the only reasonable methodological principle. Moreover,
it precludes neither criticism nor change; on the contrary,
insistence on the dynamic character of the status quo, on
its constant 'revolutions,' is one of the strongest props
for this attitude. Yet this dynamic seems to operate
endlessly within the same framework of life: streamlining
rather than abolishing the domination of man, both by man
and the products of his labor.
3
One major difficulty in making judgments about those current
radical therapists and educators who address themselves to political
concerns, is the impossibility of discerning in what relation, if any,
5they stand to either the New Left or critical theory, and therefore
what the term "political" itself has come to mean to them. Is the
"politics of therapy" a concept already absorbed into the "daily
hegemony," and if so, to what end? My questions apply not only to the
ambiguity of their roots in political theory, but also to their roots
in some psychological theory. Their relationship even to existentialism,
no less Neo Freudianism, ego psychology, or Freudian analysis is, at
best, obscure. At worst, it is denied. In the abstract, this obscurity
pervades as well their connection with the major philosophical traditions
in history, particularly classical liberal thought and positivist
methodology. Russell Jacoby writes:
Within psychology new theories and therapies replace
old ones at an accelerating rate. In a dynamic society,
Freud is too old to be a fashion, too new to be a classic.
. . . The ability as well as the desire to remember
atrophies. Most of the social sciences turn radically
ahistorical ; one hardly studies Hegel within philosophy,
Freud within psychology, Marx within economics, and so on.
For some, this is proof of progress and vitality. But
dynamism can be perpetual motion without forward movement.
Within dynamism a static moment can inhere: the structure
of society . 4
The very fact that the origins of a slogan such as the "politics
of therapy" have been forgotten, that self-styled radical humanists
do not know from whence their battle cries derive, vitiates the hope
that the dialectical mode is anywhere preserved in them. If they do
not have a substantive political theory, nor a substantive psycho-
logical theory, it is not likely that their view of relating the two
will be substantive, nor that they will generate significant implica-
tions for counselor training or undergraduate education, broadly
considered. Actually, we might have cause for concern even before we
6look at the specifics of their conception of the relationship between
politics and therapy. Jacoby states earlier, "The shift in social
attention towards psychology is no accident; it testifies to a shift
in the social structure itself ." 5 And so it is not only the uncritical
attitude towards an easy fusion of politics and therapy (as well as
theory and therapy) to which we must take exception, but also the
earlier error: an uncritical acceptance of the increasing popularity
of psychology and therapy.
In the course of searching out the possibilities of an alliance
with those currently concerned with radicalizing or politicizing
therapy and education, I have asserted here that it is difficult to
know how the words "radical" and "political" are being used, both
generally and in the specific contexts of therapy and education.
Before proposing some specific answers to these questions, it is
necessary to explore one more word frequently used by those who
currently consider themselves to be involved in radical therapy and
education: "alternative."
Another value held by "radical" therapists and educators which
would have to be taken at face value in order to proceed with this
project in a simple manner is the belief that what is "alternative"
in education is new and radical (and therefore good). This research
itself provides yet one more alternative model of higher education.
Therefore, before developing and defending a specific counselor
training program for undergraduates, it is important to look more
closely at what it means to offer educational alternatives within the
notions of classical liberal arts education, and within the prevailing
7university attitudes toward counseling.
The essence of alternative is choice between 1 i mi ted
, differing
possibilities. Yet today there seems to be no limit to the prolifera-
tion of alternative therapy systems and training models, many of which
assume an automatic connection between "alternative" and "radical"
or "humanistic." I do not disparage the goals behind these alternatives,
or the motivations of their proponents; the achievements in the fields
of humanistic education and counseling are considerable. My concern
is with the ultimate failure to achieve their ends. In losing sight
of the fact that there is a limit to truthful, correct possibilities,
we may not so much have liberated a vast resource of ideas as we have
allowed ourselves to become overwhelmed with a variety of pseudo-
answers which do little more than block the salient questions. Clearly,
the "alternatives" we have devised cannot possibly all be different
from one another, and most certainly cannot be presenting us with
genuine choices.
History shows that educational practices are not in the vanguard
of social change but rather lag behind, reflecting changes already at
work in society.^ Only those who ignore history can believe the
reverse. To ignore history, obviously, is to risk being manipulated
by it, and to risk changing nothing at all. It likewise follows that
only those who are oblivious to history can claim an ipso facto
connection between the terms "alternative" and "radical"; both words
take on meaning only within specific historical contexts. With all the
talk today about politicizing therapy, altering education, and
humanizing the social services (now often referred to as "human"
8services, as if the semantic change were a structural change). It is
imperative not simply to offer another allegedly political "alterna-
tive" and compete for recognition on terms which may already have
precluded the possibility of choice and innovation, but rather to
question the very terms on which we have been offering and accepting
"alternatives.
"
To summarize, then, the original goal of this research had
been to develop an interdiscipl inary counseling curriculum for under-
graduates. At first glance, the task seemed easy. Yet what started
as a relatively straightforward project proved almost endlessly complex
as I began to critique the alternative therapy and educational systems
available as models, and to define and historically situate current
so-called radical therapy and pedagogy. Some of the difficulty
derives, no doubt, from a multi-disciplinary approach. However, the
complexity really begins as soon as we focus on the terms: "alternative,"
political," "radical," "dialectical." Clearly, these terms are bandied
about far too freely— so much so that it is difficult to ascertain
what they mean at all, no less as applied to therapy and pedagogy.
In fact, it is extremely difficult to establish what, if anything, one
has in common with people all too eager to become one's radical
bedfellows.
There is fairly extensive literature establishing the need, and
a preliminary set of guidelines^ for integrating psychological theory
into political theory in order to formulate correct analyses of social
problems and devise effective strategies for political change. However,
the literature calling for an infusion of political awareness into the
9shaping of psychological and pedagogical theory is less complete,
less sophisticated, and generally speaking, less correct. Of special
importance in this regard is the lack of attention paid to the tension
inherent in the relationship of theory to therapy, and the simplistic
sacrifice of therapeutic standards to political polemic or of political
standards to the polemic of instant self-realization. Can these
allegedly politicized therapy and training systems and their theoretical
underpinnings be evaluated by any criteria? Are they in fact dia-
lectical, strictly defined? Or even political? Or even therapy ? Is
there a theory of subjectivity adequate to address all these questions?
What will be the consequences of allying oneself with the spokespersons
of radical /humani sti c therapy and working within their confines without
determining the philosophical and theoretical strains that inform
their work? These questions can only be answered by returning to the
basic theoretical foundations from which a definition of "radical"
as well as of "therapy" may be drawn. It is from within adequately
supported and theoretically comprehensive definitions that a radical
counselor training program must be built.
Where one attempts to build a counseling program for under-
graduates on the foundations of what exists, the foundations begin to
disappear, leaving so many questions unanswered that the very justifi-
ability of this project as an "alternative" education strategy is
called into question. Therefore, let us turn to the original impetus
O
for beginning this program--the students --and look more concretely at
who they are, what they're doing, and what they want, in order that a
program be designed which can have genuinely radical impact for them
and for society.
10
The Students
We, as teachers, are confronting an undergraduate student body
that arrives on the college campus knowing little more than that they
want "to help" people, or perhaps "work with people," and that they
feel unsuited for the more structured professional possibilities in
this area, such as nursing or teaching. Traditionally, this has been
experienced as an altruistic rather than politically-motivated goal,
although that is changing. In recent years, word has filtered back
from the Peace Corps, Vista, volunteer workers, victims of the depressed
economy, that there is little cause for optimism about the chance of
doing any good (or even of getting a job) with merely a traditional
liberal arts education and no graduate degree. Some students decide
immediately to try for graduate school in psychology or social work,
endure an irrelevant undergraduate major (statistics rather than
counseling), and don't find out until they arrive at graduate school
that even there they won't learn much about therapy. Others begin to
search for meaningful undergraduate programs, knowing that they don't
want graduate school, or having heard that their chances of getting
in are often as slim as one in a hundred. These students discover
earlier than those who follow (and those of us who followed) the
graduate route, that there is really no place within the university
to receive clinical training.
They find that what exists is fragmentary and incoherent at
best: a smattering of courses (nowhere developed into unified
curricula) in departments of psychology, sociology, education, human
development, home economics, and political science, all with vague and
11
vaguely competing theoretical orientations and philosophical bases.
As a general rule the social sciences avoid all clinical approaches,
and while schools of education may embrace them, it is invariably from
a non-theoretical vantage point. Even trying to put together a
composite major (at this university through BDIC, Project 10, or
Women's Studies, for example) will not succeed: there simply are not
enough related courses. The fact that no counseling program exists
for such students comes as a startling revelation to them as well as
to some of us, given the enormous student interest, the decreasing
likelihood that they'll get into graduate school, the urgent demand
for practitioners in our increasingly social -service oriented society.
The few of us who are attempting to respond to the demand for
undergraduate courses in this area tend to be housed in departments
of education and human development (rather than in the social sciences).
So far we have adopted mainly human relations/organizational develop-
ment, skills dissemination, or existential counseling approaches, and
the humanistic education or human relations laboratory teaching
g
methods that accompany these approaches. We have believed that we
were responding to students' and society's needs. We have believed
ourselves to be in the vanguard of social action, exploring the
possibility of converting social service to social change.
History cautions against assuming that we were correct. And not
just history: a closer look at the issues reveals too many contra-
dictions and questions brushed aside and ignored. It is still unclear
why, when so many disciplines claim authority over a field, none has
developed it; why no set of categories has been articulated to which
12
any such program would need address itself, nor criteria by which it
-night be evaluated; why no guidelines have been set forth delimiting
the possible areas of internal connection between the various disciplines.
There is no consensus over even the most basic of issues. Is psychology
a physical or social science? Is counseling a legitimate sub-
discipline of psychology? Do the scattered courses offered now
constitute a counseling program, and if they do not, should a program
exist at all? With these issues in dispute it is certainly not clear
why any of us would feel confident to generate allegedly improved
alternatives along with theoretical systems and pedagogical models
to complement them. For now, I will leave aside the crucial question
of the relations between theory and method, or even the order in which
one presumes they come.
Let us hold these questions in abeyance for a moment more while
we follow the path of a student trying to educate herself as a counselor.
In the face of the confusion and frustration resulting from this dearth
of courses and major programs, students will often decide to arrange
internships at nearby social service agencies, or even leave school
entirely for a year to do extended counseling practica at institutions
in larger metropolitan areas. Most of these students will already
have had whatever coursework is available at the university, possibly
a class in personality, one in abnormal psychology, and one in theories
of counseling. Perhaps these students will have had a course or two
in humanistic education, values clarification, an introduction to
humanistic counseling, microcounseling, or a sensitivity training
group. Yet out in the world they feel incompetent, guilt-ridden and
13
overwhelmed. (By and large they intern at some of the more gruesome
institutions— in this area, Northampton State Hospital, the Belchertown
State School, for example-and are rarely placed at the nice, clean,
well-staffed, well-funded agencies that graduate students at least
might have a chance at.) There may be some who will try out a few
humanistic counseling techniques with Spanish-speaking welfare mothers,
chrome schizophrenics, child abusers, retarded, violent, or autistic
children, and these students will come back to the university feeling
enraged as well as guilty and worthless. Until now they have been
discouraged from viewing these feelings and experiences critically—
their anger has been deflected or diffused, their guilt assuaged,
their feelings of incompetence reassured away. In large measure, this
may be due to the enormous difficulty teachers and clinicians have in
facing some of those same feelings. Guilt, for instance, is only too
familiar:
This motif [masochism, self-flagellation, and often near-
schizophrenia] on the part of the 'bourgeois' student
radical has always been constitutive of the life of bourgeois
intellectuals in general and radical intellectuals in
particular, as well as of the New Left. Historically it
has been grounded in conscious or unconscious recognition
that within the division of labor in capitalist society
intellectuals are parasites on the body of the working
class, and this recognition is not without its genuine
and progressive aspects.
Such feelings of guilt are assuaged in the classroom with
humanistic reassurances
,
efforts to bolster students' flagging self-
esteem. They might be told to stop putting themselves down, or that
they have a "pattern" of feeling over-responsible, or that we're all
human beings and we're all in pain. (Some students may, at this point,
14
discover and become involved in Re-evaluation Counseling or Trans-
actional Analysis, both of which are heavily relied on in humanistic
education and values clarification.) Another common teacher response
is to offer more instrumentalistic reassurance, as in the counseling
laboratory method, and treat the issue as one of quantity: more skills,
more techniques, more counseling approaches, larger bodies of
clientele
-families, communities, networks. Alternatively, organiza-
tional development advocates will blame "the system": methods are
offered for improving administrative incompetence, always with
complaints against the bureaucracy, our common enemy-eum-red-herring.
Some teacher/clinicians abjure therapy and personal liberation
altogether: it offers too little, too late, for too few. Therapy
and therapists are seen as elitist, and there is a call for what one
friend has called "downward mobility"--adopting erstwhile blue-collar
ego models, moving out into the factory to work with "the people."
While this appears to students as most radical, it is again only a
superficial reversal, not a genuine negation.
It is a false and alienated overcoming of one's own
alienation as a 'bourgeois' student, and a suppression
of the most original fact about the New Left itself:
that it is not the classical breakaway intellectual
vanguard whose role is to serve the impoverished but a
revolt against capitalist affluence itself, a critique of
capitalist abundance as an abundance of alienation. And
by denying the legitimacy of the critique of his own
existence, the student radical not only recapitulates
his alienation (his 'untrue' existence) at a new level,
but simultaneously suppresses the peculiarly explosive
total critique and demands that arise out of his own
alienated life.H
Finally we must look at the justifiability of their anger over
the inadequacies of their education, both in their trade and in providing
15
a framework in which to understand social problems. They have not
been provided with a comprehensive and unified curriculum; one which
would include a theoretical foundation, carefully supervised practicum
training, and some form of personal exploration that would integrate
with the first two, each playing a specific, rather than inter-
changeable part in the educational process. Nor are there clear-cut
guidelines as regards what their jobs will be, what they will need to
know in order to perform them- In short what a therapist is. Rather
than being helped to understand in a more complex and sophisticated
way the history, meaning, and consequences of a state-supported,
institutional social service system, they have been encouraged to
strive at being better agents of that system, or if they are unsuccessful
at learning to negotiate the system" better, they are advised to
look for another career. Without reference to the fact that it is
"social relations which nourish and poison human relations," 12 it is
implied that human relations training can make a difference in the
social system. They are caught up in, (and not challenged by us in
this regard) an age-old understanding and acceptance of things as
they are:
Yet despite this painful consciousness of the inseparability
of rationalization and the potential for domination, Weber,
and other less sophisticated social theorists have stressed
that there is no alternative and that our collective survival
depends upon the possibilities presented by the extension of
all kinds of purposive rational action systems. This thesis
is too simplistic and one-sided. If we accept it we are led
into a stoic acceptance of the social necessity of separating
political decision from ethics, science from values, and
social theory from the systematic analysis of utopian
possibilities. We are all asked to see 'how much we can
stand,' and admit the 'rational necessity' of the extension
of centralized management strategies to more and more areas
of human life.
I
3
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The conclusion drawn from this approach is "that social problems can
be managed"' 1 and that anger will best serve if placed aside while
we learn new management strategies. This leaves undergraduates, who
will essentially be paraprofessional s , at the mercy of the better-
managers - of-the-future. In the meantime, we encourage students to
learn to build community in the classroom in hopes that someday they
will be allowed to practice what they have learned, when "the system"
becomes more humane. 15
In every regard, then, teachers have been deflecting attention
away from the critical meaning of students' personal experience: their
attention is drawn towards the richness of inner experience, or away
from experience altogether and focused on outer behaviors. These
students have been out in the world, seeing firsthand the contra-
dictions inherent in performing social service work in an unfree
society. The most basic of these are the contradiction between what
they have been taught to do and how much there is to be done, and the
seemingly unbridgeable gap between social service and social change.
This is happening for them at a time when they can still return to the
university and question what they have seen and experienced, can
perhaps find a way to integrate their rage, despair, and helplessness,
while developing their understanding of meaningful work with
individuals (including their own personal work towards liberation),
and politically effective forms of social action. In this regard,
these students are unique--the proletariat of the social service field,
as it were. Those who go on to graduate school experience the "real
world" much later on, and not always as intensely: they have a thicker
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armor of counseling techniques to protect themselves from feeling
overwhelmed or incompetent; often they see the nicer side of
institutions; furthermore, graduate students have gone far enough along
to be invested in their profession in ways that these younger students,
with lower career aspirations, are not.
The end result of all these approaches is the dissipation of the
critical and liberatory possibilities inherent in the defiance (as well
as the naive altruism) of these young student/workers.
The youth rebellion is manufactured but it is also real.
Here as elsewhere the hint and praxis of liberation mixes
with its denial which would alternately sell or crush it.
Youth remains more than the object it is made to be; that’
fashion [popular psychology and pop-psych pedagogy] closes in
indicates the subject is getting restless. . . .
Youth is more than lacking in years; rather its fidelity
to the instincts of life defines the young. 16
As teachers, then, we have a responsibil ity to remain faithful
to the possibilities for liberation within the experiences that students
bring to us. We must find ways to explore those experiences that will
not trivialize in the guise of celebrating them, but will rather
elucidate the political within the personal. We must help them explore
the universal and social causes for joblessness and bureaucracy, for
feelings of guilt and incompetence, for rage and despair. This
responsibility includes a commitment to face the truth of their
incompetence (and our own, if need be) and to delineate the ways in
which faulty and limited education has contributed to that incompetence.
The time for arbitrary defiance, for easy reassurance and warmth,
has passed.
... a concentration upon teaching strategy, method, and
technique, however well meant, is based, first, on
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implicitly demeaning assumptions about students; second oncertain empiri ci st and mechanistic models of mind which liewithin the heart of classical liberal thought; and finally,
„/^ inS“ talistic and theref°re reductionists under-standing of the meaning of human thought.
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umP^i°ns is, in the long run, self-defeatingfor the radical teacher who sees his or her task as the
articulation and defense of a critical theoretical perspective.
Instead, pop-psych pedagogy encourages.
.
. a strained andphoney warmth which some, in moments of bland delusion, call
community. 1 The vision of human liberation which emerges
from the therapeutic classroom is not so much social or
political as it i s i ndi vi dual istic and antisocial although
it appears in the guise of the former. 17
The impact of humanistic education has been more pervasive in
counseling classes than in disciplines where content is at least
separate from the methods used to impart content. In counseling courses,
content and method converge; they both devolve from certain assumptions
about human development which have implications for a theory of
learning and also a theory of social order (beginning, of course, with
the social order in the classroom). The assumptions inherent in
humanistic teaching strategies, as in human relations laboratories,
denigrate students because they presume students' inability to work
hard, to think for themselves about content matter other than their
lives, and to learn except by the "how-to" method.
The effect of these strategies has been most insidious in regard
to the theory of social order they assume and which is inferred in the
classrooms in which they are taught. Since a concern with authoritarian
modes of consciousness and authority relationships is primary in a
psychology which sees itself as political, one of the speciously
appealing aspects of humanistic classrooms and counseling 1 aboratories
,
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is their nonhierarchical structure and non-authoritarian style.
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However, according to an analysis based on distinctions between
coercive and manipulative power, 19 "If it is possible to avoid coercion
within the traditional approach, manipulation is unavoidable within
the pop-psych model." 20
Students are manipulated into glorifying their feelings, when
they might be provided with a framework in which to critically evaluate
their experience, their actions, and the ways in which they are acted
upon. Teachers have frequently adopted 'nice-guy' attitudes, thereby
abrogating our authority; we buy into the pejorative understanding of
authority," and its true meaning--power derived from knowledge and
mastery is lost. We also fail to acknowledge and work with the power
that we do, in fact, wield in the classroom, thereby continuing to
run the risk that we will act from our own unconscious power agendas.
Finally, we do our students a grave disservice if we encourage them
to hold unrealistic expectations for the future. Their 'superiors'
elsewhere will not relate to them in the loving therapist role. Neither
is it safe to confuse love and acceptance with learning and work, and
they will surely find that out the hard way when it comes time to work.
Undergraduates trying to cope with the educational possibilities
at hand want to know what they have to learn in order to be eligible
for which jobs. While it would be easy to buy them off with reassuring
answers, we really have no grounds on which to responsibly assert that
they can be politically effective counselors. We can't even offer
encouragement that they'll find jobs, nor can we speak cogently to the
fact that there aren't any. Surely we have no right to propose that
their incompetence can be eased with a few more skills and some self-
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knowledge; surely it is equally irresponsible (and certainly reductioni-
sts) to imply that clinical work is useless altogether.
In order to come to grips with students' concrete questions and
problems, we must know precisely what clinical expectations we have
of paraprofessionals, and, therefore, to what end we should train them.
To establish a hierarchy of clinicians, we must begin with a base line
definition: what is therapy? From this definition it is possible to
draw distinctions, as well, between problems which are, and are not,
appropriate to therapeutic rather than social/political intervention.
We must avoid such ambiguous philosophical stands as the ones now
offered which assert that therapy either can do everything, or nothing;
that anyone can be a therapist but no one ought to be. Instead, we
must operate from within a comprehensive theory of subjectivity,
consisting of theoretical postulates adequate to the complexity of the
human mind and human behavior. Within such a theory, the therapeutic
relationship and the therapeutic process can be materially, rather
than metaphorically, situated and defined as one agency of healing.
This theory would also generate theoretical conceptions of social
order which could speak materially to the relationship and tensions
between the individual and society, inner and outer, private and
public, formed and unformed. Ultimately, it must address the contra-
dictions between social service and social change, in ways that are
not simplistic and reductionistic (such as asserting that society is
mad and the individual is glorious, especially on acid). From this
foundation, we may also establish significant links between psychology
and social and pedagogical theory.
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Part Two: Psychoanalysis, Feminism,
and Social Theory
Overview
The concerns of feminist theorists have been particularly help-
ful in elucidating the subtle and complex problems which mandate an
interdisciplinary approach to counseling curriculum. The same problems
make it difficult to arrive at an adequate notion of "interdiscipl inary"--
one that would not merely juxtapose areas of inquiry, i.e., be multi-
disciplinary or parallel disciplinary, nor one that would collapse
together the disciplines rather than exploring the manner in which
they interrelate.
On one hand, wide-scale interest in therapy and personal growth
as means to the transformation of women's lives has encouraged a large
number of undergraduate women to seriously consider careers in the
helping professions. Yet, on the other hand, critical interpretations
of the statistics showing an already disproportionate number of women
as consumers or involuntary victims of social services cautions
against an overly optimistic assessment of the value of therapy for
feminist strategies. Interdisciplinary curricula which span psychology,
history, political science, literature and the arts are required to
evaluate and develop the usefulness of counseling and psychotherapy
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for the feminist movement.
Psychology and psychotherapy may thus be seen to represent a
legitimate special interest of Women's Studies. Furthermore, Women's
Studies presents the advantage of already being committed to inter-
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disciplinary education, however ill
-defined at present, and by an
explicitly political rationale. While feminist analysis may have
provoked recognition of the need for an intermingling of political and
psychological disciplines, it has not provided the theoretical links
between the realms of discourse. Good feminism does not necessarily
equate either with good therapy or good teaching. If simple analogy
is not employed, little remains to guide in the working out of a
more intricate and substantive relationship among our areas of concern,
Within this problem what emerges as primary is the failure in
the first place to adequately define feminism. This leaves the field
open to confusion and contradiction when trying to conceptualize the
goals, tasks and limitations of Women's Studies in general, and of a
'feminist psychology' in particular. To speak more abstractly, it is
essential to establish the internal requirements of any given theory
for maintaining its coherence and explanatory power. Failure to grasp
these considerations may lead to arbitrarily synthesizing different
theories; the essence of a theory has then been sacrificed in order to
make it harmonize with a system of explanation fundamentally different
from i ts own
.
A closer look at the relationship between the women's movement
and psychotherapy may shed some light on the roots of the feminist
movement's failure to define itself: the inability to define feminism
is in part due to the fact that one can't define it without reference
to complex psychological constructions. While this might be asserted
of any political movement, it is inescapable in the case of feminism.
It has long since been observed that the oppression of women is
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characterized, if not by their consent, than at least by their
complicity and collusion. (This observation, coupled with citations of
the benefits that accrue to women from their second class status, is
used in conservative camps as proof that women in fact are not op-
pressed at all.) By virtue of this "gentle tyranny," women come to
know, perhaps more acutely than other oppressed groups, that their
movement's viability depends on locating a theory of subjectivity
adequate to account for their complicity. The secondary advantages of
women's collusion can come to be so firmly established that they
cannot be renunciated in favor of the benefits that might be reaped by
an adult woman if she were to give up her role as 'victim.'
The view of human nature sufficiently complex to grasp this
contradiction would have to be a cornerstone of feminist analysis. If
one can sidestep such a building block in other political theories,
the unique psychosocial experience of woman as victim/participator
makes it impossible to do so in developing both a philosophy and a
program for the women's movement. Even those marxists (at least in
this country), who take the view that a theory of subjectivity is the
essential link to understanding and overcoming "false consciousness"
do not, by and large, obtain this knowledge in a concrete, immediate
way: they will not have experienced a breaking through of false
consciousness equal to what almost every woman who comes to feminism
goes through to get there.
This attempt at defining the terms of the research is an early
reflection of the problems attendant upon this project. While Women's
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Studies provides an excellent vehicle for a discussion of the issues,
quickly drawing them into stark relief, it must be pointed out that the
difficulties and contradictions inherent in establishing a feminist
program in counseling are not new: they have beset every attempt to
bring together the theories or action strategies of politics and
psychology. Political theory attempts to answer general questions
about society as a whole, whereas psychology would seem to mount
theories that can answer questions only about individual persons:
history vs. autobiography, as it were. All attempts at synthesizing
the two approaches are doomed to failure because epistemologically
they are altogether different. If one insists on bringing them to-
gether, the result will be a collapse of categories, oversimplification,
reductioni sm. These problems have plagued even those theorists who
are aware of them. The further complication that feminism is not a
clearly defined political movement, such as marxism, proves to be both
a hindrance and a help. The failure to arrive at a viable definition
helps to confirm what it is that psychology must offer to the women's
movement: a theory which can speak to both the universal and
particular dilemmas of women; which has an internal logic that will in
the first place draw distinctions between these two categories, and
will show the manner of their mutual influence.
Thus I will aim toward conceptual clarification of the relation-
ship between feminist theory, psychology, and pedagogical strategy
(with emphasis on notions of pedagogical responsibility). This effort
at clarification is set within the broader context of social theory
and social action generally conceived— it is not limited to feminism
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and/or education. It is a primary aim of this dissertation to outline
the contours of a theory of human nature which speaks to all these
issues.
O o
At minimum, such a theory must 1) address the nature of
human thought . What is the relation between thought and action? How
do we assess motives and intentions? Are there motives other than
conscious ones? What factors in development can impoverish or enhance
the capacities of thought and judgment? 2) offer some conception of
mind/body relationship
. What are the effects on mental development,
in particular on ego development, of identity being forged within a
physical framework? 3) provide a catalog of human needs . Are there
true and false needs? Is this a question that we can or would want
to legislate, i.e., should we legitimate some needs and not others?
Can we make meaningful statements about what we owe to one another
based on what we need from each other? 4) delineate the relationship
between a person and her social world . Is there such a thing as the
autonomous individual? Are there limits to personal freedom?
5) locate mental illness within psychologically or sociologically
"normal 11 society
,
and by extension, establish guidelines for the ethical
stance of students of the human mind and of mental healers in relation
to their subjects/patients and to society at large.
One can address these questions from a variety of philosophical
vantage points.. (It is also, of course, possible to begin with a
preferred political gameplan and create a theory of human nature
which will justify it, or vice versa.) In the classical liberal view-
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point (characterized by an empiricist theory of mind and presupposing
a radical mind/body split), persons are seen as empty vessels through
which experiences and perceptions are filtered by the mind. Given
proper nourishment the person will flower and develop; the potential
of the human mind, easily equated with soul, spirit, essence, is un-
limited and benign. In opposition, there are a variety of mechanistic
view points, for example vulgar marxism and behavioral ism, which
again view human beings as passive reflectors of external phenomena,
but with a more pessimistic bent—persons are totally constituted by
that which acts upon them, they will not flower, they will simply be
as they are made. Neither of these approaches provides a persuasive
explanation of the enormous destructiveness that pervades human re-
lations or sometimes pervades an individual's internal existence.
Neither mounts a theory of consciousness—including the relation of
thought to action—which can sustain a genuine notion of "conscious-
ness raising." The classical and behavioralist theories are each
unidirectional: the environment is responsible for individual and
social ills. Psychoanalysis depicts persons as active agents who
transform as well as are transformed by their social world; as
possessing a consciousness governed by unconscious motivation and
conflict and therefore capable of transcending (in the Hegelian
sense) its history. The liberal and mechanistic points of view are to
be rejected precisely because they fail to answer the most pressing
questions asked by social theorists; worse, their structure precludes
the asking of those questions.
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In constructing a feminist therapeutic or pedagogy we must always
be asking what is required to free women from their internalized
oppression. What, in the words of Abigail Rosenthal, would lead to
breaking woman's long "silence"--a silence she defines as "not the
absence of reactive noise, but rather the absence of a serious dis-
course, employing a critical method, which would work to determine the
presuppositions and constituents of women's suppression, in order to
lift from them that suppression." In this context, feminist scholar-
ship must encompass a range of disciplines whose interconnections are
perceived at a profoundly political depth, broad enough to break
silence. A theory of human nature and of psychic change adequate to
account for the manner in which emancipatory action occurs in the
classroom, in the therapy session, and in the streets, has thus far
eluded feminist thinkers.
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Psychoanalysis, which avoids these oversimplifications and
sees the mind as a complex locus of conflicting forces, sees mental
processes and in the end personality as the result of conflict between
psychological and objective reality, sustains a framework in which
one can attempt to explain that which the liberal and mechanistic
viewpoints erroneously take for granted: the human subject. It is
inherent in the content and method of psychoanalysis to frame one's
hypotheses, and to focus one's research through a movement from the
particular to the universal; each individual's development is seen as
shaped through the interaction of those categories.
Nowhere is that clearer than in Freud's metapsychology
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which attempts to ground the psyche in the conditions of material
existence; to give meaninq and substance to the psychoanalytic premise
that conflict- the disjunction between mental perceptions of internal
need and external reality— is central to the development of not only
human mental capacities but also human morality.
Psychoanalysis, the Freudian Feminists, and Critical Theory
Presenting psychoanalysis as a potentially radical theory of
human nature, one amenable to revolutionary political theory, is hardly
a new venture. In recent years a handful of women writers have turned
to Freud for a theory of subjectivity which would support their feminist
social analysis. Juliet Mitchell ( Psychoanalysis and Feminism ) and
Ann Foreman ( Femininity as Alienation: Women and the Family in Marxism
and Psychoanalysis ) share a Marxist background with the critical
theorists whose work is discussed below, and their efforts are plagued
by similar problems; the usefulness of Mitchell's work for defining the
terms of my own is further complicated by her Lacanian bias. Dorothy
Dinnerstein ( The Mermaid and the Minotaur ) and Nancy Chodorow (The
Reproduction of Mothering ) have used psychoanalytic theory as a basis
for exploring the social and psychological consequences of unilateral
female parenting. Dinnerstein 's work, however, ultimately attempts to
'correct' Freudian theory by supplementing it with the existential per-
/
spective of Simone de Beauvoir and the utopian vision of Norman 0.
Brown, viewpoints which are essentially incompatible with Freud's.
Chodorow, on the other hand, attempts to improve on Freud's notion of
psychosexual development through the addition of object relations theory,
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which she fails to grasp as being riddled by the same conceptual
-and
therefore political — flaws as other NeoFreudian approaches. All of
these women theorists have, in effect, succumbed to the same weakening
of the psychoanalytic approach that was so cogently critiqued in the
first place by Freud and later by the critical theorists. The end
result of their work is an evisceration of the theory of the un-
conscious mind.
The most fully developed appropriation of psychoanalysis for
the purposes of social theory was undertaken by the critical theorists
of the Frankfurt school, as well as other less easily categorizable
marxists such as Wilhelm Reich and Otto Fenichel
.
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Though there
are significant differences in their work, these writers share the
heritage of dialectical analysis, as created by Hegel and modified
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by Marx for the purposes of his materialist political theory. They
have mounted an argument sufficiently comprehensive and articulate
that it need not be re-argued here. I would like merely to point out
some of the essential affinities between psychoanalysis and this
school of social thought, as dialectical critique remains significant
within my own framework despite the serious divergences outlined below.
What psychoanalytic and dialectical methodology hold in common
is the process of demystification. In contrast with positivist
methodology which works only with surface, observable data, they
describe human experience as embedded in disjunctions between varying
levels of reality which are held in relation to each other through
dynamic tension. The ultimate task of critical thought is to arrive
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at the reality beneath appearances, to interpret what is visible in
terms of its deepest causative factors; to articulate that which was
silent, to unearth hidden connections between apparently disparate
elements. Hegel and Freud share a further bond in the belief that the
search for self-knowledge must be intimately tied to the search for
objective real i ty--indeed it is its most important aspect. One can
only locate truth in the objective world through the arduous search
for the truth about oneself. Rosenthal ties this to feminism--by
implication to feminist therapy and feminist pedagogy--when she states
If Hegel is right where he argues that wisdom, philosophy's
object, may be understood to lie in human self-knowledge,
then it. will follow that love of wisdom—or the philosophic
eros--will provide the radical motive for the liberation of
women that we have been seeking. Women are henceforth seen
not as exceptional cases to whom revocable favors may
occasionally be granted, but as occupying a sector of silence
within a humanity whose freedom to know itself may be
recognized wherever it extends its ability to break such
silences. In his institutionalized repressions, man [sic]
becomes incomprehensible to himself.
. .
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Despite this affinity, however, dialectical methodology as
applied to the uses of psychology and psychotherapy has resulted in
problems and limitations which I am reluctant to inherit. It would
be distracting to go into a detailed exposition of these problems at
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this point; for now it must suffice to flag the broad categories
of error which have dead-ended this line of inquiry. It might be
argued that these are ultimately pitfalls of the modern theorists,
and not difficulties inherent in an application of dialectical thought
to psychological theory. If so, we might expect that the hypotheses
ultimately put forth from a "purely" psychological perspective would
in the end prove to be dialectical. However, rescuing the dialectic
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from all of its theorists since Hegel in order to apply it freshly
to questions of psychological theory would be a monumental task, one
far beyond the scope of this project. What is important is to develop
a psychology which, through its own internal logic, meets the criteria
of the dialectical stance-whether that theory is cast in Hegel's or
Marx's terminology or not. Indeed, it is a major contention here
that psychoanalysis can stand on its own in fulfilling those epistemo-
logical requirements, without being recast in the terminology-or the
jargon--of critical theory.
The dialectic as applied by critical theorists to psychoanalysis
has resulted in historicizing psychological concepts which are by
definition trans-historical
,
(for example, Marcuse's misconstruction
of the reality principle). In other words, critical theorists have
often particularized universal aspects of human experience in order
to make them remediable. Not only does this remove the foundations of
the theory thereby collapsing whole portions of it, but also dissolves
the central human conflicts on which the dynamic theory of mind rests.
If these conflicts are not universal, then the explanation that psycho-
analysis offers for how the psyche as we know it has come into being
is no longer to the point. This is a methodological as well as a
substantive issue— it entails denying the relation of universal to
particular explanations within analytic theory. This denial must take
place in order to make Freud harmonize with a socialist view of society
in which there is eventual freedom from material want. To maintain such
a viewpoint it is necessary to reject the immutability of current
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'reality.' In the process, the distinction between external reality
and psychological reality is lost. Regardless of the specifics of any
social order, each human being must learn to distinguish between an
external, objective and an internal, fantasy world. That learning can
take place only within the context of his or her primary caretakers,
the most important features— in some respects the only relevant
features—of the external world. In the struggle to master the
distinction between inner and outer, between self and other, to give
up the illusion that there is only self, the capacity arises for
thought and for social relatedness.
If one grasps the psychoanalytic meaning of the reality principle,
then a further set of limitations is imposed on the historical malle-
ability of objective reality: there are facets of our external world
which, though they may not be absolutely fixed, must be seen as
universal in that we cannot imagine them not being so and humans still
growing up human. For example, the nuclear family in its varying
manifestations may be an historical rather than a universal response
to certain human needs, but the infant, due to relative neonatal
immaturity and a protracted maturational process, will always require
extended parenting. It is not possible within the framework of
"dialectically orthodox" psychoanalysis to undo the fundamental internal
conflicts set before each child; there are broad categories of conflict
between the child and the world that can perhaps be meliorated, but
can not be dissolved. This has often been brushed aside by theorists
who seek a somewhat more utopian vision of the future; who believe
that a reduction of want, whether material or sexual, can soften the
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essentially conflictual nature of human experience. Psychoanalysis
asserts, depends upon, the consideration that these conflicts are not
only inevitable, they are central building blocks of the psyche that
we recognize as peculiarly human. To underestimate them is to once
again underestimate the force of the psychical qualities which can
undermine the human community.
The second major difficulty in critical theorists' appropriation
of Freudian theory is that it includes a reductionistic view of the
psychoanalytic treatment process, one which enables the method to be
seen as distinct from, and therefore dispensible to the theory. This
distinction is drawn partly in order to jettison therapy, which,
because of its 'adaptational 1 and 'conformist' potential, is viewed
as something of an embarrassment.
Yet psychoanalysis is defined simultaneously as a cure for
neurosis, a research methodology into unconscious processes, and a
set of hypotheses regarding mental functioning. Once the significance
of the link between theory and therapy is apprehended, it becomes
clear that if the theory is in any sense revolutionary
,
then its
method must reflect some aspect of this radical nature. The link
implied here has nothing to do with Third Force psychology's tendency
to equate individual with general, social improvement, nor with the
Neoanalytic tendency to deny the conformism that can lurk behind
cultural or environmentalist interpretations . I am alluding, rather,
to the psychoanalytic move toward uncovered communication: the breaking
of silence described above by Rosenthal. The relation between theory
and therapy is neither simple identity nor is it utter disjunction;
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critical theory's reduction ism-which must amount in the end to
revisionism— is not preferable to that which it critiques.
Two interrelated problems result from this erroneous assessment
of the theory/therapy matrix. First, it is assumed that therapy is
completely apolitical, and second, that therefore, the varieties of
therapeutic experience are, for the purposes of social theory and
social action, more or less interchangeable. Yet because that which is
political in psychoanalysis is embedded in its method, there is indeed
a political "moment" in the analytic process, and it is one that does
not inhere in other forms of treatment.
Russell Jacoby has stated that while psychological theory may
have important implications for political activity, therapy is
apolitical. The conclusion he draws, therefore, is that it is
irrelevant what form of therapy one chooses. "Individual therapy must
necessarily forget the whole so as to aid its victim; how exactly it
does that is, in part
,
irrelevant .
"
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Elsewhere 32 Jacoby draws an
analogy between the political aspects of medical practice and those
of psychotherapy. He states that a doctor would, of necessity, treat
the victim of a car accident, and that the treatment would be
apolitical. One would not suggest that the doctor ignore the victim's
wound and instead urge him or her to go demonstrate against the American
automotive, oil, highway construction, and alcoholic beverage industries.
However, Jacoby's analogy is simplistic, for medical treatment and
psychotherapy are hardly parallel processes. Since analysis works with
changes in consciousness, as well as with the relationship of
consciousness to action, its accomplishments go far deeper than merely
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curing physical symptoms. Moreover, the relationship of therapist
to patient is much more complex than that of medical doctor to patient.
The doctor could give the patient some literature on the social factors
involved in destruction on the roads, in addition to setting a broken
limb if he or she chose to. Though a patient might, in the course of
psychoanalysis, make some of those connections, the analyst could
never explicitly offer them; the odds are less good that it will
happen, but if it does it will have entailed a more profound structural
change in the consciousness of the patient.
The role that self-knowledge plays in psychoanalysis is
unique precisely because of its notions of unconscious mental processes--
one expects to discover a different set of hidden facts about oneself,
undertakes the search with a different set of risks, and attains that
self knowledge only through a somewhat extensive restructuring of one's
psyche. That is to say, one comes out of a 'successful' analysis
valuing the deepest kind of self-knowledge. And though there is no
way to legitimately influence any other values a patient may have,
radical or otherwise, though there is no way to influence whether
'political' contingencies will be drawn into the scope of the quest for
truth, to value self-knowledge in the way one does in analysis will
always hold the possibility of revolutionary, critical thinking.
The radical content of psychoanalysis emerges through its
hypotheses of the unconscious mind. The unconscious is accessible
only through the techniques of psychoanalysis, particularly through
the transference, which in turn depends for its emergence and resolution
on the tools of free association and interpretation. It is the inter-
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pretive method which both demystifies appearances and also unearths
new information-making the process both treatment and research-with
which to widen our theories of the human mind.
The method is elegant in its simplicity. The analyst remains
largely anonymous and the situation offers as little stimulation as
possible. Whatever thoughts, feelings, and behaviors arise therefore,
particularly fantasies and actions in relation to the analyst, can be
attributed to past experience and internal psychic material. Archaic
infantile conflicts, sexual and relational, literally come to life in
the transference relationship; the analysand relives his or her
original neurotic conflict in the passionate but ambivalent relationship
to the analyst. Impulses, feelings, fantasies are "transferred" to
the analyst, who does not engage or "gratify" them, but rather insists
that the analysand appropriate them as his or her own internal
psychic history. It is the task of the analyst to interpret the un-
conscious material which emerges in the patient's free associations
and behavior in the analytic setting. Theoretically
,
interpretation
is possible only after the most arduous work, pursuing free associations
and resistances (unconscious efforts to block the treatment, primarily
efforts to be gratified within, rather than to scrutinize and resolve
the transference relationship) until they yield their deep unconscious
determinants.
The presumption is that as the patient becomes aware of this
previously unconscious material it will cease to govern his or her be-
havior and internal experience. As neurotic conflicts are resolved, the
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analysand will have an expanded sense of autonomy and Increased energy
to devote to 'productive' activities.
It is precisely because psychoanalysis places such a high premium
on autonomy, because influence is so explicitly ruled out, that its
political content holds a place in the education of counselors. That
is, if it must remain solely up to the patient whether or not the
treatment abuts on political realities, then it is all the more im-
portant that the therapist create her own political framework within
the therapeutic process. This can be done if the therapist views the
process as part of an ongoing research endeavor, one that will build
our eventual understanding of the components of critical thinking. It
goes without saying that this attitude on the part of the therapist will
in turn have a bearing on the course of the therapy for the patient.
The point here, however, is not to create a political experience for
the patient but rather to remove from the patient the burden of making
a political experience happen for the therapist. This is done by
creating a viable political context for the professional, independent
of the patient s insights and changes. In this task, other treatment
processes will not substitute for psychoanalysis, which "stands more in
awe of the unconscious ," and thereby becomes research as well as
treatment.
While these quarrels with critical theorists' assessment of
psychotherapy may seem minor by comparison with the acuteness of their
theoretical work on thevalueof psychology for political theory and
their superb critique of revisionist schools of psychology, it must be
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remembered that mine is a project intimately concerned with the treat-
ment process-even though I do not purport to train undergraduates as
counselors or therapists, (obviously not analysts), but rather to assess
what it is that one must begin to study in order to work in the mental
health professions. Ultimately, neither critical theorists nor recent
Freudian feminists offer a model on which to base a collaboration
between political theory and psychoanalysis, since humanistic therapy
and alternative education fail in the first place to mount a serious
social critique. Thus I am left with many questions, some initial
guidelines, and yet not a clear theoretical framework by which to
"operationalize" the terminology of the research. What language can
be used to define feminism. Women's Studies, interdisci pi inary,
'political psychology'? Though I believe that the language of psycho-
analysis can suffice to elucidate these terms, I am faced with the
contradiction that the women's movement by and large has made Freud
its arch villain. Furthermore, the existence of feminist therapy
would seem to argue that there is already a model on which to base a
Women's Studies counseling program, and that it is possible to proceed
directly with curriculum development. Before going on to explore the
basis on which to build a collaboration between psychoanalysis and
feminist scholarship, therefore, I will first attempt to assess
whether feminist therapy has managed to avoid those problems in
politics/psychology 'synthesis' raised in this chapter. Have feminist
therapists paid too high a price in terms of the quality of their theory and
the viability of their therapy, for explicitly blending thei r pol itical and
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psychological perspectives? Does the advance over Freudian theory
and method that they purport to represent really constitute a radical
political and psychological venture?
CHAPTER II
FEMINIST THERAPY: A CRITICAL REVIEW
Overview
Feminist therapy adds the explicit political edge that the
humanistic therapies lack. Juxtaposing political and psychological
terms in the naming of the venture makes it, by definition, a
direct attempt at a synthesis of the two disciplines. This termino-
logical device again derives, no doubt, from the New Left's 'politics
of the unpolitical' and again the heritage is not specifically
acknowledged. Such historical amnesia represents the loss of intellect-
ual links to a more complex and dynamic political theory. Here, for
instance, in their own assessment of feminist therapy's eclecticism,
the blandness of the approach is self evident.
The ways in which we interact are consistent with the
philosophy of many radical and humanist therapists. Like
radical therapists, we advocate an intensive examination
by the therapist of her own value system so that she can
facilitate change rather than adjustment to existing
societal norms... As humanism espouses, both therapist and
client are individuals struggling to become self-actualiz-
ing. As radical therapists have noted, both therapist
and client labor under the same constricting political
and social system which hinders the full development of the
individual as a free agent. Feminist therapy goes a step
further in its detailed analysis of the effect of sex-
role stereotypes on women's growth. It also seeks to
facilitate awareness.of and expansion beyond those extern-
al ly imposed 1 imits
J
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The theory behind feminist therapy is vague and confusing;
very little is written,2 what's in print is theoretically weak, and
there is little agreement among the authors.
However, despite this evidence that something referred
to as feminist therapy exists (at least to the extent
that there are women who label themselves as feminist
therapists and their work as feminist therapy), discussion
of what feminist therapy is and of what feminist therapists
do in practice is absent from the literature, particu-
larly from academic and professional journals.
3
The most general statement that might be made is that the
theory and practice are organized around principles of sisterhood.
There is not, unfortunately, an agreed upon definition for the cluster
of concepts designated by that term, nor do feminist therapists spell
out details of applying sisterhood to psychology.
Whether an individual was a feminist who learned to
conduct therapy or a therapist who identified with
feminism, her feminist beliefs had an impact on her thera-
peutic orientation, and vice versa. In short, a meshing
took place whereby feminism and therapy no longer existed
as discrete parts of the individual's life but became
integrated into feminist therapy.
Perhaps the first problem here is the variety of meanings
attributed to feminism, and the fact that feminist therapists rarely
make explicit which school of thought they are drawing on. They
seem not to realize that one's political and philosophical orientation
will have drastic consequences for the questions which a theory will
be challenged to answer, the methodology which will be deemed approp-
riate for locating answers, and the establishing of goals for psycho-
therapy.
Broadly considered, one can distinguish three separate branches
of feminist literature. 5 The first, drawn from classical liberal
_
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theory, sees society as basically sound and attempts to extend human-
istic values to include women. Socialist feminism, on the other hand,
locates the problematic status of women within the 'larger' context
of capitalist relations of production. In the tradition of Engels
,
6
first priority is given to an assault on the relations of production
under the assumption that changes in women's predicament will auto-
matically follow
.
7 Lastly, there is radical feminism, which views
all of society's problems as resulting from institutionalized
patriarchy. In other words, all social ills can ultimately be reduced
to a question of the relations between the sexes and the lower status
of women. Radical feminism does not have a clear cut link to an
established political theory and draws frequently on interpretive
anthropological evidence. There are minor divergences among the
theorists in any given classification, as well as frequent overlaps;
nonetheless these three represent the basic philosophical orientations
prevalent among American feminists today.
Feminism and Psychotherapy: Theoretical Considerations
If we define feminism as the need to combat sex-role stereo-
typing, then we have already made certain assumptions about society
and its relation to the individual. In order to take a feminist
stand bounded largely by the struggle against sex-role discrimination
and in favor of equal rights for women, we must presume that society
is basically all right but that women deserve a larger piece of the
pie. Therapy becomes the process by which they achieve the "self-
image" and the skills, for instance assertiveness training and sex-
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uality workshops, requisite to taking their fair share. If feminism
is defined as the need to alter the relations of production, then
consciousness raising as to one's role in society becomes predominant
in the therapeutic process - again with an eye to developing action-
oriented skills. A radical feminist approach would follow a similar
line except that consciousness raising would be focused more directly
on the oppressed position of women. Despite the fact that these
latter two seem to mount a more serious social critique, they are
finally more utopian than materialist; both espouse the possibility
of a harmonious, conflict-free social order.
If our definition of feminism includes a drastic transforma-
tion of the quality of society and the individual's experience with-
in society -- not just a partial redistribution of assets, nor a
rearranging of jobs that may cover over the same old relationships
between men and women, nor a simple reversal of the positions so that
women are empowered and men disenfranchised-^then the therapeutic
stance becomes far more problematic.
The original impetus behind introducing a psychological per-
spective to social theory was that the marxist predictions for the
development of revol utionary consciousness had failed to materialize
.
8
Marx had not adequately come to grips with the subjective components
of revolution -- he believed that purely external events would bring
about the dissolution of "false consciousness." To now adopt a
psychological vantage point in which external events are once again
placed at the center and deemed sufficient to restructure political
*
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consciousness, is to return to the political naivete that preceded
the failed European revolutions of the early part of this century.
Why believe that consciousness raising will do when its called therapy
what it couldn't do under its own aegis?
Psychologically this represents a return to the preFreudian
vision of the mind wherein all mental phenomena are equated with
that which is conscious. It presumes at best a descriptive rather
than dynamic theory of the unconscious. If consciousness raising
techniques are adequate to bring an idea into consciousness, then it
cannot have been repressed. It may have been out of the line of at-
tention, but not altogether out of mind. Furthermore, there is no
theoretical explication of the ways in which consciousness raising
might lead to deeper, characterological change. The entire problem
is perceived as one of information, which Freud repeatedly demon-
strates in his distinction between a descriptive and a dynamic
theory of mind, begs the question entirely: internal, psychic conflict
actively prevents repressed ideas from attaining consciousness
.
9
If one accepts the necessity of exploring the unconscious as
a correlate of the structural changes that might lead to revolution-
ary consciousness, or to a level of characterological integration
sufficient to undertake large scale, urgent social tasks and to build
productive working communities, a therapeutic posture becomes far
more elusive. The extent of the regression that may occur in the
course of bringing one's psychological past into consciousness mandates
a far more careful definition of the authority relationship that
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develops in therapy. The capacities for responsible judgment, coun-
ted political activity, membership in a social community, become linked
to the development of an autonomy which cannot simply be given over
by a therapist but must be discovered and, in a sense, earned through
the resolution of the relationship with the therapist. It is a mean
circle of logic, but a paradox which can be wished away only at great
cost. The only route to autonomy is to allow the patient to discover
herself; once you create strict boundaries, there is no way to
guarantee that the patient will come to espouse your political view
of the world, or for that matter, any view which might be described
as 'political.'
Feminist critics discovered that therapy is a value-laden
process by exposing the anti-woman bias frequently embedded in the
work of traditional therapists. We are in a position, therefore, to
work openly with those values and challenge them. But may we not
still be promulgating a complex network of our own unexamined values
that represents the fabric of society? Feminists have a tendency to
extricate themselves from society at large--it is manmade, not their
responsibility nor reflective of who women are. However that is a
naive conception, all the more so for clinicians. Where our values
coincide with society's, or with our patients', we don't notice our-
selves as value-influenced and don't see ourselves as influencing
the therapy. It is only when we come to see ourselves as at odds with
societal values that we begin to question the role of the therapist's
cultural presumptions in her work. When a feminist patient seeks out a
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feminist therapist, there is no such disjunction to provoke scrutiny.
If a therapist's value system is not identical with society's and/or
with her non-feminist patient's, how does she make her point about
that and still allow full room for the development of autonomy? This
is a particularly sensitive judgment, since the therapist always, to
a certain degree, stands back from the patient's own assessment of
what's wrong. (Regardless of egalitarian rhetoric in the more radi-
cal therapies, all therapists at minimum presume that the patient
doesn't know, at least at first, what's wrong.)
All therapists need and use some theoretical model to help
tnem diagnose and treat their patients, and no theoreti-
cal model accepts the patient's definition of her problems
as ultimately correct. Over and over again patients ask
therapists to help them never to be angry, to be satis-
fied in self-restricting jobs, and to end their headaches
and depression without disturbing their repressed anger. 10
In actuality, it is impossible to build a counseling program
based on feminist therapy -- there are as many versions of feminist
therapy as there are feminist therapists. I have heard informal
definitions that range from 1) a woman therapist who likes women to
2) one whose awareness of feminist issues indirectly affects her ther-
apeutic stance in sessions; 3) one who builds therapeutic interven-
tions around feminist political analysis; 4) one who adheres to and
promulgates a strict political line in session. The mistake is that
while we might mistakenly support this eclecticism in the name of
sisterhood and believe that they are all feminism, we cannot possibly
assert that they are all therapy. What remains to be established,
here as elsewhere, are the internal links between one's political
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7S a "d °ne ' S ° f *• "*« of psychology and psycho-therapy.
What all of these versions of feminist thera Py share in corcnon,
aS1 6 ambiguous commitment to sisterhood, is that they have
defined themselves in opposition to that which exists, that is, in
terms of what they are not. The danger, and in this case not an idle
danger, is that the move to a simple opposite leaves untouched the
less exposed sources of oppression.
Feminist therapy begins with a critique of current practices
in professional psychology and a looser critique of the current state
of psychology as a science. What's usually attacked is psychoanalysis
though distinctions are not generally made between Freudian and
nonFreudian schools. It is assumed that all bad therapy, whether
done by psychiatrists, psychologists, or counselors is Freudian. A
usual list of charges^ covers statistics on the disproportionate
number of women in treatment, and the reverse disproportion of women
professionals; the equation of healthy male with healthy adult charac-
teristics and healthy female with pathological or at least undesirable
characteristics (i.e., sex-role bias in mental health assessment and
diagnosis); the replication of societal disenfranchisement in the one-
down position of the therapeutic situation; failure to address the
real life crises that typically face women, emergency or develop-
mental, for example divorce, rape, postpartum depression, menopause,
or "empty nest" syndrome.
Feminist therapy sets about correcting and/or never committing
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these sins; that is its starting point and its foundation.
The critical vantage point adopted is that "The question for
social workers in direct practice with women is how to apply the
conviction that cultural conditioning accounts for the dilemmas of
many women clients ." 12 Radical therapy takes up a position essenti-
ally identical with this:
First, we believe that people are good, and that left
alone in a nurturing environment they will develop in
a positive and life-promoting way. They can live in
harmony and well-being with themselves, each other,
and the earth. . .
Second, we believe that people feel bad because they are
oppressed by forces outside themselves. , P
Because "It was begun, in short, out of attempts to make it different
from something rather than attempts to create something in and of
itself," 1 ^ what you have is a theoretical void in psychology filled
in by a side array of therapeutic techniques developed from a cultural
critique which has nothing substanti ve to say about the human mind.
To look again at the radical therapy program
...the source of people's unhappiness is relationships
of unequal power and resultant oppressive social condi-
tions . 1 5
When people feel bad, they come to believe that there is
something basically wrong with themselves and with life.
We call this feeling al ienation . 1 6
There is no recognition of the fact that such terms as "power"
and "alienation" are not psychological categories. This becomes clear-
er as radical therapy tries to explicate its own terms. The psyche
and its processes of change and development are reduced to formulas
which have no internal, private meaning. "Opppression plus lies plus
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isolation equals alienation." "Action plus awareness plus contact
equals liberation." Contact is defined as protection and support. 17
Furthermore, the existence of feminist therapy dangerously
obscures the roots of the problem it is trying to redress. It creates
the illusion that feminist scholarship has made a contribution to the
fields of psychology and psychotherapy and that they in turn have
influenced the development of feminism. We are forced to admit that
because only a political critique is offered -- and a weak one at
that — in the end nei ther a' pol i tical nor a psychological critique
has been mounted; the contributions that might be made are lost.
None of these characteristics [of feminist therapy]
taken individually distinguishes feminist therapy
from all other schools, but the constellation ap-
parently is either unique enough, or perceived as
unique enough, to have created a demand. 18
What is most unfortunate is the belief on the part of feminist thera-
pists that the demand is being filled. Because feminist therapy can-
not distinguish between different kinds of psychological theories, it
cannot engage in the endeavor of theory-building which must be seen
as one of the crucial tasks of a feminist psychology.
How does it happen and what are the consequences of develop-
ing a school of therapy without reference to a psychology, a theory
of human mind? Firstly, it must be remembered that what psychology
has come to represent is a science not so much of mind but of behaviors.
While radical therapy eschews any form of psychological explanation
as basically extraneous if not counterrevol utionary
,
liberal feminist
therapists maintain loose connections to what may be informally termed
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feminist psychology,' and is generally referred to as "psychology
of women." The hard science split between clinical and research
psychology is thereby perpetuated, despite the fact that revolution
in psychology can only be made by bringing clinical evidence back
into research.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a full review
or critique of the "psychology of women" studies.^ In part this is
because, as stated, they have only peripherally been incorporated into
the literature and practice of feminist therapy. Beyond that, the
term and the endeavors it represents are riddled with conceptual con-
tradictions;
a straightforward review must stay within (and thus
to some extent affirm) the conceptual confines of an
existing research tradition. (Methodological inadequa-
cies of individual studies or inconsistencies among the
results of several investigations may be noted, of course,
but the underlying conceptual framework, as reflected
in the formulation of problems and operationalization
of terms, remains fundamentally unchallenged.)^
Thus the problems in a hard science approach*^ -- problems
which are not neutral but rather have a political meaning of their own
— go unchallenged by the "psychology of women" research. This involves
a theoretical regression to preFreudian epistemological formulations
and to social theory as not yet influenced by Marx and the critical
theorists.
More significantly, the "psychology of women" enterprise is
compromised in its very essence. Earlier in the same essay Parlee
states
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a conceptual monstrosity.
. . because it implies the
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3WS and theories to accountt e behavior and experience of females. (That itis the presumable "special" nature of the laws and
theories and not the subject matter which prompts thepsychology of women" designation is suggested by the
absence of a subfield on the "psychology of rats").
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Feminist therapy is only vaguely connected to a psychological theory,
and at that, one which is plagued by conceptual flaws, an approach
long since abandoned by radical social theorists for its conservative
political thrust.
Taken in sum this lack of theory, combined with a philosophy
of human nature based on environmental rather than intrapsychic fact-
ors, is most insidious for the therapeutic it engenders.
If a theoretical orientation to therapy is defined in
the traditional sense as encompassing a series of pro-
positions and techniques, a model for problem assess-
ment, and a training methodology, it may be concluded.
. .
that feminist therapy as such does not exist. . . . This
suggests that feminist therapy must be understood more
as part of a social movement than as a type of psycho-
therapy and less as a theoretical orientation in the
traditional sense than as a belief system and a number
of ways in which the system is put into practice. 23
The void created by the omission of a psychological theory is filled
by philosophy and social theory; philosophy becomes more important
than therapy. "... the techniques ultimately chosen by the feminist
therapist are less important to her than the shift in values that was
24
engendered by her feminist beliefs." It becomes clear that the stance
in which one believes that feminist therapy can be anything is really
one in which one believes that feminist therapy can be therapy at all;
in which, ideally, the phenomenon of therapy disappears and there are
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only politically correct belief systems for troubled persons.
The eclecticism that results from this liberal view is, if
anything, the reverse of liberatory. It is not merely a dilution of
the critical force of psychology and individual change, it represents
its complete annihilation, not least within the academy. In the sur-
vey of feminist therapists cited above
33 different orientations were listed. Twenty-four of
these (74 percent) can be characterized as newly develop-
ing and non-traditional in nature.... .a significant number
of respondents did not make use of formal academic train-
ing in traditional fields such as psychology and social
work to learn therapy. D
The Feminist Counseling Collective cited above as placing themselves
in the traditions of both humanistic and radical therapy announces,
"We use tools from Gestalt, transactional analysis, bioenergetics,
parent effectiveness training, sensory awareness, moving family sculp-
ture, role playing, and movement therapy."
The mistaken equation between variety or quantity and quality
extends beyond modes of therapy to the concept of therapy itself,
which ceases to have reasonable limits and boundaries.
Feminist therapy can be seen as the making of connec-
tions on many level s--connections between feminism and
therapy, between one woman and all women, between one's
personal problems and one's social awareness, between
one's beliefs and what one does, and between what one
does in therapy and how one lives one's life. Thus un-
like most forms of therapy, feminist therapy is not mere-
ly a means to be used from time to time to alleviate
stress but a way of life for the therapist and, potentially ,
for the cl ient as wel 1
.
Therapy becomes normalized and is
connected to rather than divided from everyday life. 7
[italics mine]
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This expansiveness has a most pernicious effect on the critique
mounted by feminist therapy of the conditions of women's lives. One
finds feminist therapists celebrating for the newly liberated woman
that which lies at the core of women's oppression. Here the Feminist
Counseling Collective offers its groundplan for what they call the
new "feminist ego ideal":
The new woman is centered in herself and can fulfill her
own individual needs, yet remains aware of the needs of
those she loves. She accepts the full range of emotions
trom love to anger and can express them directly, if
appropriate, or sift them through her rational thinking
process to choose which ones to express. She can act
without embarrassment at her own initiative and aggression.
. . . Hopefully the new woman will realize that her own
interdependence with others extends to community and
political involvement as a necessary part of being a full,
responsible adult. ...
The new woman is proud of her body and the natural beauty
of being alive and sensual. . . . She knows that her sexuality
is within herself, so she doesn't have to wait for someone
to arouse her sexually. She can satisfy her needs alone
or with others in many different ways. She can be both
aggressive and active, passive and receiving, without fear
of behaving in an unfeminine way. . . . Since sexuality is
centered in the self, the new woman prizes highly her
freedom to choose the way she expresses her sexuality and
her love.
She may choose to marry, to be celibate, to remain single,
to try a group marriage, to love monogamously with another
woman or man, to live communally, to become a mother: what-
ever she chooses will be an expression of her own nature
and her needs.
In other words, the feminist ego ideal is a strong and
vulnerable woman . 28
Perpetuating the old myth of "supermom," woman is challenged to be
all things to all people, challenged to find fulfillments which the
structure of society has already made impossible. The final judgment
of a concept as complex and elaborate as the ego ideal is that it will
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be "strong and vulnerable."
It is only movement along a continuum, not in any way a con-
ceptual leap, to arrive at the voraciously consumeristic therapeutic
which can emerge when feminist therapy loses all sight of a critical
analysis. The following is excerpted from the only book length treat-
ment of feminist therapy:
No one should be deprived of the freedom to be fully oneself
with a lover. Like flying or fucking or having a baby, this
is one of life's great experiences. If she cannot have this
freedom with her present lover, she may want to consider a
new lover. 29
on
Here's to fucking forever!
One of my definitions of a "healthy" woman is a woman who
is able to support herself in work that is fun for her. 31
A feminist therapist is one who supports women who want
to be assertive in going after what they want in the same
way men do [higher salary, dates, eg.,] ... . Is it not
far more "natural" to be joyfully free in helping oneself
to the good things in life?32
Techniques of Feminist Therapy
The goals of feminist therapy remain remarkably similar to those
of traditional therapies, if one looks at them in the abstract. (Psycho-
analysis alone among the traditional therapies has succeeded in trans-
lating its goals into specific clinical terms: "Where id was there
ego shall be." To the extent that feminist therapy cannot give psycho-
logical referents for its therapeutic ends, clearly it cannot share
anything in common with psychoanalysis. ) An average catalog of the
goals of feminist therapy might read as follows:
To construct a new definition of self--a clear and individualized
standard of personal value. ... To increase awareness of
wants, alternatives, and power. ... To consciously choose
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It remains for us to critically assess which therapeutic can best
achieve these ends. To do so one must first translate them into
clinical realities.
The environmentalist point of view leads to a simplistic schema
of personality and development, hence to a simplistic formula for
psychical change,, (in particular its opinion of the role of the
therapist in the treatment.). As the literature moves back and forth
between humanistic and radical language^ in its descriptions and
polemic, the same set of liberal assumptions emerges, ones characterized
by a focus on human interests rather than needs. This position entails
a psychological theory in which mind is divorced from body, and
conscious factors predominate over unconscious phenomena. Registration
of intrapsychic life increasingly gives way to assessment of environ-
mental influences, and of a particularistic rather than universal sort.
The preference for cultural interpretations, coupled with what
has been loosely termed the feminist value system, mandates doing away
in one sweep, with unconscious motivation, with the dynamic theory of
repression, and, most important for technique, the use of the trans-
ference relationship as a therapeutic tool. This takes place in a
somewhat blind, superficial fashion. In most cases, feminist
therapists do not merely eschew the use of transference, they maintain
(perhaps as a bit of magical thinking) that because it's bad it simply
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doesn't exist. Where the concept of transference is integrated into
feminist therapy it is misunderstood and therefore misused.
Other psychoanalytic techniques are likewise condemned and
abandoned by virtue of their association with the negative authority
connotations of the transference relationship. Here, for example, a
therapist states, "I'm also noninterpretative. No way would I say.
I know what this means and you don't." 35 In this case it is not
altogether clear what she construes to be the essence of the inter-
pretive method, simply that she sees it as an authoritarian modality.
Another therapist explains,
Sometimes women will say they're afraid of men. I used
to interpret that as a totally individual thing, that the
woman's own personal history alone had contributed to
making her afraid--her father was punitive, and so on. 36
The kind of "interpretative" remark they have given up making bears
little if any resemblance to an interpretation in the true Freudian
sense. (The criticism is noteworthy in that such remarks have increasing-
ly passed for interpretation in psychoanalytic circles— see Chapters
IV and V below.) Interpretation requires movement between conscious
and unconscious levels of meaning; it requires that something heretofore
unconscious be brought into conscious consideration. An interpretation
can only be offered at the end of a long trail of associations generated
by the analysand, who alone has the information from which it is
constituted. Only the patient can verify the correctness of the inter-
pretation--not through her conscious response but through the associa-
tions she has to it. An appeasing "yes" in response to something
suggested by the analyst is never sufficient conformation for hypothesis
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put forth in the course of treatment. The comments referred to above
as interpretation were the therapist's speculations about some possible
connections that might be drawn between her patient's past history and
present problems— no more weighty than one person's partially informed
opinion about the vagaries of another's life. To pose such an opinion
as a form of professional knowledge or wisdom is certainly at least
illusion if not deception. Still, to reject the interpretive method
based on how you misunderstand the way in which in the first place it
is being incorrectly used is hardly sound or advantageous.
Some of the techniques of psychoanalysis re-emerge in diluted
form. In lieu of free association leading deeper into the unconscious
there are a variety of ways of expanding consciousness. No explanation
is offered of the way in which we may now presume certain facts to be
outside of consciousness, and this piece of illogic goes unnoticed.
Thus free association may reappear, newly christened "self-originating
feedback," in this form:
Keeping a journal of the significant events of the day is
another technique that helps to heighten a woman's awareness
of the thoughts, actions, feelings that are important re-
flections of who she is. Depending on the nature of her
perceptual gaps, the counselor may ask her to record such
categories of events as the occurrence and thoughts that
accompany depression, irritation, self- recrimination, or
anxiety. . .37
Or, for another example, the great emphasis on emoting in experiential
therapies may be seen as one large elaboration of the part that
abreaction plays in the resolution of psychical conflicts. (In Social
Amnesia
,
Jacoby has treated in depth the problem of renaming and
presumably reinventing psychological concepts, with particular emphasis
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on its retrogressive political effects on psychology.) Through their
link to the feminist value system, these bastardized Freudian techniques
are subsumed under the umbrella of the truly nonanalytic battery of
therapeutic interventions, where they lose all capacity to open out
onto the unconscious mind.
The techniques of feminist therapy are drawn from Third Force
psychology and are also modelled on diversified forms of political
activity. The overarching theme seems to be the equalization of the
patient-therapist relationship. Four more or less discrete activities
on the part of the therapist can be isolated as contributing to this
equalization: consciousness raising, support, modelling, and self-
disclosure. The techniques flow into and from one another in a mutually
supportive manner (i.e., modelling is supportive and raises conscious-
ness), always referring back to the feminist value system rather than
to theoretical conceptions. They are intertwined in ways that make it
difficult to set forth individual techniques in logical order, there-
fore the discussion which follows must be somewhat repetitive and
loosely structured.
Support . "Feminist therapists see themselves as being supportive
to women and giving them permission to act in ways denied them. . . such
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as being assertive, making non stereotypical life decisions" A number
of problems emerge here which can be followed throughout this section on
techniques. Firstly, this ostensibly liberating tactic can be shown
to be, in fact, inherently demeaning to the patient in that it presumes
a certain level of dysfunctional ity. Secondly, there is no way to
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gauge what this support will mean to the patient at the unconscious
level. In fact, there is no guarantee that at her entry into therapy
she has the capacity to take in such support-weak ego boundaries, a
fear of engulfing or of being overwhelmed, excessive guilt, a host
of psychical difficulties might prevent the patient from taking in
support or might provoke her to make decisions that she is not ready to.
live with. There is an illusion that the patient is finally being
cared for when she may be more alone than ever.
Consciousness Raising/Awareness Training
. These techniques
represent opposite sides of the same coin . 00 While awareness training
focuses on internal experience in an individualistic, asocial manner
,
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consciousness raising directs attention to external events to the
exclusion of intrapsychic factors. Though they may seem to move in
opposite directions politically and psychologically, the end results are
similar: a failure to unearth the concrete connections between the
individual and her social world.
To return to a point made earlier, this approach to enhancing
conscious functions is built on the flimsiest conception of an un-
conscious mind--a conception which can barely be described as psycho-
logical in nature. How and why ideas become unconscious, what this
tells us about the nature of the human subject, are questions which
seem never to be asked. This constitutes the supreme trivial izati on of
Freud's most dramatic discovery, the extent and nature of self-
deception.
As with support, the technique masks an essentially dis-
respectful and potentially manipulative direction. It is understandable
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that a woman needs time, help, and a special set of circumstances to
discover her unconscious motivations. But women are made to look foolish
and cowardly if they need help in order to explore that which they
could apprehend at any time if they chose to make a certain shift in
attention. And it is manipulative to steer a patient's attention in
specific directions and then treat the intervention--"making their
clients more aware by asking them questions phrased to expose entrenched
stereotypical assumptions that the clients have unquestioningly
accepted -- as a neutral one because it has to do with discovering
'neutral,' external facts.
Modelling
. "Once our clients are aware of these conflicting
ideals (ideal woman vs. ideal adult), we as feminist therapists attempt
to make growth possible by offering a unified feminist ideal for women
to model themselves upon." I will leave aside considerations of what
kind of standards go into the creation of this new ideal— it will
suffice to say that this quote refers back to the "ideal" woman
described by the Feminist Counseling Collective on p. 53. The important
point, in the context of therapy, is that this technique undermines
feminist concern over the undue influence that therapists may exercise
over their patients. It is as if they openly state that since patients
have to come out of therapy just like their therapists we might as well
openly indulge in personality manipulation. But no— because the values
of sisterhood can be presumed to be 'correct' in some moral sense,
feminist therapists are exempt from such charges.
Once again, this technique leads towards increased dependence
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rather than the reverse, and brings with dependence the possibility of
its regressive nature being ignored. At best the patient remains stuck
at the same level of ego development, while superficial changes may be
construed as deeper structural change; at worst she may be traumatized
by a relationship which weakens her defenses without having built up her
ego strength by first undoing the repressions held together by those
defenses.
Self-disclosure
. The ubiquitous and perhaps most important
innovation of the feminist therapy movement. It seems shared only by
radical therapists--while the humanistic therapies, even the NeoFreudians
,
advocate being more 'real,' more of a person in therapy sessions, they
do not by and large advocate telling stories about one's own life.
Outside of feminist therapy it is agreed that the patient is paying for
the opportunity to use the time for herself and does not need to pay
to hear about someone else's problems.
This is another example of an allegedly liberatory, respectful
therapeutic intervention being more denigrating than enhancing-- it
suggests that a person is in such serious straits that she can't find
the ordinary interactions of life in her outside world and must be given
them by the therapist. It is clear how this would foster rather than
discourage undue dependence. I will quote at length on the operational-
ization of this technique, since it is so important and also represents
the essence of the feminist style of therapy. Here are excerpts from
the only article that tries to theorize about self-disclosure; it offers
an inventory of three levels of "sharing":
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The criticisms here are legion-the social critique can be found else-
where and so I will concentrate on clinical matters, with the under-
standing that the two are intertwined. On the simplest level, it is an
unfortunate therapist who is incapable of identifying and empathizing
without verbalizing her own feelings, and we must immediately be
suspicious of the therapist's needs for gratification if this kind of
self-disclosure is used at any time other than when crucial for the
advancement of the therapy. Even if the therapist's motives were
'pure,' there would still be the possibility that the patient might
experience the therapist as exploitive--wanting attention, using her
time, etc.,
--and yet be too dependent to verbalize those fears.
• • . On the second level of sharing the therapist communi-
cates her past and present conflicts.
.
. sharing this may
again help the client feel less inadequate. ...
The third, most difficult and most important level of sharing
for a feminist therapist is the openness and risk that leads
to full and deep intimacy between her and her client: two
adults who care about each other.
. . not tellinq how one
feels, as on the first level, but being how one feels. JheA9therapist consciously chooses to expose herself completely . 1
The criticisms, of course, become redundant. There are the
implications of a patient having to pay for experiences that are part
of real life; the possibility that she will grow dependent on this
intimacy and not seek out other contacts; the possibility that she will
construe the therapist's overtures as a sign that the Dr. knows no one
else could like her. And to come back to the distinction between the
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patient's unconscious and conscious experience during treatment, it is
impossible to assess what this intimacy truly feels like to the patient.
The gratification inherent in such intimacy occurs at varying levels
of regression and may have a wholly other effect than that which is
visible. If the patient should be precipitated into a deeper level of
regression she may be too frightened (of her own impulses or the
therapist s) to speak about that openly, or she may simply be too
dependent on the gratification she has found in the relationship to
want to give it up. Such regressions can and regularly do occur without
the participation of the therapist, simply on the basis of the patient's
fantasies. However, in the analytic situation there are built-in
controls. For one thing, the analyst is alert to such possibilities
and continually examining the patient's associations for signs of this
kind of involvement— signs which eventually become grist for the
therapeutic mill. For another, since the analyst will not actually have
participated in building the inappropriate involvement, the chances
are somewhat improved that the patient herself will eventually be able
to bring up the matter without having to fear the analyst's disapproval
or withdrawal. The 'impersonal' quality of the analytic setting
creates altogether another order of trust and security than that which
is built upon a purportedly non-hierarchical rel ationship--an equality
which is only thinly disguised reparenting. One group of feminists
describes their new version of transference, oblivious to the necessary
authority relation in the parenting process:
We agree with our colleagues that real intrapsychic growth
requires dependency on the therapist, so the therapist must
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accept a parenting role. Howevpr wo .
dependency occurs just as wpll whin that thls necessary
nonhierarchical
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Feminist therapy does not perceive the intricacy of the develop-
mental process wherein the ego only gradually acquires the capacity to
mediate between internal demands and external reality. Hence, while
attentive to maintaining forms that are egalitarian on the surface,
feminist therapists do not give weight to the intrapsychic effects of
taking on a parenting role; they do not understand that such a role
must, regardless of its external appearance, be hierarchical. Conversely,
psychoanalysis allows the transference to develop while forbidding the
analyst the role of parent; regression on the part of the analysand
can then be examined rather than acted out-in the language of psycho-
analysis, can be remembered rather than repeated. 44
The simplification of development into two stages--child vs.
grown up— rather than an ongoing, arduous process, results in a
flattening out of therapy. One returns to a childhood phase of anger,
identification, dependence, gives the patient what she never had, and
she automatically matures through that phase into adulthood; she
experiences her anger, identifies with a new role model, learns to
take in support and nourishment. The psychoanalytic view, wherein
developmental fixation is attributed primarily to fear of internal
impulses in relation to the environment, firstly, offers a more cogent
explanation for the prevalence of such developmental failures. It is
not that there are millions of bad mothers but that the child's needs,
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as prepresented in the psyche, are insatiable; the path to maturity,
given that fact, is fraught with danger. Secondly, when fixation is
located within a multitude of conflicting forces, the prospect of
inducing regression by replicating the circumstances under which the
fixation was established is far more awesome. One cannot expect that
nourishment offered to the patient will have a necessarily remedial
effect on psychic scars; one cannot expect an instant transition to
integrated, adult relations from childhood need to traumatic that it has
split the ego.
This problem brings us to one final, extended difficulty which
lies concealed within the set of techniques which makes up the feminist
therapy style. For the present it can only be noted, for it is a
subject which has impact on and must be looked at within the women's
movement as a total phenomenon. The failure to elaborate a develop-
mental process, and therefore to comprehend fixation and regression
(within the therapeutic, or any setting), robs therapy of the opportunity
to contribute to women developing more highly evolved relationships,
and more fully integrated commitment to their social responsibilities.
A patient can transform any mode of therapy--certainly this
includes analysis--into a Weltanschauung . However, when the therapy
already partakes of a political world view, and one which precludes
examining the patient/therapist relationship if it challenges that
view-- then the patient's primitive identification with her therapist
and her primitive identification with the idea of feminism become
merged. Rather than challenging some of the immature needs that may be
met by affiliation with a political group, feminist therapy supports
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the kind of group psychology phenomenon described by Freud47 and most
eloquently by Alexander Mitscherl ich. 46 Impressive evidence has been
offered by Mitscherl ich and by Christopher Lasch47 to the effect that
primitive group identifications are increasingly replacing more mature
object relations as the social formations of advanced capitalism
encroach upon family life. It is one of therapy's major potential
contributions that it can offer a structured relationship with one
individual with whom conflict resolution and growth is possible, the
opportunity to abandon identifications of a lower developmental order
in order to embrace a more integrated, responsibly adult commitment
to an idea and a community. As "sisterhood" becomes a form of trans-
ference— and countertransference—whi ch cannot be explored and worked
through, therapists relegate feminism to the same fate as other failed
political movements.
Psychoanalysis and Feminist Therapy
Within psychoanalysis, as within no other theory, are concepts
which give a material base to the efforts to juxtapose political and
psychological projects. While other theories might support more
grandiose aspirations, psychoanalysis offers the opportunity to recognize
the truth of our condition and still hope to improve it. NeoFreudian
and existental ist theories offer far more hope, but they do not
recognize the unfreedom of the society in which personal transformation
must take place— and in the end, that is no hope at all. Because
Freud's assessment of the possibilities for therapy was based on the
concrete formulations of his metapsychology, he was not overly optimistic.
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He is often quoted as having said. "you will be convinced that much will
be gained if we succeed in transforming your hysterical misery into
everyday unhappiness." 48 He understood that, until everyday life was
better, no amount of therapy would bring people genuine happiness. This
afforded him a very sophisticated political vision-even in tents of
the women's movement, which, with few exceptions, has made him its arch
villain. In a letter to James Jackson Putnam, he wrote:
I believe that your complaint that we are not able to
compensate our neurotic patients for giving up theirillness is quite justified. But it seems to me that this
s not the fault of therapy but rather of social institu-lons. What would you have us do when a woman complains
about her thwarted life, when, with youth gone, she notices
that she has been deprived of the joy of loving for merely
conventional reasons? She is quite right and we stand
elpless before her, for we cannot make her young again.
But the recognition of our therapeutic limitations reinforces
our determination to change other social factors so that
men and women shall no longer be forced into hopeless
situations.
Out of our therapeutic impotence must come the prophylaxis
of the neuroses. The more energetically one attacks the
sexual problem in such cases the more one is able to
palliate. Where the conditions are not so hopeless sub-
limation creates new goals as soon as the repressions are
1 ifted. 49
The limitations of therapy in the psychoanalytic view are inextricably
bound to the material base of the theory. At the core of this
materialism is the analytic paradigm which supports a mind/body unity,
in contradiction to the more reduction!' stic philosophical schools.
Idealism sees human beings as self- forming, able to create their lives
from "free will" and from within their intellectual capacities. The
current humanistic movement shares this heritage, though "a suspect
Cartesian tradition in reverse: I feel, therefore I am."
50
Behaviorism
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and mechanistic social science see us as empty vessels, constituted
by what has been poured into us, whether stimulus-response conditioning
or bourgeois ideology. In contrast, the Freudian view grasps the human
experience in its totality, accounting for desires, consciousness, and
the relation of these to actions and cultural formations. Marcuse
states, "Identifying the energy of the life instincts as libido meant
defining their gratification in contradiction to spiritual trans-
cendentalism: Freud s notion of happiness and freedom is eminently
critical in so far as it is material isti c--protes ting against the
spritualization of want ." 51
The theoretical vantage point which acknowledges conflict as the
basis of social relations and recognizes the social influence on
individual development, affords teachers and clinicians more opportunity
to work honestly and progressively with students and patients, and
to survive with integrity. Until now, awareness of the contradictions
between appearance and reality, theory and therapy, social service and
social change, has either paralyzed professionals or been denied by
them. Psychoanalysis offers an alternative. We can hardly afford to
live in our ivory towers and presume that orthodox Freudian analysis
would be an appropriate tool for undergraduates, or to be used in
treating lower class patients in community mental health centers.
However, psychoanalytic theory provides insights to these crippling
contradictions, and the metapsychology of human change has important
implications for applied psychology programs, for pedagogical methodology,
and for working with blocks to class consciousness. The relationship
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between psychoanalysis and praxis is not merely speculative. The theory
specifically addresses the relationship of thought to action, and the
ways in which that relationship may be developed.
As women come to see our mistreatment as not just unfair but
profoundly degrading and violent-as we break the middle class myth that
sexism is about unequal employment opportunities, personal inhibition
and nothing more—will these theories account in some meaningful way for
what has been done to us, and for our own participation in a process
of violence? As women begin to scrutinize themselves, can humanism
or marxism provide a foundation for the breaking of silence, the develop-
ment of critical discourse; can they provide sustenance adequate to the
urgent tasks of social change?
A notion of the individual as an empty vessel into which the
conditions of life are poured—whether that means bourgeois ideology or
learned behaviors—cannot adequately account for the complexity of
even 'normal 1 experience; it cannot explain even the simplest dream.
Certainly such a viewpoint cannot lend meaning to the mental life of
those who are not making it under the strain of what our society
presently imposes as normality, whether we mean by that depressed
housewives or hospital i zed schizophrenics. The flip side of this
ideological position, wherein we are depicted as self-creating, utterly
harmonious and loving creatures who would grow up all right if only
our self-esteem were not so wounded as children is not powerful enough
to account for the extremes of individual and social distress which
we have all witnessed— not the experiences of the passive victim or
the active oppressor. Does that version of innate, loving, harmonious
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sociality make sense of Hitler? Vietnam? Wife beating? Does a
child molestor suffer from alienation? Would he have grown up a nice
person if mother had liked his finger paintings better? Can he have
been so seriously psychologically derailed because his father worked
in a factory—or owned a factory, for that matter? Does it make clear,
finally, why women have taken so much abuse, largely unquestioningly,
for so long?
We are searching still for a theory of subjectivity which can
explain not only the violence of men but also the rather extraordinary
self-deception which allows oppressed people to collude. While lying
to others in the interests of self-preservation is perfectly understand-
able, what can motivate us to lie to ourselves when these lies allow
us to continue acting against our own interests? This self-deception
can be explained only if we posit that there are things about ourselves
,
not just things about what others do to us, that we must not know. As
we move to explore our inner worlds more deeply we will uncover not
just feelings, thoughts, memories which we have pressed out of aware-
ness, but also impulses, urges to impermissible activity and impossible
satisfaction--impulses which no mother can satisfy or make tolerable
and which threaten the ties that bind society.
It is not that masochism is a learned coping pattern imposed on
women from without and irrelevant to their true natures, but rather
that masochism is the only psychical structure offered to women (unlike
to men who are given other choices) so that they may contain their
unmanageable sexuality and aggression. Masochism is hardly an irrelevant
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or unnatural phenomenon- it is a psychological achievement necessary
to both men and women as the foundation for the sacrifices which devolve
on us to maintain our families and communities: it is what allows us
to tolerate pain in a meaningful and enriching way. It is only the
hyperattenuated form it has taken on in the lives of women which is
not in any way 'natural .
'
The significance of this emerges in one's assessment of the
depth of conflict between the individual and her social world, and
therefore the depth of influence one can attribute to societal demands
on the psyche. The humanistic theories posit tasks for the infantile
ego which are too simple to merit the awful consequences that result
from the failure to master these tasks; too simple to have merited an
ego in the first place. One must expect to find, as layers are peeled
away in the therapeutic process, not only assertiveness, independence
and loving cooperation, but also destructiveness, immature, amorphous
sexuality, narcissistic psychic structures which must be mediated by
the ego over a long developmental process that witnesses the creation
of what Freud termed secondary process thinking and the moral capacities
that make human social bonding possible. If we are not prepared to
face this reality in ourselves, if we will give no voice to impulse
life in our daily existence, then it will continue, unconsciously, to
hold sway and govern our behavior.
For a theory which can sensitively move back and forth between
the individual and the social, which will not collapse the person into
a merely social, external being, nor glorify her out of all social
determinants altogether, we must return to the notions of the human mind
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posited by Freud in the early days of psychoanalysis.
Psychoanalysis begins with the instinct theory. It posits that
conflict is the essential psychic and social condition of humanity;
that our instincts and desires are inevitably in competition with
external reality. This has radical implications for social theory.
Underlying the societal organization of the human existence
are basic libidinal wants and needs; highly plastic and
pliable, they are shaped and utilized to 'cement' the qiven
society. Thus,
.
.
. the libidinal impulses and their
satisfaction (and deflection) are co-ordinated with the
interests of domination and thereby become a stabilizing
force which binds the majority to the ruling minority.
Anxiety, love, confidence, even the will to freedom and
solidarity with the group to which one belongs— all come
to serve the economically structured relationships of
subordination. 33
If we do not accept conflict resulting from material want as the basis
of human and social development, there can be no dialectical understand-
ing of the individual or society. Without appreciating the ego's role
in mediating conflict, it will be impossible to reconstruct ourselves
as actively responsible for our own emancipation, and for building
emancipated social relations.
If sexuality does not play the constitutional role which
Freud attributed to it, then there is no fundamental
conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality
principle. ... It was precisely because he saw in
sexuality the representative of the integral pleasure
principle that Freud was able to discover the common
roots of the 'general' as well as neurotic unhappiness in
a depth far below all individual experience, and to
recognize a primary 'constitutional' repression underlying
all consciously experienced and administered represssion. . . .
For Freud, an enormous gulf separated real freedom and
happiness from pseudo freedom and happiness, that are
practiced and preached in a repressive civilization. The
revisionists see no such difficulty. Since they have
spiritualized freedom and happiness, they can say that
'the problem of production has been virtually solved. '53
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All revisions of analytic theory have been centered around a
rejection of the instinct theory as being too mechanistic. By and
large, these changes in the theory were necessitated by problems in
therapy. No doubt there were genuine problems and they have been
ameliorated by the revisionist therapeutic innovations. However, that
does not suffice to explain the revisions, nor does it adequately convey
the consequences to the original theory. Marcuse writes, "Therapeutic
findings may have motivated the theoretical reductions in the role of
sexuality; but such a reduction was in any case indispensable for the
...
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revisionist philosophy." While I have argued that historians have
not been sufficiently sensitive to the complexity of the therapeutic
process, still the essence of critical theory's objection to NeoFreudian
and existential /humanist revisionism remains cogent: "This is what is
crucial, that the contradiction between theory and therapy is lost,
not that changes are made in the name of therapy. . . . Rather the
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relationship is dialectical." The result of obliterating the tension
between theory and therapy has been the destruction of the theory's most
radical aspects and the trivial ization of therapy. As the instinct
theory is undermined, repression and the unconscious cease to be dynamic
concepts, reflective of intrapsychic and social conflict; psychology
ceases to be dialectical and no longer supports a radical interpretation
of social problems and the nature of social change.
As the repression of instinctual gratification recedes into
the background and loses its decisive importance for the
realization of man, the depth of societal repression is
reduced. Consequently, the revisionist emphasis on the
influence of 'social conditions' in the development of the
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neurotic is sociologically and psychologically far moreinconsequential than Freud's neglect of these conditions.The revisionist mutilation of the instinct theory leads tothe traditional devaluation of the sphere of material needs
™ I™0/ of spiritual needs. Society's part in the regimenta-tion of man is thus played down.
. . . Neurosis too
appears as an essentially moral problem, and the individual isheld responsible for the failure of his self-realization. 56
Because the unconscious, repression, and the libido theory are
at the heart of the Freudian theory, and at the center of controversy
within psychological disciplines I have chosen to review these concepts
in depth. This controversy has been long and bitter and has resulted in
a wealth of literature, much of which is plagued by ambiguity, confusion,
and polemic. Once again, it is difficult to clear away the debris and
see where the truth lies, or know whose interpretation to trust. The
theory cannot be held primarily responsible for how it has been read,
though it will be important to look for weaknesses that might support
conformist misreadings. The fact that psychoanalysis has been used to
justify certain conservative social analyses makes it all the more
important to discriminate between its central and its interpretive
elements. Reich indicated early on the manner in which conservatives
might apply psychoanalysis:
Adaptation to reality is interpreted simply as adaptation
to society, which, applied in pedagogy or in the therapy of
the neuroses, is unquestionably a conservative view. 57
Yet the theory itself will demonstrate that though he participated in
some such errors, "Freud's own insights into the historical character
of the modifications of the impulses vitiate his equation of the reality
58
principle with the norms of patricentic-acquisitive culture."
Regardless of whether or not we choose ultimately to reject the
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content of the drives as they are spelled out in analytic literature,
it is crucial that we retain an understanding of the role of instinctual
conflict in individual and social development. Many radical theorists
have thrown out psychoanalysis altogether, seeing it as the bastion of
conservative mental health care. Much of the damage done by American
analysts centers around their clinging to oppressive derivative notions.
Concepts such as "penis envy" have been used in therapy and literature
to persuade women to conform to an oppressive reality. However, it must
be reiterated that the conclusions some have drawn from Freud's sexual
psychology (or from his 'pessimistic' cultural anthropology), do not
touch the heart of the theory, repression and the unconscious mind.
Even if Freud in the end justifies civilization, he has in
the interim said enough about its antagonistic and repressive
essence to put it in question. The reverse is true of the
revisionists: whatever criticisms of society they advance
are absolved by the concepts and formulations that point
towards health and harmony. 59
While the discussion of repression and the unconscious which
follows is not polemical, it is surely not scientific in the empirical
sense. That is to say, the research was not undertaken, nor the literature
read, in a neutral fashion: to engage in a historical reading of
psychological theory at this time is a profoundly political act.
CHAPTER III
GENERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY: REPRESSION AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
Overview
Students of psychoanalysis know it to be a theory of extra-
ordinary complexity. As stated above, it represents a set of
principles regarding mental functioning, a research methodology into
the workings of the mind, and a mode of treatment for pathological
phenomena. In order to fully appreciate the psychoanalytic enter-
prise, one must apprehend the ways in which those three aspects
are inextricably linked. Psychoanalysis evolved through their inter-
action and it is not possible to discard any one facet, nor alter
the theoretical principles by which they interrelate and mutually
influence one another, without serious damage to the theory's
integrity.
There is the further compl exi ty— for any theory— of the many
components that must be included in a comprehensive description and
explanation of the psyche: development, personality, clinical theory,
cognition, perception, memory, etc. Contemporary efforts often view
these as disparate elements which need not meet the requirements of
unification. Each one of these is taken on its own terms and presented
as "psychology. " This is particularly true in academic psychology,
which tends to focus experimental ly on the various cognitive aspects.
There are also attempts at more comprehensive psychologies, generally
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developed from varying clinical perspectives, which, again, tend to
take one of these elements as a starting point and build an entire
theory around it. Object relations theory, for example, attempts
to provide an exhaustive explanation of psychological development
through an examination of early social relationships. In general,
those psychologies that were developed from the exigencies of clinical
practice (NeoFreudian and existentialist), turn their attention almost
exclusively to development, personality and clinical theory.
Psychoanalysis sets as a goal a unity of explanation which will
be inclusive of all these mental qualities and functions. At its
heart is the dynamic theory of mind, central postulates on the nature
of the psyche—the origins, meaning, and function of consciousness.
These precepts generate and include, but are not identical with, a
theory of development and personality formation. This nonidentity
is evident by the mere fact that psychoanalysis did not have a fully
developed concept of personality until Freud introduced his tripartite
mental organization, the id, ego, and superego. The theory of mind
is built on principles which entail a certain view of development and
personality but which do not require a commitment to precise develop-
mental sequences . Those are to be evaluated only on the basis of what
they can explain about how people come to be who they are, as adult
men and women in private and public social relationships; they are
to be hypothesized and verified only through clinical data which
has been subjected to psychoanalytic interpretation. The relations
between the theory of mind and, respectively, personality and develop-
ment, are neither rigidly determined nor arbitrary. What is important is
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to elaborate and revise the notions of personality, and the develop-
mental sequences adduced to explain adult personality in a manner
compatible with the basic framework of psychoanalysis. One must
view the particular developmental story that Freud set forth in the
context of that framework--what questions he was attempting to answer
and at what level of abstraction he was offering explanations for the
extraordinary phenomenon of consciousness. That is, one must elaborate
and/or revise the picture of personality and development along lines
compatible with the central ordering principles of psychoanalysis,
lines equal in explanatory power with that which Freud has offered.
Yet general psychological theory is the aspect of psychoanalysis
that is least studied and least well understood. NonFreudians seem
completely ignorant of it; Freudian nonanalysts who have appropria-
ted analytic theory for the purposes of social theory have often
tampered with the theory for failure to appreciate its dimensions . 2
And in professional analytic circles, that level of theoretical
3
speculation has come into high disfavor.
To further complicate matters, there is the complexity and
confusion which arises from the gradual evolution of psychoanalysis
over such a long period of time, with no final integration of the varying
pieces. In that regard, it is not always possible to know which Freud
is being discussed or cited--and this is true of people who are
ostensibly Freudians as well as critics who know only fragments of
his work and might be expected to quote it out of context.
The effort at integrating the earlier work with the later for-
mulations is to some extent the responsibility of the individual reader.
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Many analyst's interpreted the direction of Freud's late work as
moving away from general psychological theory toward an exclusive
focus on clinical theory, a shift which in fact the work does not
support. Nonetheless, the last major revisions— the postulation of
the death instinct, the structural theory of mind (id, ego, superego),
and the final hypothesis of the nature and role of anxiety— have
all been taken as a shift in emphasis from unconscious to conscious
phenomena. Hence we have seen a growing preoccupation with ego
functions-- personality and "character"— at the expense of their under-
lying instinctual determinants. This move has drawn support from the
fact that, at least superficially, personality and character, whether
normal or abnormal, can be elucidated in terms of developmental and
clinical considerations, without reference to general psychological
theory. (For the nonanalytical ly oriented, in fact, they are discernible
qualities which can simply be argued to be one way or another without
reference to psychology at all: women are either passive or they are
not, and one way or the other, personality qua personality can be taken
to be the result of cultural influences, social learning processes,
etc. ).
These issues are of central importance in a discussion of the
political implications of psychology and psychotherapy
,
which indeed
must concern themselves with the form that the adult personality
assumes. What factors lead to the development of autonomous rather
than conformist or authoritarian traits? By what route do people
arrive at what they consider to be their moral codes and how do they
attain the capacity to live by those codes? What governs their ability
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to accurately assess the environment in which they live and their
influence and impact on that environment? Underlying any discussion
of "false consciousness" is the fact and meaning of our being
conscious creatures at all. It is the theory of mind that fundamentally
locates the individual in society and provides the context in which a
concept of personality takes on meaning. The particular story of the
human infant’s psychological origins and the manner in which those
processes are mediated developmental ly over time into the adult
personality lay a complex and material foundation for our understanding
of the private and social facts of human experience. The fragmentary
psychic structure of the infant struggles with its instinctual in-
heritance and problematic environment; the struggle gives rise to
consciousness and the capacity to integrate needs and aims through
judgment and reasoned action.
In the case of psychology and feminism these issues underlie
the controversy over Freud's theories on women. For in fact, what is
argued over repeatedly is whether or not his views on female person-
ality— and therefore the developmental sequence he proposed as leading
to mature "psychological femaleness"--is scientifically accurate and
philosophically acceptable. (The two questions are often treated as
indistinguishable.) This debate takes place almost totally without
reference to the theory of mind and its requirements for developmental
theory. Freudians and nonFreudians alike argue over whether or not
women do grow up as he said they do, whether they should grow up that
way and whether his reasons for suggesting that particular develop-
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mental path for them are "plausible." Consequently the story of
female development is rescripted with a portrayal of the mature woman
that is more politically palatable despite the fact that the new
versions cannot account for any of the qualities (which are in fact
developmental achievements) we commonly associate with maturity:
sexual orientation, gender identity, moral development, the evolution
of the structured and structuring ego.
If, indeed, these have been thrown into question, along with
the larger issue of what relation they bear to other aspects of ego
-functioning, then we are urgently in need of a research methodology
through which to develop and test new hypotheses. Yet research
method is precisely what has been abandoned in rejecting Freud’s
general psychology; for it is only through the appl ication of those
highly abstract postulates that clinical inquiry comes to constitute
research and can be used to build theory.
In order to evaluate and revise Freud's portrayal of female
psychology (or male for that matter), we must trace the way in which
developmental theory was elaborated, and in turn generated a theory
of personality. The implicit connections between the basic formative
components of the psyche and the complexity of adulthood must be made
explicit, and the relation clarified between gender identity on the
one hand, and personality or character on the other. In other words,
we are attempting to assess whether or not the manner of generalizing
from components of psychic development to the mainstream of one's
personality is defensible, and to ascertain just how much of that
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generalizing did and should take place along sex-linked lines.
Are the psychoanalytic notions of personality development
compatible with the theory's basic framework? To answer this question,
I will use tthe twin pillars of analytic theory, repression and the
unconscious, as ordering concepts for a discussion of the Freudian
theory of mind. While the topic suggested here, repression and the
unconscious, is almost infinite within the scope of Freudian theory,
the nature of the question lends itself well to focusing on two tasks
of significance for the student of Freud. First, through examining
these two concepts we can elucidate psychoanalysis as a dynamic theory
of mind which accounts for and gives meaning to those aspects of
human experience and behavior which hitherto had been inexplicable.
The existence of the unconscious is the only theoretical postulate
sufficient to explain neurotic symptoms, dreams, jokes, and parapraxes;
one can't account for the existence of these phenomena if one con-
tinues to hold to the belief that psyche is exhaustively described by
what is conscious. Furthermore, one can only describe
, and not
ex P^ ain these phenomena unless one attributes a motive-internal
conflict--as well as a quality to the unconscious. It is conflict which
is at the heart of the dynamic conception, though the terms of that
conflict may be seen to shift dramatically through the revisions of
the theory over time. In the course of documenting psychoanalysis
as a dynamic theory through the use of repression and the unconscious,
it will be necessary to demonstrate their centrality to the theory
and to establish that a coherent and defensible theory can be built
from such concepts.
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The second task is to follow the development of psychoanalytic
theory as Freud revised and developed it along the lines of what he
might have considered to be "dialectical orthodoxy ." 4 For in what-
ever ways Freud or his followers may have refined the derivative con-
ceptions of psychoanalytic theory (the etiology of the neuroses,
the description and classification of the various drives, the elabora-
tion of psychosexual development, the addition of a concept of
personality, etc.), the dynamic conception of mind rests, and always
will, on the disjunction between innate somatic drives and the
possibilities of reality; on the management of this conflict by the
agencies, conscious and unconscious, of the mind.
It is impossible, really, to separate Freud's theory from the
history and method of its formulation. The factors addressed here
lend themselves to an organization which devolves from this
(chronological) method of investigation: Freud said of psychoanalysis
that
It has not been a matter of indifference for the course
of its development or for the reception it met with that
it began its work on what is, of all the contents of the
mind, most foreign to the ego--on symptoms. Symptoms
are derived from the repressed. . . . The path led from
symptoms to the unconscious to the life of the instincts,
to sexuality. ... 5
I propose to add to this investigative trail only the study of dreams,
which along with symptoms, are the principal phenomena from which
the unconscious and repression are inferred.
If we continue on Freud's path, we find that in the course of
his investigations he eventually grew less concerned with the explicit
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distinction between what is conscious and what is not. It is beyond
the scope of this chapter to present those later developments in any
but outline form: it is not genuinely possible to enter into a full
exploration or even exposition of the theories of libidinal develop-
ment, or of the structural theory of mind, without first tackling
the Oedipus complex, which will only be discussed fully in the context
of psychosexual development (Chapter IV). Yet it is important for the
purpose of this discussion to illustrate some of the fundamental
elaborations of the concepts of repression and the unconscious in
order to demonstrate that later developments in no way implied a
rejection of their centrality to the theory.
This, then, provides the two principles for the organization
of the following discussion and its manner of exposition: to show
how the concepts interrelate (in part along the lines of Freud's
investigative method) and build a dynamic theory of mind; to use a
somewhat schematic history-of-ideas approach in following the develop-
ment of Freud's conceptualization of consciousness and what is un-
conscious in order to begin to establish principles of "dialectical
orthodoxy" for the development of psychoanalysis.
Hysteria: Hypnosis to Free Association
A recapitulation of Freud's work before the emergence of
psychoanalysis proper will help to locate the concepts of the un-
conscious mind and repression as two of its central theoretical
postulates.
85
We may begin by looking at the influence of Charcot on Freud's
work. The most significant elements here are, first, the diagnosis
of hysteria which states that conversion symptoms can be connected
back to jdeas, and second, that hysteria can be cured through the use
of words in the form of hypnotic suggestion. This "ideogenic"
conception of symptom etiology was enough to challenge, in Freud's
mind, the universally held belief that what is mental could be equated
with what is conscious. The ideas which govern symptoms are clearly
inaccessible to consciousness. Though the unconscious is a rudimentary
concept at this stage, one of the central ordering principles of the
theory of mind has already emerged, that of psychic determinism
From the time that it became apparent that symptoms were not bizarre,
meaningless phenomena, Freud was to maintain that all psychic events,
no matter how seemingly inexplicable or irrational, have meaning which
is determined by unconscious antecedents. Psychic determinism is
not in any way related to the strict biological determinism which is
often misread into psychoanalysis. Freud is not attempting a reduction
of meaning to mechanism, in fact his effort is not one of simplification
at all, rather the reverse. It is a juxtaposition of meanings which
he strives for, an enrichment of conscious meaning by reference to
unconscious roots.
Upon returning from France, Freud, together with Breuer, began
to use hypnosis in their treatment of nervous disorders. The method
they employed, however, was that of catharsis rather than hypnotic
suggestion. The rough theory of hysteria that they put forth at this
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time was that a memory of a traumatic event remained inaccessible to
consciousness and that the memory governed the symptom. The cathartic
method involved directing the hypnotized patient to talk his or her
through memories of the traumatic event; at the end of the session, if
the memory had been fully recaptured, the symptom would disappear.
As Freud encountered difficulties with hypnosis, he began to
introduce free association, which was to signal the end of his belief,
held concurrently with the use of the cathartic method, that "hysterics
suffer mainly from reminiscences ." 6 With the use of free association,
Freud came up against two obstacles to treatment: resistance, the
refusal or inability to associate, and transference, a special form
of resistance in which the patient created the neurosis anew through
an irrational emotional attachment to the analyst; an attachment which
became far more important than being cured. "The use of hypnosis is
bound to h id e t h i s resistance; the history of psychoanalysis proper,
therefore, begins with the new technique which dispenses with
hypnosis ." 7 This shift is critical— it is that which definitively
effects the movement from a descriptive to a dynamic theory of mind,
for it was no longer possible to postulate the cause of conversion
hysteria as a merely accidental trauma, nor to explain its occurrence
as having set in during a hypnotic trance, as Breuer does. It could
no longer be deemed sufficient to simply describe mental events by
whether they were conscious or unconscious, it was necessary now to
offer a reason for certain ideas being kept unconscious. Resistance
demonstrates that ideas are blocked from consciousness due to internal
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conflicts—the patient has reasons, themselves unconscious, for
limiting his or her self-knowledge.
This extraordinary fact of self-deception is perhaps the most
trivialized of all Freudian ideas; the failure to grasp its significance
represents the failure of all revisions of analytic theory. It is
the principle which informs the theory through all its later develop-
ments, and supplies a standard of judgment by which to measure those
revisions. For the theory must provide a motivation for keeping things
secret from oneself, a mechanism by which such an astonishing event
can take place, and a relationship between the process of self-
deception, the content of the hidden material, and pathological
phenomena. It will be by the exigencies of these three questions that
Freud will feel continually spurred to improve his hypotheses and
within the context of these three that he will contain his theory.
This clinical innovation (free association) and the resultant
changes its use made in the theory are a superb example of the inter-
relationship between Freud's clinical and theoretical sources, essential
for any understanding of the epistemological status of psychoanalysis.
The descriptive conception of the unconscious mind does not account
for the motive or the mechanism of self-deception; while it correlates
to a certain extent with pathological phenomena, it does not explain
them. The emergence of resistance in the treatment process necessitated
the concept of repression, a view of the mind dynamically divided
against itself. "If anyone should seek to regard the theory of
repression and of resistance as assumptions instead of as results
88
following from psychoanalysis, I should oppose him most emphatically ." 8
The concept of repression, deduced from the results of clinical
method, derives its validity from what it has the power to explain,
what it can make sense of. Psychic determinism underlies what here
constitutes the rudiments of the interpretive method: that the surface,
to be intelligible and exhaustively explained, must be viewed in terms
of its hidden determinants. Again, the interpretive method intends
not to reduce one to the other but to enhance one by the other. (This
remains true despite the fact that in recent times pseudo-interpreta-
tion has been used to mask some lazy and pernicious clinical work, for
example the pervasiveness of the "nothing but" phenomenon--"That 1 s
nothing but hostility.")
The Emergence of Sexuality
There is one further discovery that comes with the introduction
of free association, and that is the importance of sexuality in the
etiology of the neuroses. At this point (around the time of the
writing of the Studies on Hysteria ), the notion of conversion hysteria
being caused by the memory of a traumatic event was still retained;
yet more and more the event turned out to be sexual in nature and to
have occurred in early childhood. Thus the etiology stood as follows:
an event occurs in early childhood which contains an incompatible
idea, probably sexual; some form of psychic defense moves in to
separate the idea from its correlated affect; this act of repression
works reasonably well until puberty, when the reactivation of sexuality
necessitates further repressions, resulting in compromise formations
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which then manifest themselves as symptoms. They are compromises in
that they fend off sexuality and do not allow it expression until it
is so disguised as to appear asexual, but ultimately they do permit
some satisfaction. This formulation provided the starting point for
the individuation of the various neuroses, with the traumatic event
in hysteria being an instance of parental seduction.
All of the data accumulated thus far was leading Freud more and
more toward a preoccupation with the nature of the repressed material.
It is important to bear in mind that at this point (1895-6) he had
already abandoned the Scientific Project
, his first attempt at
constructing a comprehensive general psychology. The Project evidences
Freud's growing concentration on drives as a major explanatory factor
of consciousness and the unconscious mind. The motivating force be-
hind the differentiation of the ego (ego at this time is roughly
equated with conscious processes), is seen as being the need to find
some relief from relenteless endogenous stimuli through the ego's
mediating between innate drives and external reality.
The following picture of the infant's psychological origins
emerges from the Project . Conflict is built into the instinctual
inheritance of the human organism, if for no other reason than
extreme neonatal immaturity and prolonged developmental process.
Instinct, in the Freudian lexicon, refers to mental representations of
somatic needs, not to fixed, "instinctive" patterns of behavior.
Because of the human infant's inability, motor and psychic, to satisfy
its needs it is subject to constant internal tension. While the infant
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has neither concept of self nor concept of other, it requires
concrete objects in the world for the satisfaction of its needs. At
first it strives to attain release from internal tension through
hallucinatory wish fulfillment. This tendency toward tension re-
duction Freud names the pleasure principle; the process of immediate
drive discharge through hallucinatory wish fulfillment is the essence
of what he terms primary process thought.
Eventually, wishful thinking being what it is, real dissatis-
faction, increasing somatic tension, confront the infant with the
discrepancy between hallucination and reality; the infant must begin
to distinguish between internal and external. In the beginning the
pleasure principle is maintained through the illusion that everything
needed is contained within the organism. Gradually, as the ego is
differentiated, immediate drive discharge through hallucination is
abandoned in favor of delay, which gives rise to memory and thought
—
what Freud termed secondary process. He is suggesting that thought
arises only through the discrepancy between internal psychic reality,
which is at first hallucinatory, and the actual satisfactions provided
by the external world. If it were possible for all a baby's needs to
be satisfied immediately, we would not be thinking creatures; it is
not possible, not merely because parents aren't fast enough or smart
enough, but because the psychic equipment with which the infant enters
the world is too fragmentary and too vulnerable. Every child must, of
necessity, be subjected to these same learning tasks.
The process of development requires that another person have
satisfied the infant's needs so that it can sustain memories of
91
satisfaction which it then endeavors to reproduce-first through
hallucination and then through action guided by thought. In this
regard, psychoanalysis implicates social relations at the heart of
development. This is particularly important given that Freud appears
to neglect the impact of external objects on early development in his
assertion that for quite some time the infant has no genuine concept
of "other." What psychoanalysis says, in fact, is that we are as
psychologically precarious as we are, precisely because of being born
both needing a concept of other, due to our dependence, and yet unable
to sustain such a concept. Much of the story of early development
centers around the gradual achievement of the concept of an object--
a fact which has the most important implications for our adult social
relations. "It is a basic contradiction between the longing for
relaxation and the longing for objects which is said to be the fore-
runner of love and hate ." 9
If the ego does not develop through the direct influence of
objects (as opposed to the Neo Freudian account), then on what
basis does development proceed? Freud suggests that the ego develops
along the concepts of its own body.
Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of an almost
entirely helpless living organism, as yet unoriented in
the world, which is receiving stimuli in its nervous
substance. This organism will very soon be in a position
to make a first distinction and a first orientation. On
the one hand, it will be aware of stimuli which can be
avoided by muscular action (flight); these it ascribes
to the external world. On the other hand, it will also be
aware of stimuli against which such action is of no avail
and whose character of constant pressure persists in spite
of it; these stimuli are the signs of an internal world.
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In later elaborations on the nature of thought, critical
thinking--judgment--is also seen to be grounded in the ego's earliest
stages of development along bodily concepts. The process of negation 12
is based on one of the infant's earliest discriminating modalities,
taking in and spitting out," a rudimentary way of determining
what is acceptable to the organism based on what it is willing to keep
inside itself. Over time, the ideas attached to primitive judgments
("thing presentations") become associated with words, which will provide
the subject with the distance and objectivity required to separate
critical thought and action from wishful thinking.
In the Project
,
Freud attempts a neurophysiological explication of
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these facets of mental function! ng-not in an attempt to reduce their
meaning to the workings of a machine, as has sometimes been asserted,
but rather on the belief that an adequate depiction of mental processes
must include both mechanism and meaning. 13 To that end, Freud
provides a model wherein the shift from quantity (of psychic energy)
to quality accounts for the phenomena of consciousness. He proposes
different neuronal systems for primary and secondary process thinking,
and attributes different motives and functions to the systems.
Against the backdrop of the material realities of the mind, a framework
emerges which is sufficient to capture the intricacy and meaning of
complex persons in their social relationships. Freud has shifted from
an effort to explain some mysterious aspects of mental functioning
to the effort to explain the human subject itself: how does con-
sciousness arise? and in respect to being governed by conscious choices
rather than strict instictual ties between subject and object, what
manner of creature are we? Though he will go on to offer far more
elaborate theories of neurosis and of general development, Freud's
theory of mind, or at least its conceptual framework, is hereby
establ i shed.
Infantile Sexuality: The Libido Theory
In 1897 Freud formulated a major reconceptualization, as seen
in a letter to Fliess: "The physical structures which in hysteria are
subjected to repression are not properly speaking, memories. . . but
impulses deriving from the primal scenes." 14 The notion of re-
pression being instituted due to internal conflict, as representing
a flight from internal danger, has finally been fully integrated into
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the theory. Though Freud had been increasingly faced with the
realization that his patients' early sexual traumas had been, more
often than not, fictitious, he had only reluctantly abandoned the
seduction theory in favor of infantile sexuality. "We have to learn
that sexual instinctual impulses accompany life from birth onwards,
and that it is precisely in order to fend off those instincts that the
infantile ego institutes repressions.
With the adoption of infantile sexuality, the dynamic theory of
mind comes fully into its own; there is a dramatic gain in the theory's
internal coherence and explanatory power. Self-deception only makes sense
if it is one's own impulses about which it is necessary to be deluded.
There is no clear advantage to not knowing about external danger,
since the more one knows, the better one can mount a defense. The
neurophysiological model had always attested to the fact that it was
from mental representations of internal danger that the psychic
mechanism took flight through repression; in the case of external
danger, real flight is more efficient.
Again, clinical experience can be seen to account for a major
source of theoretical speculation: once more it is the fact and
specific quality of transference which provoked these revisions in the
theory.
The fact of transference appearing, although neither
desired nor induced by either physician or patient, in
every neurotic who comes under treatment, in its crude
sexual, or affectionate, or hostile form, has always seemed
to me the most irrefragable proof that the source of the
propelling forces of neurosis lies in the sexual life. 16
Infantile sexuality is of great importance both for the understanding
95
of neurosis and for maintaining a dynamic theory of unconscious
processes—clearly these two factors are closely linked. In speaking
of the diphasic onset of human sexuality, Freud directly equated the
nature of sexual development with the singularly human trait of be-
coming neurotic. It is in large measure due to the fact that the
sexual instincts are capable of displacement and substitution to such a
great extent and over such a protracted period of time that neurosis
is a viable adaptation pattern for human beings.
We are thus left with the following etiology of hysterical
symptomol ogy: a child experiences her early sexual impulses as in-
compatible and institutes some form of repression against them, re-
fusing entry into consciousness of the ideational representations of
these impulses and severing the ideas from their accompanying affects;
during puberty those earlier impulses, whose ideational representations
have flourished in the unconscious, become unmanageable and additional
repression is required; the impulses find "substitute satisfaction"
in the form of a symptom— the symptom expresses both a repressed sexual
impulse and also accommodates the standards of the ego. In short:
"The patient's symptoms constitute his sexual activity ."
17
The Dream Theory
It remains for us to look at one additional aspect of psycho-
analytic theory and practice which is of great significance for a
general theory of the unconscious and also of special importance for
an understanding of the role of sexuality in symptom formation. Let
us begin by looking at the manner in which Freud first came to study
dreams
:
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It was discovered one day that the pathological symptoms
of certain neurotic patients have a sense. On this dis-
covery the psychoanalytic method of treatment was foundedIt happened in the course of this treatment that patients,instead of bringing forward their symptoms, brought forwarddreams. A suspicion arose that the dreams too had a sense. 18
From this it can be seen that dreams occupy a place in psycho-
analytic epistemology similar to that of symptoms, and they afford
confirmation of the principle of psychic determinism: dreams are
meaningful psychic events and their meaning cannot be reduced to the
neurological mechanisms by which they occur. That is, one cannot
exhaust the meaning of a dream by explaining the physiological factors
that occasion it— though contemporary researchers are still engaged
in such endeavors.
While the dream theory can be established separately from that
of the neuroses, the unconscious, and repression, it reflects back on
those aspects of psychoanalytic theory significantly. Freud summarized
the crucial theoretical connection between dreams and the unconscious
and repression as follows: "... the essential characteristic and
the most significant part of my dream theory— the reduction of dream
distortion to an inner conflict, a kind of inward dishonesty— . .
The dream theory states that every dream is a wish fulfillment, and
that the wishes are disguised. The first half of that statement re-
flects the significance of drives (represented in the wishes), and the
second lays the groundwork for an understanding of the unconscious
mental processes (the manner in which the mind creates these disguises);
together they underline the role of conflict in dreaming (the motive
for disguise). Dreams afforded Freud the clearest opportunity to study
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the laws which govern unconscious mental operations. He stated: "The
best part of what we know of these processes in the unconscious is
derived from our study of the dream-work ." 20 Through the dream-work
(the mechanism of disguise), the latent content of the dream (the wish,
which is the mental representation of an instinctual drive) is trans-
posed into the manifest content (the disguised wish). This provided
the first detailed description of primary process, and displayed the
unconscious as being regulated by the pleasure principle, since it
hallucinates a wish as being satisfied in order to attain immediate
drive discharge (in the case of dreaming, this allows the subject to
continue sleeping undisturbed), tolerates mutually contradictory ideas,
has no sense of time or space, and readily condenses and displaces
ideas. Freud was also able to deduce, therefore, that the mechanism
of dream construction provides a model for understanding the manner
in which neurotic symptoms are formed.
The significance of the dream theory derives from the fact that
it provides a study of non-pathol ogical aspects of human mental
phenomena, and from the fact that the line of investigation which leads
to it can be carried out independently of any of the evidence and
proofs which establish the theory of symptom formation. A variety of
proofs are adduced to support the thesis that a dream expresses a
disguised wish: children's dreams, which express undisguised wishes;
that the wishes in adult dreams can be undisguised through psycho-
analytic dream interpretation; the appearance in dreams of primal
symbols, whose meaning can be established independently of dream
interpretation; the character of the wishes themsel ves--their un-
98
acceptable nature explains why they would be disguised. The independent
verification of the dream theory lends considerable confirmation and
also universal applicability to Freudian suppositions regarding the
unconscious and repression.
Thus the dream theory, taken in conjunction with the Scientific
Project, provides a model for mental functioning that is grounded in
material reality— the necessities of the body— yet sophisticated
enough to confront the human subject on its own terms. The differ-
entiated neuronal systems of the Project
,
which correspond to freely
mobile (primary process) vs. bound (secondary process) psychic energy
can now be seen in terms of the complex motives and functions that
they serve. The pleasure principle operates at many interrelated
levels of meaning and purpose: in sleep the ego withdraws its interest
from the outside world and returns to hallucinatory wish fulfillment.
At the simplest organismic level, dreams are the "guardians of sleep."
They prevent a buildup of tension from arousing the dreamer. Yet no
two people create the same dream, and only an extraordinarily complex
psychic apparatus can help to account for the specific sources and
meanings of any individual's dream images.
In summary, then, we see the way in which psychoanalytic theory
and practice evolved: the unconscious and repression are deduced
(first in the descriptive and later in the dynamic sense) from symptoms,
dreams, parapraxes, transference, and resistance; in the course of
developing a theory which could explain these phenomena, drives and
eventually infantile sexuality were postulated. Freud had this to say
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about the historical development of psychoanalytic theory:
the other new factors which were added to thecathartic procedure as a result of my work, transforming
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The theory as formulated thus far affords the following con-
struction of the unconscious and repression: consciousness and the
unconscious are not merely descriptive terms; ideas may be strong or
active and unconscious, in which case they will be inaccessible to
consciousness without encountering resistances; ideas may be merely
temporarily unconscious, in which case they may now be thought of as
unconscious descriptively but preconscious dynamical ly--that is, they
can enter consciousness without encountering resistance. The ego
institutes acts of repression against ideational representations of
impulses emanating from the unconscious which are incompatible with
its task of self-preservation, the ideas remain in the unconscious,
and their derivatives continue to influence development and behavior,
while the ego has lost its control over them and has been to that
degree impoverished of its strength. In the coming years, Freud will
increasingly struggle with the implications of the fact that these
two sides of the mind, each functioning according to its own set of
principles, are not necessarily available to each other. In attempting
to accord full meaning to conscious phenomena by interpreting them in
terms of their biological substratum, he will build an increasingly
complex picture of the human mind. With the passage of time, a
description of the mind in terms of what can and cannot be admitted
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to consciousness will fall short of what is required to describe the
person in his or her total experience.
The Systematic Theory of Mind
The theory thus stated raised several questions, as did it
point in certain specific directions for continued development and
research. In particular, Freud was to focus over the next several
years on the nature of repressed drives. This research, once again,
had both clinical and theoretical sources. While the theoretical
writings reflect a continuing effort to document the nature and stages
of 1 ibidinal development (in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality
,
for example), there were also a number of problematic factors in
Freud's practice with which he was forced to come to grips. These
involved him in an ongoing exploration of the forces, or agency, of
repression. Ultimately he was to postulate the existence of the ego
instincts, which had their own source of psychic energy and whose
purpose it was to oppose the sexual instincts. In order to accomodate
the fact of unconscious processes pertaining to the ego, Freud developed
his theory of the unconscious mind from a dynamic into a systematic
one. That is, if we are unable to equate the ego with consciousness,
if we must admit that some ego processes are unconscious, then it
is more sensible to organize the mental apparatus around general systems
of functions than around the two qualities of a thought being either
conscious or unconscious. Each mental system, (Preconscious
,
Conscious, and Unconscious) has certain qualities and properties, and
operates according to its own set of laws and principles in order to
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fulfill its functions and purposes.
Freud's speculations during this period culminated in the meta-
psychological essays which present a detailed classification of the
instincts, explicate the process of repression, and the relationship
between repression and libidinal development, and formulate the
systematic theory of mind.
As Freud continued in his practice, two obstacles to treatment
had become more and more troublesome: the overdetermination of symptoms
(that they can seemingly be traced to many different causative
factors), and, more important, the refusal of a neurosis to disappear
even though all its symptoms might, one-by-one, be cleared up. His
attempt to develop a more adequate theory of the neuroses, one which
could account for more than the symptoms (which had come to seem like
merely the surface characteristics of the neurosis), is clearly reflected
in his theoretical writings during the first fifteen years of the
twentieth century.
By 1915, in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud was
employing a fully developed language for the instincts--each of the
innumerable component instincts was described in terms of its impetus,
aim, object, and source. (For the purposes of psychoanalysis, only
aim, the mode in which satisfaction is achieved, and object, the
person or thing that affords satisfaction, remain significant.) He
went on, in that article, to present his first real attempt at
classification: the self-preservative or ego-instincts vs. the sexual
instincts. Despite the fact that very little more was said about the
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ego instincts at this point, their emergence in the theory is
critical, for the reworking of the theory of the unconscious from the
dynamic to the systematic conception is concurrent with this oppositional
classification of the instincts. The paper goes on to trace the
vicissitudes of the sexual instincts, essentially in terms of the
possibilities for pathological development. Reversal, turning around
upon the self, repression, and sublimation are seen as modes of de-
fense against instinctual impulses. The first two alone are not
enough to account for neurosis-they will establish fixation points
that result in perverted or inverted forms of adult sexuality. To
account for neurosis, Freud needed to examine repression.
This he does, most significantly in two metapsychological
papers also written in 1915, entitled "Repression" and "The Unconscious."
The 1915 essays offer the fullest expositions of these two central
concepts and their relationship to the drives and the neuroses.
Repression is now elaborated as a three-phase process. In primal
repression, the ideational representations of instinctual impulses are
refused entry to consciousness. This then establishes a fixation point
in devel opment-- the instinct remains attached to the presentation which
continues unaltered in the unconscious, sends out mental derivatives,
and makes associative connections. The second phase of repression,
termed repression proper, involves the derivatives of the repressed
instinct-presentation, and the associative chains of thought with
which it has become linked. Repression then consists merely in pre-
venting those ideas from reaching consciousness--they are not destroyed,
but rather preserved in the unconscious where they continue to flourish.
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Repression, of course, does not succeed in barring all mental der-
ivatives of the instinct-presentation from consciousness-if it did,
we would never even know that it had occurred. When these derivatives
attain a form sufficiently different from the original idea, they are
permitted to emerge. "Neurotic symptoms, too, must have filled the
condition referred to, for they are derivatives of the repressed,
which has finally by means of these formations wrested from con-
sciousness the right of way previously denied it ." 22 The third phase
is termed by Freud the return of the repressed: the forces of
repression prove unequal to the strength of the instinctual impulses
(which may be provoked by some frustration that succeeds in touching
the primal repression), and that is when symptoms will form.
Freud postulated the notions of anticathexis and hyper-
cathexis to explain economically how repression works, and how it
may be reversed, that is, where the forces of repression get the psychic
energy to perform their task, and what manner of psychological change
is necessary to undo that. Freud stated that, "... in reality
there is no lifting of the repression until the conscious idea, after
overcoming the resistances, has united with the unconscious memory-
23trace." It is possible to tell a person something of which he or
she is not yet conscious, and though that idea might then be held in
the conscious mind it will not necessarily produce any genuine change
in consciousness or undo the repression that had banished the idea to
the unconscious.
Freud goes on to formulate the systematic theory of mind in which
the topographic aspect (referring to spatial, though not necessarily
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strictly anatomical locations) of mental functioning becomes inte-
grated with the dynamic and economic aspects: the system Ucs,
primitive and ancient, consists of that which is innate and inherited
as well as all that is placed there by acts of repression; the system
Pcs contains all thoughts which are unconscious only descriptively, and
may at any time gain access to consciousness; the system Cs, (which
is more or less the equivalent of the ego), evolved from the outer-
most cortical layer of the brain and in most direct contact with the
world, is responsible first for differentiating between internal and
external, and then mediating between the two. Each system has its own
rules, qualities, and functions. We then have a model in which anti-
cathexis (repression) is seen to occur principally between the systems
Pcs and Ucs. Within this framework, hypercathexis, the reversal of
repression, also takes on a specific, non-metaphorical meaning.
The Metapsychology
Freud's metapsychology is a highly problematic component of his
theory. There is no agreed upon definition for the term, nor is there
consensus on its role in theory building. Contemporary thinkers
consider it to be largely a biologistic embarassment. Yet in the
context of the reading of Freud offered here, it can be defended as
the epitome of that level of psychoanalytic explanation which lends
itself to a radical social theory . 24
Freud considered his metapsychology the attempt to describe
psychological propositions in economic, dynamic, and topographic
dimensions. In the absence of an adequate definition of metapsychology,
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it appears Freud was aiming at a psychological conception which
would capture what Paul Ricoeur25 has termed the elements of "force"
and "desire:" a conception which does not reduce one to the other but
insists on holding several levels of explanation and description
simultaneously. Marie Jahoda suggests that through the metapsychology
Freud turns his attention to those questions about human nature which
he considered to be most fundamental and most pressing: "the dynamics
of conflict; the limitations of self-knowledge; the reducibility of
meaning to mechanism; personality; development; and relation to
environment." 2^
Through his continued insistence on the juxtaposition of
quantitative and qualitative explanation, Freud provides, from the
Project to the metapsychology, a model in which the development of a
concept of reality is of necessity linked to a model of moral develop-
ment; thinking emerges only through the conflictual interaction of the
dependent infant with the responsible social world. The metapsycho-
logical presentation of repression offers a nonmetaphorical description
of the process of self-deception which is integral to psychic survival,
and consequently a nonmetaphorical description of the reversal of
that process. This will be of critical importance when we come to
evaluate what is required to effectuate not only a change in
consciousness but a change that enhances the individual's capacities
for committed political action and involvement in committed social
groups.
The metapsychology also provides a framework in which to assess
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the role of emotions in psychological change. In these essays Freud
distinguishes very carefully between repressed ideas and "repressed"
affects, stating that, in fact, there are no "repressed" affects.
The affect which has been severed from its idea may suffer one of
three fates: remain as it is, be suppressed or inhibited altogether,
or be transformed into another charge of affect. While the manner in
which repression works is that its force is directed against ideas, if
it doesn t squelch the affect it will not have succeeded. Thus the fate
of the affect is important for any understanding of neurotic symptoms.
In conversion hysteria, for instance, the idea disappears altogether
(though the area of the body in which the symptom appears may be
governed by the idea), and the affect may be seen as
an excessive innervation (in typical cases a somatic
innervation), sometimes of a sensory, sometimes of a
motor character, either as an excitation or as an
inhibition. . . . Insofar as it is rendered possible
only be .means of extensive substitute formations, the
repression which takes place in hysteria may be pro-
nounced entirely unsuccessful; with reference to
mastering the charge of affect, however, which is the
task of repression, it generally betokens a complete
success.
It has never been altogether clarified what part the release
of feeling, or "abreaction," will play in hypercathexis
,
and therefore
in the therapeutic process. The relationship between abreaction and
insight is of particular interest. Many of the contemporary therapies
rely almost exclusively on reclamation and expression of feeling, either
as the means to insight or, in the belief that insight is irrelevant,
as ends in themselves. The humanistic therapies, in all their variety,
tend to share this premium on expression of emotion. Psychoanalysis
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distinguishes between emotions which are mature and those which are
not (the latter being tied to infantile drives), as well as between
modes of expression which have or have not been mediated over a de-
velopmental process. The analytic method discourages the expression
of immature, unmediated affect, in that such expression is likely to
satisfy the conditions of drive discharge sufficiently that it will
block rather than enhance insight; coming under the sway of the
pleasure principle, it reflects a wishful attachment to childish
satisfactions and is incompatible with correct judgment and a concept
of reality. The release of emotion, under these conditions, is seen
as likely to intensify rather than undo an early fixation point
precisely by gratifying the impulses behind the fixation. Under less
than optimum conditions, the partial undoing of defenses required for
the release of affect may have a distinctly harmful effect, leading
to serious regression or even disintegration of ego strength.
Psychoanalysis is indeed not clear on the precise relation of
affect and expression to insight; the psychoanalytic method requires
recollecting archaic feelings and subjecting them to intellectual
scrutiny, rather than "acting them out." Underlying this requirement
is the belief—or at least the hope, for it is not spelled out
theoretical ly— that the reclaimed affects and their energic force may
then be integrated into the adult personality. Certainly psycho-
analysis can be used as a rationalization for maintaining intellectual
defenses at the expense of expressiveness and at the expense of the
body, which must, after all, contain this energy in some manner. None-
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the! ess
, the metapsychology provides a conceptual framework in which
to view the tension between intellect and affect, and in so doing,
provides for the fuller working out of the relation between the two
in the process of change. Therapies which celebrate the uncritical
release of feeling may do as much to undermine change in conscious-
ness as to enhance it.
The highly abstract metapsychol ogical speculations are to be
viewed now against the richly elaborated developmental phases of the
libido (see Chapter IV) and the concurrent process of ego development;
from this admixture a much richer and more coherent theory of neurosis
emerges.
Children are protected against the idangers that threaten
them from the external world by the solicitude of their
parents; they pay for this security by a fear of loss of
love which would deliver them over helpless to the dangers
of the external world. . . .the child embarks on his attempts
at defence— repression—which are effective for the moment
but nevertheless turn out to be psychologically inadequate
when the later re-animation of sexual life brings a re-
inforcement to the instinctual demands which have been
repudiated in the past. If this is so, it would have to
be said from a biological standpoint that the ego comes to
grief over the task of mastering the excitation of the
early sexual period, at a time when its immaturity makes it
incompetent to do so. It is in this lagging of ego develop-
ment behind libidinal development that we see the essential
precondition of neurosis. 28
The revisions in psychoanalysis which come after the meta-
psychol ogical papers do not fundamentally alter the theory of re-
pression and the unconscious; they will be presented here only in
order to give an over all perspective of the growth of the theory and
also because these changes have at times been misconstrued as
constituting a rejection of the central significance and force of the
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unconscious and repression.
The Death Instinct
Beyond the Pleasure Principle entails a major reclassification
of the instincts, and also forms a central building block of what is
to become Freud's next view of the organization of the psyche. Here,
as so often before, the theory was reworked in order to accommodate
certain phenomena emerging within Freud's clinical practice. Specific-
ally, Freud sought a way to explain the phenomenon of repetition
compulsion, particularly as it occurred in the veterans of World War I
who returned suffering from traumatic nervous disorders. What, he
asked, could be presumed to account for the compulsion to return to
experiences which could not in any way be described as affording
pleasure? Furthermore, earlier work on narcissism had led him to the
conclusion that both the sexual and ego instincts were libidinal in
origin--that is, they drew their energy from the same source. They
might often be in conflict, but structurally they were not oppositional.
Hence, some other force had to be postulated in order to maintain the
instinctual dualism at the heart of the dynamic point of view. The
overarching dualism is now seen as life against death rather than as
a conflict between the sexual and ego instincts.
This late reclassification of the instincts provides a more
coherent ontological theory concerning the primary driving forces of
human motivation, and can account for phenomena which the pleasure
principle cannot. The new theory represents a major step forward in
explanatory power, yet also leaves a problematic legacy in its wake,
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particularly in its application to clinical practice (and through
that indirect connection, to research and general theory development).
While the death instinct is essentially a biological concept, not
verifiable through psychoanalytic evidence (or any psychological
evidence for that matter), its derivative, the destructive drive, is
a manifest, observable entity. The death instinct remains highly
controversial within psychoanalytic circles, but innate destructive-
ness was a concept which practitioners were quick to adopt. (In
general it might be said that the death instinct and the destructive
drive have both been accepted or rejected more for their moral implica-
tions than on grounds of scientific validity; this was certainly true
in the area of clinical practice.)
The old theories could not be directly applied to the
phenomena; the latter had first to be analyzed, i.e.,
thei r unconscious meaning had to be investigated. But
classifications such as "erotic" or "destructive" could
be applied directly to the raw material of observation,
without any previous analytic work of distilling and
refining (or with a bare minimum of it): they could be
applied.
. . according to physiognomic rather than psycho-
analytic criteria, i.e., judging from outward appearance
rather than from the meaning they yield to analytic study.
It is easy to say that a patient is hostile, much easier
than, e.g., the reconstruction of an unconscious fantasy
from transference behavior .
&
[Italics mine]
The trend toward easy characterizations rather than arduous grappling
with unconscious instinctual material which begins here will be
compounded by the next major revision in analytic theory, the shift
from the systematic to the structural conception of mind.
The Structural Theory
The final theoretical revision of major importance (within the
Ill
scope of this paper, that is-there is also the later work on anxiety
which is, in other contexts, extremely important) is Freud's modulation
of the systematic into the structural theory. Here he postulates
three discrete agencies of the mind, the famous trio id, ego, and
superego. The agencies are each seen as having many various functions,
processes, and qualities, including that of being conscious or un-
conscious.
The following quote shows that, by the time Freud had culminated
his work explicating the unconscious, the term had ceased to hold the
same significance for him:
It would put an end to all misunderstandings if, from now
on, in describing the various kinds of mental acts we
were to pay no attention to whether they were conscious
or unconscious, but, when classifying and correlating them,
inquired only to which instincts and aims they were related
how they were composed and to which of the systems in the
mind that are superimposed one upon another they belonged
.
30
The systematic conceptualization had been devised primarily as a result
of investigating repressed drives, and the resultant awareness that
aspects of the ego were unconscious. From here Freud was led more and
more to explore the agency of repression, and it was this exploration,
coupled with the need to account for exceedingly destructive guilt
feelings in his patients that motivated the shift from the systematic
to the structural conceptualization. The structural theory again
represents an impressive step forward in the explanatory power of
psychoanalysi s . For the first time Freud has put forth a theory of
the whole person, rather than one that accounts for mental qualities
and events. In the earliest years he was entirely preoccupied with
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unconscious processes; during the period that followed he gradually
turned his attention to consciousness. Finally the inexplicable
phenomenon of relentless feelings of guilt which he encountered in
his practice (and had been extremely concerned with from the time of
the writing of Beyond the Pleasure Principle! forces him to adopt a
vantage point from which he can look at the totality of a person's
motives.
Freud proposes that personality should be regarded as
a habitual mixture of purposes to which human actions
are geared: satisfying needs of the organism [id],
meeting internalized standards [superego], and relating to
the external world, its demands and opportunities [ego]. 3 "!
In adopting this point of view, it seems almost inevitable that he
will describe the mind in terms of structures--the cumulative and
enduri ng resul ts of a tenuous and only abstractly predictable develop-
ment— rather than in terms of processes, which are by definition less
grounded in historical context.
The id is described essentially as was the system Ucs. The
two major changes consist in the addition of the superego, and in the
richness and complexity of the ego as it is now presented. In The
Ego and the Id
the ego is introduced as a coherent organization of
mental processes (p. 15) which arises from identifications
with abandoned objects (pp. 36 ff.), is organized primarily
around the system perception-conscious (pp. 27-8), but
also includes the structures which are responsible for
resistances and are unconscious (in the same sense as
the Id is, pp. 16-18), has neutral energies at its dis-
posal (pp. 61-63), and can transform the energies of
instinctual drives into energies of its own (pp. 64-5).
The superego is introduced (though it had been hinted at earlier,
generally referred to as the ego ideal, in, for instance, the essay
113
On Narcissism") as a separate agency which had been differentiated
out of the ego and with the specific task of observing and passing
judgment on the ego. It is described as the inheritor of the Oedipus
complex (in the form of parental introjects to enforce the incest
taboo), and as representing the conscience.
The adoption of the structural theory brought serious and often
unexamined problems along with its explanatory advances, in much the
same manner as did the introduction of the death instinct. The
structural theory provided another easy way out for cl inicians--another
support for offering global characterizations of a patient's "person-
ality" rather than staying with the tortuous process of investigating
unconscious processes. It is possible to interpret the structural
theory— in clinical terms— as indicating a shift in the goal of treat-
ment from expanded self-knowledge to a smoother, more functionally
adaptive relationship among the mental agencies, and between the
patient and his or her social world. This was not Freud's intention.
His final formulation of the aims of therapeutic treatment— "Where Id
was there Ego shall be"—clearly locates self-knowledge at the center
of the process of reducing conflict among the provinces of the mind
and among the varied motives and aims of the total person. Nonetheless,
the structural theory provided, for those who wanted it, a more finite
set of answers by which to define health than could a doctrine which
had no answers other than to assert that pursuit of the truth about
oneself counted above all else.
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In the abstract, then, Freud's theory of personality (the
relations among id, ego, and superego) is not normative. Yet it is
with the introduction of the concept of personality that even he begins
to generalize about the outcome of "normal" psychological adulthood-
ground on which until then he had feared to tread. Albeit with serious
reservations, he takes the context that personality theory begins to
provide for viewing the early stages of libidinal development and
speculates on the differentiation of female from male personality.
From the very beginning the discussion is fraught with ambiguity, for
the term personality seems clearly to convey more than an abstract
set of principles governing the relations among the mental provinces.
The word rapidly begins to blend its psychoanalytic with its popular
meaning—and though :: probably everyone understands what is being re-
ferred to in the notion of "personal ity , " few people could actually
offer a definition. Consequently, Freud is moving in territory that
is both psychoanalytic and not, with no set of theoretical principles
governing that movement, nor even making those discriminations. It
is not at all clear, for instance, on what theoretical grounds he
arrives at the conclusion that because narcissism and masochism are
prevalent psychic phenomena in the little girl's development, they
then enter the mainstream of her adult personality and become
acceptable normative characterizations of her style, mode of percep-
tion, object relations, and general orientation toward life.
This process of generalization begins with the shift to the
structural theory: examination of conscious and unconscious mental
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processes does not lead to distinctions between the sexes; examina-
tion of repressed content may point up some differences but does not
suggest a framework within which to theorize about those differences.
Once one begins to view early development, and the repressed material
of that early development as being ultimately intertwined with the
motives, purposes, and aims of the whole person, concepts such as
masochism, narcissism, and passivity may be construed to transcend
their meaning as psychic constructs and attain normative value as they
are generalized into the adult personality. One does not necessarily
stop at saying that there is a high incidence of masochistic fantasy
in oedipal girls; even Freud, against his own cautions
, goes on to
suggest that the normal" female personality is more masochistic.^
In fact, on close scrutiny, it becomes apparent that the theory
of psychosexual differentiation is built almost entirely upon the
structural theory. It is differences in the process of superego for-
mation, in turn dependent upon differences in the oedipal experience
of boys and girls, which lays the groundwork for the alternate pictures
of personality development painted for men and women. It appeared
that the structural theory finally provided Freud with a framework
in which to view the development of the whole person; that it estab-
lished the links between a basic conception of the nature of the
human mind, the phases of libidinal development, and the emergence of
an integrated personality from that developmental process. Yet those
who came after Freud lost the links between those facets of psycho-
analysis and it remains to be seen whether their error derives in part
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from Freud's legaey-whether in fact, the connections Freud made
between psychosexual development and personality were correct and
whether those connections are compatible with his theory of mind. How,
indeed, does one generalize from qualities and processes present in
everyone s psychic development, to normative presumptions about the
way those processes enter the mainstream of personality? To what
extent is it possible or theoretically logical to make those generaliza-
tions along the lines of gender? What theoretical steps are involved
in the process by which Freud came to a view of the female personality
as passive, narcissistic, and masochistic, and is that process de-
fensible? In what ways have successive generations drawn upon Freud's
late work to build a value-laden psychology of "normal" personal ity
rather than a psychology and a clinical method dedicated to the
discovery of truth, whatever it may be?
To explore these questions, the next two chapters will examine
in detail the theory of psychosexual development, and the manner in
which a theory of personality was extrapolated from it. I will focus
particularly on the Oedipus complex, which is the nucleus of Freud's
theory of personality (and of his notions on moral development, which
are often ambiguously intertwined with gender-linked notions of
personality development), in hopes of making explicit and evaluating the
connection between psychosexual developmental theory and the formula-
tion of a theory of personality. It is the aim of the next two chapters
to disentangle from Freud's own work and the writings which came after
his, material and method which are not, strictly speaking, psycho-
analytic.
CHAPTER IV
THE THEORY OF PSYCHOSEXUAL DEVELOPMENT
Overview
From the outset, Freud's theory of mind presumes a genetic point
of view. Because of the lessening of "instinctive," biologically de-
etermined behavior patterns, human beings are to be viewed in terms of
how they become who they are. The components of adult personality
are not inscribed onto the infant psyche, awaiting only nourishment
and time for maturation. At every turning point the nonidentity between
internal, psychic reality and external, objective reality will spur
the infant's ego development. Freud locates infantile sexual drives at
the center of this motivating conflict, and posits a series of
developmental tasks and crises endemic to the concurrent, but not
coincidental, maturation of the ego and the sexual instincts.
The Oedipal conflict is axial among those tasks and crises, and
lays the foundation for the emergence of the adult psyche: it is a
period during which childhood passion is left behind, gender identity
and sexual orientation are established, the superego is formed,
and the structured and structuring ego as well; for only
then, on the strength of its new identifications and the
desexualized energy now available to it for sublimated
activity, does the ego begin to function as an organized,
independent, and influential agency.
1
It is also this picture of the different resolution of the Oedipus
Complex in boys and girls, and the impact of that resolution on superego
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development, that provides the starting point for Freud's speculations
on female personality.
In order to understand the explanatory enterprise inherent in
Freud's evocation of the Oedipal constellation, it is necessary to view
it in the context of his theory of libidinal development as a whole.
Taken out of that context, concepts such as penis envy and castration
anxiety indeed become meaningless, or even foolish. Critics of Freud
have reworked the Oedipal conflict (or discarded it) in order to make
childhood development compatible with a preferred view of adulthood,
particularly with reference to an assessment of gender differences,
yet to rewrite the Oedipal complex with an eye only to what comes
after it and not before is to essentially eviscerate Freud's conceptual
framework for understanding how men and women come into being. Con-
versely, but with the same result, object relations theorists shift
the emphasis to what comes before (i.e., from Oedipal to preoedipal
factors), at the expense of accounting for how those early develop-
ments must then be mediated before the person is fully formed. In
contrast, psychoanalysi s poses the question of human sexuality in such
a manner as to expose its very roots.
. . . how does a newborn baby, who must certainly not
be credited with having a psychological representation
of his sexual equipment, but who has a bi-sexual psycho-
logical potential, develop a psychological identity as a
man or a woman? The question so formulated indicates
immediately that Freud conceived of the process not as
a foregone conclusion, not as the inevitable unfolding
of maturation, but as an active interplay between the
child and varying sequences of external events; hence
a process beset by difficulties whose mastery or mere
endurance determines the type of sexual identification
which is ultimately achieved.
2
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In order to elucidate the criteria by which to evaluate and
revise Freud's account of the Oedipal conflict and the gender related
personality traits he presumed to emerge from its resolution, I will
first present a summary of his basic notions on libidinal development.
It will then be possible to discern in what manner he saw this crisis
in libidinal development as contributing to the physical achievements
which are integral to adulthood.
In following Freud's developmental account it is important to
remember that by sexuality he means al
1
sensuous strivings, from the
very beginnings of life; and that adult sexuality is what it is only
by virtue of how it comes into being. Sexual instincts, as all
instincts, straddle biological and psychological categories--
instincts are mental representations of somatic drives. For Freud
there is no sexuality that is not psychosexual . Furthermore, Freud's
libido theory is not pansexual
,
as readers often misconstrue it ot
be because of its emphasis on sexuality. The importance of sexuality
derives from its conflict with other trends--in the early theory with
the ego instincts and later on with the death instinct. The complexity
of human life, of "abnormalities" in development, derives from the
necessity of mediating instinctual impulses over a long period of time
and through the agency of the immature ego, whose nature and develop-
ment in turn depend on its role in the mediating process. Sexuality
plays the specific role that it does by virtue of its peculiar qualities--
its antiquity, its imperiousness, its plasticity, and its proneness to
mal development or fixations." That is, it is present from the earliest
moments, does not tolerate much frustration, readily undergoes trans-
120
formation into other psychic trends, and the transformative process
has a close connection to pathological phenomena.
The Erotogenic Zones
As pointed out earlier, Freud describes the instincts in terms
of impetus, source, aim, and object. He turns his attention to aim
and object, relegating the study of source and impetus to biology.
Adult sexuality is a synthesis of component, partial instincts— infantile
eroticizations of parts of the body, along with the paired instinctual
modalities (each containing an active and a passive side: looking and
being looked at, touching and being touched, inflicting and accepting
pain. The paired instincts "exist separate from sexuality and are
united with it as they are instruments of satisfaction." 4 ) All of
these components must be integrated into adult sexuality over the
extended and tenuous developmental process; adult sexual experience
is multi-layered and resonates against infantile satisfactions and
strivings which have been transcended and subsumed in the final psycho-
sexual organization. Both the aim and the object of libidinal
strivings are mediated over this long developmental cycle, not
identically or simultaneously, and both are subject to a variety of
fixations and developmental failures.
This last point is particularly significant, as the Freudian
account of early ego development relies on an elaboration of aim over
object, and all cultural ist revisions, particularly current object
relations theory, substitute the role of the object as pivotal from the
beginning. The Freudian viewpoint assumes that no development happens
without objects, but goes on to state that in the beginning the infant
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psychs doss not have a concspt of ths objsct. Early sgo development
occurs, therefors
,
primarily undsr ths asgis of ths vicissitudss of ssxual
aims. Sines psychoanalysis implicitly locatss ths objsct at ths csntsr
of ths infant's dsvslopmsnt, objsct rslations really adds nothing to
the Freudian account. By substituting one aspect of psychic develop-
ment for the complex totality, object relations theory offers a
seriously diminished explanation of the origins of the ego--that which
it is so at pains to establish. This argument will become clearer as
we trace below the stages of psychosexual and ego development, beginning
with the history of sexual aims, and continuing our examination with a
look at the changes in the role of the sexual object.
Psychoanalysis views the process of libidinal development through
the concept of an erotogenic zone--the familiar Freudian categories
of oral, anal, phallic, and genital. (It is through the last two that
the role of the object will truly move into the foregound, as the child
enters the Oedipal conflict.) Like other popularized aspects of
Freudian psychology, the stages of libidinal organization have been
highly trivialized and they have entered common parlance as a rather
simplistic typology.
The erotogenic zones are established through association with
an important bodily function, for example the mouth via the feeding
process. The satisfaction of the somatic function is experienced as
pleasurable and an independent need to re-experience that pleasure
sets in. The sexual instinct attaches itself to the survival function
and then becomes separate from it: the aim is sucking, as distinct from
feeding. To underline this point again, though the instinct can be
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gratified only through an object with whom the Infant is Involved, the
young ego does not know this.
.
. .though any instinct can be satisfied only through
an external agency, this initially in no way enters into the
^presentation of the instinct of the concept under
which the instinct is brought.
5
Internal representation of an instinctual object is a later psychic
acquisition, achieved through its own slow and primitive developmental
process. The fact that early experience and memories will be
psychically reworked in terms of later identifications with, and intro-
jections of objects, does not alter this truth.
In a 1915 revision of the Three Essays
, the theory of the eroto-
genic zones is elaborated under the notion of libidinal organization.
A complex of factors—fantasies
,
aims, instinctual vicissitudes, etc.—
are seen as moving through developmental phases under the dominance
of a specific erotogenic zone. With this relatively late revision of
the libido theory.
sexuality is now neatly characterized as a linear
progression moving through the various pregenital
organizations of the libido— the oral, the anal, the
phallic, in that order—and culminating in the genital
organization. For any reader with a general acquaintance
with Freud, it must come as something of a shock to learn
how late it was that Freud came to weld together the two
themes which had been with him for many years— the complex
history of human sexuality, and the erotogenic zones— so
that the former could be divided up into stages by reference
to the latter. 6
Early Object Relations
How does the object enter into the earliest psychic representa-
tions? Initially, as stated above, the infant's psychosexual experience
does not involve an object: the stage of autoerotism. The infant
endeavors to satisfy sexual aims through its own body, and perceives
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them as so satisfied regardless of the presence of an object. The
infant subsequently becomes attached to the person or persons who ful-
fill vital physiological needs and are thereby instruments of sexual
gratification as well. "The first objects of sexual longing, like
sexuality itself, supervene on the infant's dependence on the mother
as the source of food and comfort ." 7 This object attachment is quite
primitive in that, again, the ego has no concept of itself or of an
object but rather experiences itself as if boundaryless, merged with
the environment. The path to object choice is therefore slow and
complicated.
Before object choice proper becomes possible the infant will move
from autoerotism to a phase of primary narcissism. There is still no
psychic representation of an external object, but the ego begins to
have a concept of itself and to take itself as its own object. Psychic
functioning is regulated by the pleasure principle. The primitive
"pleasure ego" perceives all goodness as within the organism, and all
badness or unpleasure as emanating from without. Though it does not
admit of object choice, narcissism does provide the foundation and
possibility for the first form of object choice— identification
. It is
only after primary narcissism has been somewhat mediated, when sexual
aims are further evolved and there has been a concomitant development
of the ego in respect to delay, judgment, and general secondary process
functioning, that object choice proper becomes possible.
With weaning and toilet training, the child's developmental
tasks are becoming increasingly social. The phases of the libido take
on more structured detail: teething transforms oral incorporative
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sexuality to oral cannibalistic. Later, concurrent with the exaggeration
of sadistic impulses found during the dominance of anal sexual aims,
the infant first develops "consideration for the object."
The "Phallic" Libidinal Organization
Eventually, children enter into the period of infantile sexuality
which Freud termed "phallic." The designation is, in and of itself,
problematic-- to use it is to already land oneself in the midst of the
controversy over Freud's supposed phallocentric bias. In the most
straightforward sense, "phallic" implised that the erotogenic zone
under which sexual aims are satisfied during this period is concentrated
in the genital organs. Furthermore, during this period, children re-
cognize only one genital organ--the penis. The first distinction they
make between the sexes is that of phallic vs. castrated. However, the
assumptions which underlie Freud's notion of "phallic primacy" and
therefore his assessment of clitoral and vaginal sexuality have almost
impossibly entangled implications, particularly as he revises the libido
theory and the Oedipus complex in accordance with the structural theory
of mind and begins to speculate on male and female personality.
The important characteri stic of libido in Freud's phallic stage
is that its aims are satisfied through highly "active" sexuality.
Freud appears at this point to begin equating masculine with active
and feminine with passive, despite the fact that he has explicitly
warned against making this assumption.
One might consider characterizing femininity psychologically
as giving preference to passive aims. This is not, of course,
the same things as passivity. . . . It is perhaps the case that
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In choosing to name this period of the emergence of active
sexuality by a term commonly associated with the masculine genital organ,
Freud ignores his own caveat. His equation of active with masculine
will have serious consequences for his assessment of gender differences.
Until entry into the phallic phase, the development of the boy
and girl are seen as identical
-sexual aims up to this point will not
have made a contribution to the ego's concept of itself as gendered.
And this is so not because the male mouth is interchangeable
with the female mouth, or the male anus interchangeable
with the female anus, or the male phallus, i.e., penis,
interchangeable with the female phallus, i.e., clitoris—
which is anyhow obviously not true— but because through
all three phases the function of the dominant organ is
represented in the same way in the two sexes.
9
Because of Freud's implicit, and by his own terms mistaken, equation of
masculine with active, he sees that identity not as neutral
--boys and
girls are alike— but as skewed—girls are like boys. Following Jeanne
Lample-de Groot, 10 when he takes the position that male and female
development do not progress through the Oedipus complex as simple mirror
opposites, he adopts the notion that "the little girl is a little man." 11
The implications of this theoretical position and its problems for
Freud's developmental account will be spelled out below. For immediate
purposes, it is important to maintain some distinction between what
Freud has to say about the development of sexual aims at this stage,
and the valuations that his terminology may be seen to assign.
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In the debate over the connotative—and even the denotative-
implications of the term "phallic," the significance of this develop-
mental period is often obscured. Since the Oedipal period is so much
concerned with object relations, it is easy to lose sight of questions
pertaining to sexual aim. The debate focuses on aim only long enough
to argue whether or not "phallic" is adequate to describe female as
well as male experience-and at that, attempts to answer the question
often fail on grounds that have little to do with the vicissitudes of
sexual aims. Hence the internal relation between the evolution of
sexual aims and object relations is lost. As a result, revisionist
theories eliminate the biological substratum from their account—
they efface the sexual component of "psychosexual . " The Oedipus
complex then becomes a purely social phenomenon. Marcuse was an early
critic of this trend:
... The Oedipus wish is the eternal infantile desire
for the archetype of freedom—freedom from want.
. . if
the child desired only impermissible security and not
impermissible pleasure, the Oedipus complex would indeed
represent an essentially educational problem. As such it
can be treated without exposing the instinctual danger
zones of society. 12
The criticism is not merely academic. Freud has constructed a
paradigm wherein psychosexual development moves forward of necessity
through its own internal tensions as they interact with social factors,
and in so doing acts as catalyst to the developing ego. A depiction of
phallic or Oedipal development which relies solely on social and
relational factors, to the exclusion of the child's own urgent sexual
aims, cannot account for the forward movement of sexuality nor for the
necessity of the ego's attaining its new synthesizing capacities.
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The resolution of the Oedipal crisis is very much a story of
object relations. The phallic period represents the peak of infantile
sexuality. Though the end result will be a radical transformation of
the child s object relations, it is important to remember that in the
Freudian paradigm these changes are initiated at the behest of new
instinctual urgings, and not vice versa. It is the attempt to satisfy
phallic sexual aims--impulses which will grow increasingly threatening
in the child s object world--that brings the child into a crisis in
social relations. The Oedipus complex will confront the child inevitably
with the fact of gender difference; the need to assign meaning to
morphological sex difference occurs in the context of that crisis in
social relations and its resolution will make the most substantial
contribution to the development in the ego of the concept of gender.
The Oedipus Complex
The story is by now familiar even to lay people, and certainly
to students and scholars of Freud, though again it is never safe to
assume that the concepts have been grasped in the context of Freud's
explanatory enterprise as a whole. Writers on the subject seem often
not to remember, for example, that it is infantile sexuality that is in
1
3
question in Oedipal fantasies, and that the phenomenon in its
totality happens largely unconsciously . There are critics who point-
lessly argue that they don't remember thinking any such thing. There
are apologists who are at pains to defend childhood Oedipal theories as
plausible, when in fact unconscious fantasies need not be held account-
able to the criterion of plausibility. For theoretical purposes they
need only be demonstrated as universally or inevitably occurring: if
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they help to make sense of human sexual development they need not, as
it were, "make sense."
The first task, then, is to recapitulate here the Oedipal drama
as Freud described it for the girl and boy. Following that it will be
possible to arrive at an understanding of what aspects of development
he is purporting to account for and how he uses the Oedipal conflict
as an explanatory device. In so doing we may be able to begin to see
where it is possible to separate the specific content that he imparts
to the Oedipus complex from its abstract role in the developmental
schema.
The boy moves gradually from the anal libidinal organization into
the phallic, as he becomes increasingly preoccupied (via fantasy and
masturbation) with his penis as an organ of pleasure. His sexual
needs of the mother intensify with this more active sexuality and he
becomes jealous and possessive.
"For the small boy the penis as a source of pleasure becomes
14
a highly valued possession." With his curiosity and attention
turned toward this valued possession he is bound to make the discovery
that some people--including his mother and sisters--do not have one.
Thus the phallic libidinal organization instigates two phenomena: a
jealous and possessive object relationship with the mother, and the
discovery of morphological sex differences. These two dramatic
psychical events occur more or less simultaneously, and inevitably
become intertwined in meaning: how one stands in relation to desired
objects has something to do with which sex one is, and that is de-
termined (at least in some major part) by which kind of genital organ
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one possesses. (In Freud's view it is determined more simply by whether
or not one has a penis. There is as yet no clinical evidence on fantasi
for either sex regarding the absence, in boys, of a vagina or clitoris,
though it is difficult to say what the failure to collect such data
may mean. Regardless of the possible existence of fantasies, it is my
contention, argued below, that the absent penis will make its own impact
on children of both sexes.) Because jealousy and possessiveness are
integral to this stage of ego differentiation, it seems inevitable that
some form of evaluation will be attached to sex differences. This is
not to imply a specific extent to which jealousy figures into Oedipal
conflict, nor that the evaluations that currently seem to hold sway are
universal, nor that the specific gender roles that at present form
the backdrop for the child's assessments need enter into the valuing
system in the way that they now do. The Freudian model does assert,
however, that all of these are crucial ingredients of the Oedipal
crisis: jealousy, possessiveness, the discovery of gender differences
and the attempt to give meaning to those differences.
It is no doubt true that the Oedipal constellation would take
on different contours and possibilities for resolution if we were to
alter our typical family structure— for instance if fathers were to
assume primary caretaking responsibilities. However, the child's
Oedipal preoccupation with gender difference and with mother vs.
father is not historically constituted— i t cannot be undone by an
alteration of typical sex-roles. Though it is not possible from this
vantage point to gauge what part role expectations play in the concept
of gender identity, it is certainly the case that, at the very least,
the Oedipal child sees role in reproduction as an essential element.
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The questions 'Who am I in my masculinity?/Who am I in my femininity?'
are answered partly in relation to the questions, who is mother?/
who is father?/ How do I stand in relation to the two of them?' And
though some of the Oedipal triangle can be reduced to mother vs. non-
mother rather than mother vs. father (hence female vs. male), it
remains the case that a preoccupation with sex difference is becoming
paramount because it bears so importantly on the dominant organ of
pleasure. If we also remember that the ego develops along bodily
concepts, then we must understand that the little boy is highly
identified with and narcissistically invested in his penis.
For the child, then, sexual difference is something
other than a mere anatomical fact: it is a profound
enigma that leads it to radically question and re-
structure its life. The fact of sexual difference
confronts the child with a radical lack in what had
hitherto been the self-sufficiency of its phallic
narcissism .* 5
Each child must learn this lesson for him or herself. And at this
juncture it is impossible to guess whether the tasks set before the
ego in respect to gender difference would be more or less complicated
for a child raised in a setting other than the traditional nuclear
family J 6
As Freud said, "Childish love has no bounds but also no aim. It
is doomed to disappointment."^ The boy may increasingly desire
sensual/sexual contact with his mother and it may be of a "phallic"
(active) nature, but he does not desire nor is he capable of a
mature sexual relationship. He is trapped in the seemingly ubiquitous
contradiction that ensues from having an intensely sexual constitution
from birth which then takes twelve years or so to achieve maturity
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(that is, to achieve expression through fully integrated sexual aims
and within a developed, whole-object relationship). As Freud said.
It is my belief that, however strange it may sound we
nat,i that southing 7n’thenature of the Jriebe itself is unfavorable to the
realization of complete satisfaction . 18
During the Oedipal period the boy is brought face to face with this
fact of human existence as he accepts the truth of his sexual incomplete-
ness/inadequacy and is forced to relinquish sole ownership of the
object of his sexual desires.
What he believes then, is that those who do not possess a penis
did so once and had it taken away. He fears that he will suffer the
same fate (castration anxiety) and his fear is intensified by his own
projected destructive fantasies. To safeguard his valued organ of
pleasure, he must abandon his hostile competitive feelings toward his
father as rival and begin to turn to him as the stronger, "the better
19
protector. By identifying with the father he not only gets to keep
his penis, in the bargain he is also permitted to retain some object
attachment to his mother, though clearly not on the same terms as
before.
It seems possible that one of Freud's serious errors in the
account he gives of male development is to overestimate the thorough-
ness of the boy's renunciation of this, his first, most passionate
attachment. In the later revisions of psychoanalysis Freud further
exaggerates this when he incorporates his account of the boy’s Oedipal
resol ution into his theory of supergo formation. Freud now describes
castration anxiety as so overwhelming a force in the young boy's life
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x sts no longer, even in the unconscious; the super-ego becomes its heir. 20 p
Since the fear of his father is based partly on his own projected
hostile feelings which the boy then perceives as directed back toward
himself, the superego is often far more stringent than parental stand-
ards might warrant. The boy binds his aggression against the father
by turning it inward toward himself.
As Jahoda points out, the castration complex has. led to "the
resolution of that part of the Oedipal complex which produces hostility
to the father.
. .
1,21
Nowhere does Freud discuss what becomes of
hostile feelings toward the mother for having frustrated or disappointed
the boy, nor even for her role as rival for the father’s affections
(the negative Oedipus complex). It seems almost inescapable that some
of what we see as enormous ambivalence on the part of men toward
women, and particularly the hostility expressed in exploitation and
devaluation, must find its roots in the only partial resolution of the
boy's Oedipal feel ings— that which Freud thinks has totally "dissolved."
It cannot be a simple matter for the child to abandon his fantasies
of mother as omnipotent and come to see her as inferior; on the most
basic level he has been so deeply identified with her that it is a
blow to his own narcissism to see her as weak and inferior. If indeed
he makes restitution for that narcissistic blow by transferring his
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al ;giance to his father, still it seems unlikely that the tie to the
mo ler as an all-powerful figure can be so swiftly and so cleanly
br cen. The path to identification with the father and the acquisition
of i masculine identity may be somewhat clear, but the fate of the
bo s identification with his mother--the mother/female in himself—
is lurky at best.
In Freud s account, then, the following accomplishments emerge
fr i a 'successful' resolution of the Oedipus complex in boys: a
se ;e of masculine identity (though as stated above, this may be at
th expense of total ego development, if, as I surmise, the masculine
id itifi cation entails thenceforth splitting off female elements from
th ego); heterosexual orientation; a strong superego (though Freud
so itimes describes it as strong and at other times as overly harsh
in iuch a way as to ultimately undermine the morality which it endeavors
to jphold); the abandonment of childish passionate but unsatisfiable love
fo the mother.
And the little girl? As indicated earlier, Freud's original view
wa that female development exactly paralleled male--she felt toward
fa ler precisely as he did in relation to mother. Lampl-de Groot's
re )rt of two instances of a negative Oedipal complex in women--a
pa iionate attachment to the mother and sense of rivalry with the father-
22
ca ;ed him to revise that view, and left him with the problem of
ex laining the shift of the girl's attachment from mother to father,
an of her sexuality from active (clitoral) to passive (vaginal). (It
me its underscoring from the outset that the first of these two is a
qu stion which any revised account also must address.)
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As we recall, development up until the phallic period has been
identical for the boy and girl. Even to the extent that they may have
been treated differently, that does not yet enter their internal self-
representation as gender difference; the ego is ungendered. The
girl enters the phallic period under the dominance of clitoral sensa-
tion. Through her preoccupation with this organ (again, expressed
through fantasy and masturbation) she will discover, as did he, that
what boys have is different—visible, manipulate, "bigger and within
her concrete, perception-bound cognitive limits, better for all she
„23knows." She, too, must come up with an explanation for the difference
and is also likely, in the process, to view the difference in terms of
comparative value. We can only guess (beyond the data available from
clinical sources) by what criteria the boy and girl make their evalua-
tions. Differences in size, position in urination
,
whom it makes
you like and from whom it sets you apart as being different, are all
possible ingredients. Freud says, and not altogether convincingly,
that the little girl "makes her decision in a flash ." 24 Culturalist
accounts, on the other hand, assert that it is the child's perception
of male social privilege, based on differences in role, which leads
both boys and girls to assess maleness as superior. Though the
culturalist account falls short for the reasons that it always falls
short—that it depicts the process as unidirectional, with no active
participation or mediation on the part of the child; that it fails to
explain in the first place why culture is the way it is, and has,
in this instance, granted privileged roles to men and not women— still
the question remains a thorny one. Neither theory has much to say
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about what might constitute the components of self-concept. What part
might gender role play in a total concept of gender identity?; what
part of a general sense of identity is constituted by gender?; what
part by role? The culturalist point of view would seem to imply that
gender identity is totally constituted by role, and all but equates
identity with gender identity. While psychoanalysis would assert that
gender identity is but one aspect of total ego functioning, Freud is
ambiguous on the question of what part it plays. He never makes a
clear distinction between gender identity and gender role, despite
the fact that role considerations clearly enter into his thinking,
particularly regarding woman's role as childbearer (which in turn he
does not distinguish from child rearer
.
However, you choose to read it, the clinical evidence indicates
that the young girl emerges from her confrontation with gender
difference with a sense of herself as inferior. Drawing restitution
for this narcissistic wound from the knowledge that she is, after all,
more "like" mother than her brother is, is not altogether to the point.
At this stage what she wants is not so much to be like mother as to
possess mother. In that regard, the identification with mother that
forms part of the resolution of the girl's Oedipus complex may imply
regression to earlier defenses based on an ego structure still more
prone to psychic boundarylessness and merger. The point I am making
is different from Freud's suggestion in his later years (much emphasized
by other theorists, orthodox and revisionist alike) that the girl
never altogether leaves her preoedipal object relational world. I am
proposing, rather, that the dimensions of her struggle with phallic.
136
active sexuality within the context of the Oedipal complex tend to
force her to abandon her path forward and regress back to preoedipal
identification with mother. One way, albeit a more primitive way, to
have mother is to be like her, to internalize her.
The traditional account calls for the little girl to abandon
her affectionate and sexual ties to her mother. She blames her
penisless mother for her own missing organ, and from then on her
relationship with her will be characterized by ambivalence and
hotility. While the castration complex signifies the end of the Oedipal
complex for boys, it ushers it in for girls. Up until now, she has
been passionately and exclusively attached to mother. It is the
discovery of morphological sex differences that will draw her into
the inevitable triangle, involving her with her father and setting her
up in rivalry with her mother. "In contrast to the boy where oedipal
attachment to the mother precedes the castration complex, her
passionate oedipal attachment follows the 'discovery' of her castra-
tion and the accompanying feelings of envy and resentment against her
fate as a female." What emerges from the castration trauma for the
girl is penis envy, and it is out of this envy that she turns to her
father. First she seeks her father's penis for herself, and sub-
sequently this changes into the ("passive") desire for a baby by him
that will substitute for the missing penis. In order to accomplish
this shift to her father as object choice she must identify with her
underprivileged mother (though she feels ambivalent and resentful
toward her, and though identification with mother at this point may
involve regression rather than resolution) and abandon her object
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attachment to her. Clearly a far more complicated situation than that
which faces the boy--which makes, in the end, for poorer odds at a
good resolution.
Because, Freud continues, women have so much less to lose, they
do not develop as strong a superego as do men.
In girls, the motive for the demolition of the Oedipus
complex is lacking. . . Thus the Oedipus complex
escapes the fate which it meets with in boys: it may be
slowly abandoned or dealt with by repression, or its
effects may persist far into women's normal mental life. b
From this assumption, along with Freud's belief in the prevalence of
envy in the girl's early experience, he deduces an interlocking set
of characteristics that must develop in her "personality." She will
be more narcissistic, over-compensating for her genital inferiority.
She will have less sense of justice, owing to the interference of her
envious feelings. Because of her more poorly developed superego she
will be intellectually weaker (having less capacity for distance and
objectivity), develop less of a tendency to sublimation, and be less
concerned with social issues and matters of principle. The package,
as it evolves for women, is based on three interrelated mental trends—
passivity, masochism, and narcissism.
It is around this catalog of derogatory personality character-
istics that the debate over Freud's theories on women will center.
Over time theorists and critics have become concerned not with the
nature of the female Oedipal experience but with the personality which
presumably must result from its resolution. And this despite the fact
that the theoretical constructs regarding the relationship between the
components of the Oedipal complex and the formation of personality
are
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vague and often contradictory. In hopes of clearing away some of the
resulting confusion and obscurity, let us go back and take a critical
look at what Freud has to say about the vicissitudes of sexual aims
and object choice during this developmental phase. If, in the next
chapter, we endeavor to discern what in Freud's Oedipal account is
not essential or inevitable, it remains here for us to isolate that
which is universal and therefore must be retained in any alternative
account. To do this we must once again focus on sexual aims as they
evolve during the stage of phallic sexuality.
A Critical Review
In discussing the transformation of sexual aims during the
Oedipal period we must ask how the phallic libidinal organization is
transcended and subsumed in the genital organization. Though there
is agreement on little else, there seems to be consensus on the fact that
this transformation entails a rather momentous change in the role played
by objects: autoerotism and genital sexuality proper are mutually
exclusive. If we hold to the view that it is the urgency of sexual
aims that will provoke a reorganization of object relationships and
not the reverse, can we accept Freud's account of the manner in which
this happens?
07
Karen Horney was the first to say no, and she was supported
in this by Ernest Jones 28 and in part by Otto Fenichel .
29
What she
takes issue with, in her earliest essay, is the notion of phallic
primacy ,i .e.
,
that the little girl is essentially masculine in her
strivings and therefore requires a dramatic psychic motivation for the
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shift from mother to father and active to passive sexuality. Horney
contends, contra Freud, that no explanation is required for that
transition, female sexuality has its own counterpart to the innate
heterosexuality she incorrectly perceives Freud as ascribing to boys.
In her account, the girl turns to her father out of innate heterosexual
strivings spurred by early vaginal sensations. As critics of Horney
have pointed out, her position is far more biologistic than Freud's.
She endeavors to equalize what she believes is an asymmetry in Freud's
description of the differences between male and female development.
Misreading his description of the boy's somewhat more straightforward
path to genital heterosexuality, she reduces it to a biologically fixed
developmental pattern, rather than a hard won and probably only
partially successful psychical achievement; then she endeavors to offer
the same account for the girl. She is positing that woman as well as
man is born and not made, whereas Freud had asserted the opposite for
both. Moreover, as Nancy Chodorow points out
. . . the Horney-Uones-Klein account does not follow what I
take to be a fundamental rule of psychoanalytic evidence,
that it comes out of clinical experience. It relies on a
biological hypothesis of natural heterosexual drives which
psychoanalysts have no way of testing or supporting with
clinical or observational methods, and it has no explana-
tion for how or why these drives should come to the fore
when they are claimed to do so . 31 [ Italics mine.]
The little boy is not innately heterosexual, he is, perhaps
circumstantially, matri sexual --and so is the little girl. It is an
open question how mutable that circumstance is. Until very recently,
early as well as extended childcare was inevitably provided exclusively
by women. There is as yet only speculation and not clinical research
140
on the possibility and implications of altering, at any point in the
child's development, our system of unilateral female parenting. At
present it is impossible to predict what impact such changes in the
child s early object world would make on the content of Oedipal
fantasies or the opportunities for varied Oedipal resolutions. It
must be reiterated, however, that these considerations can in no way
obviate the fundamental tasks of the Oedipal period— including the
attainment of a sense of gender identity and sexual orientation. Re-
arranging the personnel in the Oedipal triangle, whether that means
men as primary parents or couples that are homosexual, does not alter
the fact that sexuality is a psychological achievement— the integration
of psychic and somatic experience— and not a biological fact.
For all the flaws in Horney's alternative, her concerns stand
to be reckoned with. As Chodorow explains
In Freud's account a girl /woman never does come to be
heterosexual, that is to want heterosexual intercourse
for itself. She first wants a penis narci ssistically
(as her own body organ), turns to her father (develops
a heterosexual orientation) because he will give her one,
and then comes to want a baby from him as an alternate
narcissistic extension (substitute for the penis she can
never have). Nowhere in this account does she want sex
for anything except reproduction and the restitution of
her narcissistic wound. 33
In other words, following her resolution of the Oedipal conflict, the
little girl has no explicitly sexual aims. It is only through her
desire for a baby as substitute for the missing penis, and not because
it is initiated by her developing phallic sexual aims, "that she attends
to the vaginal sensations that are stirring and forms the sexual aim of
being penetrated." As Wollheim points out, this roundabout account
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of penis envy leading to vaginal (passive/masochistic) sexuality is
hardly consistent with Freud's paradigm of psychosexual development.
While Freud's account explains how such a thing might come about, and
may even be an accurate description of many women, contemporary as well
as Victorian, it is hardly plausible (given his own understanding of
the importance of sexuality) as an ideal picture of the nature of
female sexuality.
The question has not been dealt with to this day. Horney's
later work abandons this line of inquiry in favor of a general cultural-
1 st critique of the Freudian libido theory. The point was debated in
analytic circles 35 from 1924 until the mid 1930's, when Freud, with
the help of Helene Deutsch 36 and Lampl-de Groot, appears to have
successfully quashed the entire question. When the controversy is
revived years later, the entire question of the outcome of female
sexual aims appears to be lost beneath the furor over object relations
and the nature of female ego development and personality. No one has re-
surfaced the issue of how she thenceforth goes about attaining satis-
faction for her sexual aims. Freud has subsumed her sexual aims (which
he describes as essentially passive) under her "passive personality."
Astonishingly, he has given narcissistic restitution priority over
sexual gratification. The little boy makes a painful bargain to
protect himself from narcissistic danger (castration), but he does not
altogether abandon his sexuality. Freud depicts the girl's ideal
developmental path as entailing a total sacrifice, a thorough renuncia-
tion of sexuality for its own sake.
142
Yet abandoning phallic primacy is an altogether problematic
solution to the enigma of female sexuality. Freud's insistence on those
interpretive elements which he derived from his notion of phallic
primacy and then wove into a picture of female personality may indeed
represent "the most dogmatic stand of his career ." 37 Certainly he
is on shakier ground here in terms of reliable psychoanalytic evidence;
certainly his logic is less persuasive, and his theoretical approach
less consistent with psychoanalytic principles. Yet on the other hand
Is one simply to forget that Freud increasingly stressed
the importance of phallic primacv to his theory in spite of
the criticism of his followers? If one is not inclined
either to forget the constancy with which Freud maintained
this position or to explain it away as one more example of
authori tari an
,
patriarchal rigidity or male chauvinism, then
perhaps it deserves renewed consideration.
What is at issue is important. If one denies phallic
primacy then it seems one must also deny—or radically
revise, as Jones attempted to do— the theory of the
castration complex. But in that case what remains of the
Oedipus complex? Can it still function as the principal
underpinning of psychoanalytic theory ? 38
Thus if we concede that the Oedipus complex is a universal and
necessary experience in child development, then we must also be willing
to concede that the phallus—and castration threat-play some central
role for both sexes. Though we may not agree with Freud's conclusions
regarding the impact of castration anxiety on girls (or on boys for
that matter), the psychoanalytic account of psychosexual development
requires us to reckon with the fact that the girl's discovery of her
lack of penis is an integral component of her sexuality.
Castration poses essentially the same question to men and
to women. It is the absent phallus that secretly and multi-
fariously haunts our desires for power and dependence and
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implies that we, men and women alike, are fundamentally
in question in ways that are the same as well as different. 39
If we abandon the psychoanalytic paradigm, and with it the Oedipus
complex, then in essence we are left with no theoretical framework
that can make sense of human sexuality at all, certainly not of the
development of sexual identity and sexual orientation. Jahoda under-
scores for us the unique and radical nature of Freud's perspective:
His model of psychological sex differentiation in child-
hood, however, is on a different plane, precisely because its
major premise is a-historical
,
namely the coexistence in
the early years of a human being of a vast repertoire of
emotion with a limited scope of cognitive ability.
. . .In
addition, the categories of thought which Freud brings to
bear on this situation are important whatever the historical
situation. What are these categories?
First there is the recognition of the fundamental unity
of body and mind: the discovery of ones own body which
inevitably has different results for each sex and leads
to concept and theory formation in the child.
. . Second
. .
.
passion, tamed and untamed, is the subject of his
thought, not stimulus and response. 40
It is striking that for women Freud ceases to locate passion at
the center of his questioning. Freud's surprising lack of curiosity
extended beyond his easy acceptance of the girl's renunciation of her
mother, and of her immediate devaluation of her genital organ; it is
most dramatically at work in his easy acceptance of her renunciation
of clitoral, active sexuality. If he asks too few questions about the
impact of castration anxiety and penis envy on her assessment of her
own worth and her relation to her mother, he asks no questions at all
about their impact on her active sexual strivings.
If we do not cut off the line of questioning where Freud did,
then a whole new realm of sexual devlopment opens up for exploration.
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particularly with regard to mother/son and father/daughter object
relations. We have already seen what may result from excluding maternal
contributions to male ego development; if the father's contribution to
female sexual and ego development is not merely as conduit to vaginal
sexuality, then what role might he play? What have been the conse-
quences to female development of fathers not having been allowed a
full role in their daughters' development?; of daughters feeling
compelled to deny identifications, other than envious ones, with their
fathers?
An alternate account of female psychosexual development requires
us not so much to challenge the notion of phallic primacy, but to ex-
plore more rigorously the fate of the little girl's phallic sexuality,
in particular clitoral sexual i ty— to fill out in greater detail the
story of her active sexuality's traumatic encounter with the fantasy
that she lacks the proper organ to express and fulfill that sexuality.
And if an alternate account also creates the need for a new set of
hypotheses regarding men and women's attainment of the desire and
capacity for parenting, so much the better, for the old account could
hardly be said to do justice to that most central of human experiences.
CHAPTER V
PERSONALITY THEORY AND FEMALE PSYCHOLOGY
Overview
We have seen how psychoanalysis slowly evolved from a theory
which could account for mental qualities into one which endeavored
to grasp the total person. The theory developed through the two
interrelated sources of its own internal inadequacies and problems in
clinical practice. Research on narcissism, guilt, aggression,
repetition compulsion, and the properties of neurosis beyond its
symptoms, led Freud not only to give increased weight to the ego in
his later writings, but also to locate the ego within a more complex
mental organization, serving both the id and the superego. The
relations among these three agencies of the mind--how one deals with
biological needs, the world, and one's 'conscience '--are the in-
gredients for Freud's concept of personality.
Over the same extended period of time, Freud elaborated the
picture of human sexuality, and ultimately integrated a variety of
themes--sexual development, object choice, and gender identity— into
his conception of the adult personality. The need for a theoretical
vantage point on the whole person may seem quite obvious from where we
now stand, but the pieces of this puzzle came together quite slowly,
with extensive revisions along the way. It was very late in the
history of psychoanalysis before Freud fully understood that it was
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necessary to relate the conscious- or unconscious-ness of mental
events to the complex aims, motives, purposes, and needs of the person
within his or her environmental context.
The increased importance of the ego combined with other factors
to dramatically change the face of psychoanalytic theory and practice
after Freud's death. Ego psychology has come to d minate the
theoretical scene, while traditional analysis of neurotic symptoms
gave way to analysis of 'character.* Both of these developments are drawn
from trends in Freud's late work and some of the problems in current
usage can be traced to ambiguities and inconsistencies in Freud's
theoretical writings on these subjects. His work on personality is
fragmentary at best, and not always compatible with his own explana-
tory framework. Since Freud did not fully integrate these later
formulations with the main body of his theory, there was more opportunity
for error on the part of those who followed him. In some cases, those
who attempted to document subject matter that Freud had only begun to
explore were taken as speaking for Freud himself. (Helene Deutsch's
writings on female psychology, for example, are largely responsible
for the popularization of Freudian views on "femininity" in this
country.
)
In essence, the focus on observable, conscious factors, which
is an inevitable concomitant of ego psychology, almost invites a
reductionists stance (though it certainly doesn't necessitate it). If
one seeks an escape from that which Freud always knew was most radical
and threatening in psychoanalysis— the unconscious mind and the libido
theory--one can more easily find it after the introduction of the
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concept of personality. It becomes possible to hold on to physiognomic
descriptions and explanations without reference to hidden psychic
determinants; since one still comes up with a picture of the psyche
that is familiarly human, in the sense that we can recognize ourselves
in such descriptions, it is tempting to do away with levels of
explanation that are more difficult and more unpleasant. It is possible
for instance, to recognize oneself as obsessed with guilt, to explore
what that feels like, and to discover how that might serve some
"neurotic" purpose, without then tying that sense of guilt to its
instinctual underpinnings. In theory and in practice, hypotheses-
certainly interpretations-regarding the ego are easier and more com-
fortable. They refer to that which feels familiar and to what we are
used to recognizing as constitutive of our humanity. To the extent
that such hypotheses or interpretations touch on unconscious material,
thatmaterial is likely to be less repressed, less alien to integrated
ego functioning, than interpretations that touch on id impulses.^
Yet Freud s theory clearly specifies that the ego must be seen
against the backdrop of the vicissitudes of psychosexual development
if it is to remain a meaningful construct. It is not possible to
sustain the dynamic theory of mind unless the ego is drawn in relation
to instinctual forces, and, in turn, the superego is seen as closely
tied to the id. By what path, then, has personality come to be
increasingly equated with ego? And what are the consequences of this
distortion for our current reading and application of Freud's notion
of female psychology?
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Personality and Character
Two separate trends in Freud's work were drawn on as the shift
was made from symptom neurosis and a focus on unconscious phenomena
to character neurosis and psyche as defined by ego functions: the
structural theory with its concept of personality and psychoanalytic
characterology
. "Personality" ( Personl ichkei
t
) and "character"
(Charakter ) are not well defined terms even in Freud's own work, and
they are far less well articulated as currently used. Freud himself
only intermittently distinguished between the two conceptually, 3 and
it seems that they have come to be used almost interchangeably. Not
only have they merged into one hazy, undefined concept, but their
common, popular meanings have colored the position they occupy in
psychological theory and practice. The result has been both a
flattening out and a distortion of the notion of personality. For
where personality would appear to imply dynamic relations among the
agencies of the mind, character is more purely a function of the ego;
and the moral connotations of character have little, if any, place in
psychoanalysis
.
Freud introduced characterology in his 1908 essay "Character
and Anal Erotism." In this paper he begins to discuss the manner in
which defenses against instinctual impulse become chronic and are
thereby integrated into the overall structure and nature of the ego.
Contained in this idea is the foundation for a typology of character
with reference to the particular instinctual impulse being defended
against--oral
,
anal, phallic.
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As the instinct theory is deepened and expanded, the typology
takes on some of the richness of the complex libidinal organizations,
with their typical modes of defense as well as developmental^ specific
instinctual impulses. For Freud, however, typologies were never
enormously useful: they are far too simplistic to encompass the
infinite variety of forms which he encountered. "Types are crude
pictures.
. . easily drawn, invariably overlapping and difficult to
prove or disprove ." 4 It is in some respects difficult to understand
why the oral-anal-phallic typology has captured the lay public's
interest to the extent that it has, since, taken separately from the
rest of psychoanalytic theory, it becomes a somewhat flat, unimaginative
screen through which to view one's history. As such, it is also
rather unpersuasive, which may account for some of the scorn to which
psychoanalysis is sometimes subjected. Regardless of its limitations,
the notion of a "character type" has become a central component of
5
current diagnostic practice. The "types" have by now vastly pro-
liferated (besides oral, anal and phallic there are passive, compulsive,
hysterical, schizoid--virtually limitless "types"), and "type" has
become a designation of both personality and character. Yet ultimately,
"organization of these types into a meaningful classification has
remained elusive.
"
While the construction of diagnostic typologies is certainly
influenced by Freud's early work on characterology
,
it is more directly
connected to his later usage of the term .'
7
Within the context of his
clinical practice, he came to be increasingly concerned with character
as an aspect of resistance to treatment, that is, with 'character
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defenses.’ Fenichel describes this shift in treatment:
Thus it was the necessity for analyzing the resistance
which in practice started psychoanalytic ego psychology.
Moreover, in this way two other things were discovered:
first, that certain attitudes of the patient's which
always recurred when similar instinctual dangers were
mobilized served the purpose of resistances, and second
that not only was that purpose fulfilled by them in the
psychoanalytic treatment, but that the same behavior
patterns were also used by the patient in his ordinary
life, either to prevent his expressions of certain
instincts or to prevent his becoming aware of them. This
discovery opened the way to the first "psychoanalysis of
character that is to the analysis of the purpose and
historical genesis of certain characterological attitudes
as repressions. 8
The inordinate difficulty in overcoming these defenses, their intract-
ability, occasioned an innovation in technique "which consisted in
denoting as the most important task of analysis the overcoming of
resistances, in place of the direct interpretation of the patient's
9
symptoms." Whereas symptoms mask specific (if overdetermined) un-
conscious material, character is a more diffuse, chronic, attribute of
the ego. It expresses itself more in form than in content, for
example, more in the attitude which the patient typically adopts toward
the analyst than in the content of what he or she says.
Though character neurosis has superseded symptom neurosis as the
primary diagnostic category, the same problems with definition pertain.
The term 'character neurosis' has achieved currency in
contemporary psychoanalytical usage without ever having
been given a very exact usage.
That the notion remains so ill -defined is no doubt due to
the fact that it raises not only nosographical problems
(what are the specific attributes of character neurosis?)
but also both psychological questions regarding the origin,
basis and function of character and the techni cal question
of what place ought to be given to the analysis of so-called
'character' defenses. 10
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Given this preliminary account of character as it takes shape
within the treatment process, we still have no consensus on what
precisely is meant by the term. Gerald Blum, commenting on the plethora
of not very specific definitions says
• • • we 9a ther only that character is somehow a function
of the ego, related in some way to the social environment.
Even the gross point of whether it is synonymous with all
ego functioning (Fenichel) or simply one among a long list
of functions (Hartmann) remains controversial. In view of
this hazy state of affairs it appears futile to question
the distinction between character and the equally vague
concept of personality. Academic psychology's offering
clouds the issue still further by way of.
. . two alterna-
tive definitions of character: 1) the ethical or moral
aspect of personality; and 2) the conative aspect of
personality without any ethical or moral evaluation.
[Italics mine.]
Hypotheses regarding the formation of character are equally contra-
dictory. Some writers cite preoedipal experience, primarily oral and
anal, as decisive, and others turn to Oedipal phenomena as the nucleus
of character. (Again, in this instance, Freud is of little help, for
he suggests both of those possibilities and furthermore, he suggests
this in essays where he too seems not to be discriminating between
personality and character.) The resolution of the Oedipal complex is
where we might reasonably expect personality and character to overlap,
to become intertwined: the chronic defenses of the ego in the phallic
period will have a strong impact on the emerging relationships between
id, ego, and superego. However, it is not possible to understand the
relationship between character formation and personality unless we can
understand them on their own terms.
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Sfflptoms, Character Neuroses, and Secondary fiain
The shift in technique from analysis of symptoms to analysis of
character is accompanied historically by the alleged disappearance of
symptom neurosis. (, say "alleged" with some caution. I am aware that
the rarity of symptom neurosis is almost universally accepted. However,
I find neither the statistical nor the clinical arguments persuasive. 12
'
I think it far more likely that symptom neurosis is more prevalent
than suspected— still largely affecting women in the form of certain
of the eating disorders-and is currently either misdiagnosed or un-
diagnosed altogether.) In an essay entitled "Psychoanalysis and
Character," Fenichel documents the historical transition:
‘
i
’ ^ ^
interesting fact that the neuroses them-
seives, which the analyst had to deal with, have changedWe began today with the statement that in the classical
nnin^K
a
.
contlnu°u s Personality was disturbed at certainpo nts by inappropriate actions, impulses, or thoughts
In modern neuroses that is no longer the case. Here thepersonality does not appear to be uniform, but open, torn,
or deformed, and in any case so involved in the illness that
one cannot say at what point the "personality" ends and the
symptom" begins. iJ
This apparent transformation in the nature of neurosis will present
the same temptation as did the incorporation of the aggressive drive and
the structural theory into clinical practice. One can eschew 'deeper'
interpretations in favor of superficial comments; one can offer, or
imply, prescriptions based on some presumption of the 'well-adjusted'
personal i ty.
This tendency is further underscored by the increased importance
character neurosis lends to what Freud termed the "secondary gains" 14
of neurosis. The primary gain of neurosis is always, in the abstract.
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the avoidance of unpleasure. The motivation for the repression is
flight from internal tension; it may represent an adaptation to exter-
nal reality, but that need not be the case. Secondary gain is not
originally a component of the neurosis (or the neurotic defense)-
it is an advantage in relation to the environment that develops once
the defense has been adopted. 15 "The adjective implies that the
prospect of such gain was not a motive for the formation of the neurosis
in the first place but that once the neurosis had been formed, the
secondary gain provided an additional motive to hang on to it. 16
The desire to continue to exploit secondary gains forms an
important aspect of resistance, the sine qua non of character neurosis
and analysis of character. Symptom neurosis rarely achieves as
effective an exploitation of the environment as does characterological
defense structure; symptoms offer the advantages of illness, but
beyond that they are bizarre, ego alien occurrences which do not smooth
one's way in the world. Their chief value lies in the ability to ward
off unpleasure— the primary gain—while still affording an acceptable,
because highly disguised, instinctual discharge. As such they remain
more intimately tied to deep unconscious material.
Secondary gains are incorporated into the defensive functions
of the ego much as are character resistances which become absorbed into
the overall structure, and are perceived as integral, even acceptable
parts of the self. They are easily rationalized as "just the way I
am," if noticed at all
.
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The integration of neurotic tendencies into the ego means
the feeling of alienation so characteristic for the psycho-
neuroses, is gone, and that these tendencies assume a
function in the service of self-preservative and self-
expansive goals; they are now part and parcel of what one
feels to be oneself. ... to which one is now bound by the
secondary gains which they impart. 17
It may even be that the motive of secondary gain is part of the mechanism
for establishing defensive character traits. This is, of course, a
purely speculative point— but the role of secondary gain in neurosis
and in general personality development and character formation is not
a minor question. Secondary gains are accrued at the cultural level,
and as such represent an important intersection of the individual with
society (albeit mediated through early family experience); they make a
direct cultural contribution to character and personality. The Neo-
Freudians, led by Adler, built a psychology almost exclusively on the
precept of secondary gain: the neurosis as a utilitarian arrangement
between the ego and external reality. In dismissing intrapsychic
factors, they effaced the dynamic theory of mind and substituted an
exclusively cultural and therefore inadequate explanation of consciousness.
Freudian psychoanalysis maintains a distinction between primary
and secondary gain. It does not see repression and the. unconscious as
the ego's fictions, necessary in a harsh environment and dispensable in
a more graceful reality. Rather, it ". . . assumes a genuine uncon-
1
8
scious, and it considers represssion a universal phenomenon." While
psychoanalysis maintains the distinction between primary and secondary
gain, it is not a point that is much pursued. The tension between the
primary and secondary gains of repression may provide a significant
window on the relationship between intrapsychic and cultural factors in
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character and personal ity~ that is, between the universal and the
historically specific, particularistic influences on human development.
The focus on the ego, resistance, and secondary gain, it can
be readily seen, treads dangerously close to the Alderian stance
which Freud had denounced years earlier. Unless we take pains to
maintain the ties between character defenses and what they defend
ISilnst, between the ego, the superego, and the id , we end up with no
dynamic theory of mind, or of pathology. And many factors-cl inical
applications of the structural theory and the model of personality,
clinical interpretations of the death instinct and innate aggressive
drives, the disappearance of symptom neurosis—are mitigating against
the maintenance of those ties. The end result is an etiology of neurosis
that is more moral than psychological, more culturalist than Freudian.
In Adler's view neurosis is an arrangement motivated by
the ego; it comes very close to being a lie, a fraud, and
the understanding of a neurosis is the uncovering of its
secret purpose, hence an unmasking.'"
Pathology, then, represents an unsuccessful adjustment to society, and
treatment becomes a process of re-education. To underscore this point
once again, such a therapeutic stance presumes a model to which we
encourage people to adapt— presumes that we know all we need to know
about mental "health," and can confidently set about curing people.
This is in direct contradiction to the analytic ethos (regardless of
whether or not this ethos has been fulfilled in relation to women)
that each case, each fragment of unconscious material, is a new mystery
which presents a fresh opportunity to explore the unknown reaches of
the mind.
_
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femininity/' or, "My dear, you're just being hvst.PHrai
Finally, what has all this to do with women anyway? Why belabor
the point to this extent in an essay on female psychology? The
answer is, paradoxically, both simple and complex. It is important
for the simple reason that it is not female psychology that is being
researched and debated, it is female personality and character-anri
they are barely psychological categories these days. The complexity
derives from the fact that so many different historical trends combined
to obscure the real issues at the heart of the question of sexual
psychology (male and female). Female psychology ceased to be debated
in psychoanalytic circles for several decades, and when the issue re-
surfaced, it was in the context of a psychology more concerned with
personality and characterological factors than with the unconscious
mind.
Of course these historical developments bear equally on men and
women in many respects. It is clearly detrimental to men to enter a
treatment process in which conformity and adaptation are more the rule
than not; it is equally damaging to have psychology hold up a model
of masculinity which requires excessive sacrifice and ego impoverish-
ment while masquerading as superior or privileged. However, when one
remembers the norm that is being held up to which women are encouraged,
or even pressured, to adapt, the insidious oppressive effects on women
stand out more clearly. This is not to belittle the impact on the male
psyche --and physical heal th--which may ultimately be traced to con-
forming to a traditional and psychoanalytic picture of masculinity.
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Indeed the distinction between the oppressed and the oppressor is not
clearly so clear in the psychological realm as it is in the objective,
social world. However, even in purely psychological terms, a case can
be made for the fact that while both men and women are required to
make excessive psychological sacrifices, men have more access to the
social benefits which in the first place merit those sacrifices. And
this remains true, at least insofar as privilege is divided by sex,
across class and racial lines; clearly some privilege is assigned not
by sex, but by class and color.
The weakening of the interpretive method, which often goes along
with the shift in treatment to diagnosis and analysis of character-
ological pathology rather than interpretation of symptoms, completes
a vicious circle. It ought to have been new data, drawn from the
psychoanalytic process— interpretations of dreams, symptoms, and
especially the transference--that were used to refute or confirm
Freud's hypotheses regarding female psychosexual development and female
personality. Yet in place of research, psychoanalysis became a vehicle
for re-education and social adjustment.
Perhaps most reprehensible is the way in which the new approach
was used to justify the barely veiled slander contained in the diagnosti
category invented for hysterical personality/character. It is a loose
collection of pejoratives, some of which even contradict each other.
The rubric was used to cover everything that might be deemed unfortunate
or unpleasant in a woman's personality (loosely termed, i.e., her
external demeanor), and so it had to include descriptors for both passive
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and weak as well as aggressive and flamboyant. The inconsistency is
smoothed out, deus ex machine
, by subdividing hysteria into categories-
hysterical personality, hysteroid personality, hysterical character,
etc., and differences in style are traced etiological ly to an earlier
or later developmental onset . 20 At this juncture there has been a
complete and unacknowledged elimination of the psychological components
of personality and character in favor of moral and/or physiognomic
components. One can make moral judgments about an hysterical woman in
a way that one cannot evaluate an hysterical symptom. The blurring of
primary and secondary gains conveniently allows the exploitive, manipu-
lative aspects of the hysterical syndrome to be incorporated into a
theory of personality and character. It is interesting to note, in
passing, that Freud explicitly refused to draw any direct correlation
between hysterical symptoms and hysterical personality
.
21
We began in the first place with a weak theoretical framework
(the problems in Freud's theories of Oedipal resolution and phallic
sexuality) from which to generate a theory of personality or character.
Through proliferation of the terms, accompanied by a flattening out
and distortion of their meanings, we end up with a framework which is,
in itself, indefensible--which is not, in effect, psychoanalytic. The
problem applies equally whether one is employing that framework to
confirm or disconfirm Freud's theories on women.
For decades now we have been debating the nature of the female
personality, the female character, and something even more amorphous
called "femininity." This last would appear to be definable as
159
'psychological femaleness,' and is, one can only suppose, a composite
of personality, character, psychosexual profile, and perhaps a soupgon
of mystery. Are women passive or not? Narcissistic? Masochistic?
Hysterical? These words are used increasingly as external descriptors,
not as reflections of women's internal experience, and with reference
to their popular and not their psychological meaning. The entire dehate
—
in some resPects bogus because it is based on the fraudulent.
categories of personality and character
.
Critics are at pains to demonstrate that female personality/
character is not passive, envious, masochistic, etc. Defenders of Freud
scrupulously marshall clinical proof that indeed women do have a pre-
ponderance of masochistic fantasies-which is beside the point since
as yet we have not established the theoretical link between fantasy and
personality or character formation. Sometimes Freudians attempt to
gather theoretical proof, from the theory of psychosexual development,
that the well-adjusted female personality ought to be passive and
masochistic. More commonly, if questioned, analysts will agree that
Freud's theories on psychosexual development can't really stand as
they are, and then they drop the question.
If we don't know what personality and character represent, nor
what goes into their formation, surely there is little point in debating
whether or not they are gendered or how they become gendered. Even if we
were to presume, with the "orthodox" Freudians, that it is the little
girl's developmental task to attain "passive" sexual aims, we are still
in no position to state that she therefore has a passive "personal ity.
"
And the controversy has raged not around her sexual aims, which indeed
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make a major contribution to the ego's concept of gender, but around
her personality or character-which in turn may or may not be the same
as her ego.
No one has yet proved that personality and character— in the
psychological £r the popular sense—are gendered at all, nor in what
manner they might be. Analysts are on very tenuous ground trying to
defend a position in which "personality style" or "character traits"
are sex-linked. On the other hand, because anti-Freudians do not
distinguish between ego and personality, when they argue for an andro-
gynous personality, they eradicate the concept of the gendered ego.
It may conceivably be arguable (and this is not to argue the point
one way or the other) that the female ego's attitude toward itself,
the world, and the superego need not be any more passive than the
male's; it is not conceivable to posit the mature ego's concept of
itself as ungendered. An adult who does not know that he or she
belongs to one of the sexes (or at least isn't very uncomfortable
without that certainty) seems an unimaginable creature. Inequities
in the value and privileges we currently ascribe to the sexes cannot
be rectified by wishfully undoing the distinction between them.
22
As Wollheim points out, if the ego is a bodily ego, then it is a
sexual ego; if it is sexual, then at some point, whether we accept the
specifics of Freud's account or not, the ego is also a gendered ego.
If we hypothesize a nonsexual
,
or a nongendered ego, then we can no
longer employ the Freudian paradigm to explain the genesis and
maturation of the ego.
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Having attempted to clear away the debris that has collected
around Freud's already problematic legacy regarding "femininity,"
and a general psychology of personality and character, let us return
once again to the specifics of Freud's account. In Chapter IV we
began to isolate some of the problems and limitations of his psycho-
sexual schema; it is time now to turn to a critique of the female
personality he deduced from that schema and a critique of the process
by which he arrived at those normative conclusions. If indeed Freud's
theory of the resolution of phallic sexuality is as tenuous as it
appears to be, and if we don't summon up male chauvinism or Victorianism
as explanation for his error, then perhaps the particular picture of
female personal ity /character which he endeavors to justify through
his Oedipal account may offer a clue to where he went wrong.
Female Personal i ty--Some Alternate Possibilities
Freud chose to build a theory of personal ity--and moral develop-
ment--which hinges on the asymmetry between male and female Oedipal
resolution. Masculine morality is synonymous with male moral
superiority--it does not have a theoretical base separate from the
one which prescribes female moral and intellectual inferiority. (In
this regard, Freud was the first to blur the moral and conative aspects
of personality and character. ) That is, the asymmetry in morality is
built in to the process of attaining a sense of gender identity and
heterosexual orientation; all of those collapse if one does, as the
theory now stands. If you dispute the fact that men are superior to
women, you no longer have a theory for how men and women learn about
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gender differences. (This alone seems enough to undermine the
plausibility and usefulness of the theory.)
If indeed moral traits and ego capacities are gender linked,
must the relationship between morality and gender be as Freud described
it? Here it becomes important to bear in mind that we are disputing
Freud from two separate vantage points. Given his account of early
psychosexual development, it is possible to draw different conclusions
regarding personality formation, particularly with regard to sex-linked
traits? In addition, and in the first place, to what extent can we
accept his depiction of female psychosexual development as correct?
Because I believe that the inconsistencies in his portrayal of female
personality will shed some light on the flaws in his theory of female
sexuality, I will explore that area first.
In keeping with the asymmetrical nature of Freud's formulation,
the problem with his assessment of personality is twofold: an
idealization of male development alongside an underestimation of
female achievements. Jahoda outlines the two for us:
Accepting Freud's construction of childhood events as
reasonable, and remaining on a Freudian basis, are there
not other, equally plausible deductions possible? Would
not men, overcompensating for their early castration
fears, develop excessive vanity with regard to their maleness?
If the little girl learns early in life that one can exist,
has to exist, without owning everything in sight, would
she not overcompensate this painful discovery by becoming
generous, making a virtue out of necessity?23
Kay Tooley, in one of a very few articles on male psychosexual
development, re-eval uates the idealized picture of the boy's Oedipal
struggles and possibilities, particularly with regard to the effects
of castration anxiety on ego development and superego formation.
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anyway; ne nas been 'castrated. 1 If
front of him on the expressway, it i
even a dangerous fleeting annoyance;
nn *0 fade in a week
another car cuts in
a castration. 24
s not a fleeting, not
e it's a major operation--
Roy Schafer concurs with her speculations that castration anxiety may
have less beneficial effects on male development than Freud supposed.
Whatever the castration anxiety of men might have to do
with superego structural ization, typically that anxiety
is so unresolved, so persistent, and so intense that it
continuously incites men to violate conventional morality.
When Freud cautioned against overestimating the degree of
true superego formation of people in general, he must have
meant men in particular. 25
And on the other side of this question, a number of these writers
have explored the possible positive effects of a girl's prolonged
preoedi pal experience and delayed onset of Oedipal crisis. 26
If the little girl's Oedipal complex occurs later than that
of the boy, as Freud plausibly suggests, that is at a stage
of greater cognitive and verbal ability, would she not be
more open to remaining in touch with her unconscious and
be more capable of empathy? Again, on the assumption of a
later oedipal experience would she not, more than a boy,
retain the marvellous childhood advantage of managing to
combine sexuality and tenderness and therefore be less
likely to develop sadistic brutality?27
Nancy Chodorow, exploring an alternate interpretation of the girl's
less thorough resolution of her Oedipal complex, suggests an enriched
internal emotional life as one possible effect:
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emotional, if not erotic, bisexual oscillation between
mother and father--between preoccupation with "mother-child"issues and male-female" issues. 28
Chodorow goes on to speculate on the possible effects of his
impoverished inner, emotional world, on the boy's ego development and
superego formation.
Denial of sense of connectedness and isolation of affect
may be more characteristic of masculine development and may
produce a more rigid and punitive superego, whereas female
development, in which internal and external object-relations
and affects connected to these are not so repressed, may
lead to a superego more open to persuasion and the judgments
of others, that is, not so independent of its emotional
origins.
In this vein, Tooley suggests we take another look at the traditional
way that men and women assess one another's moral values: "Women have
always been mystified by male willingness to bloody each other over
incidents that seem trivial, while men have been incensed because
women do not seem to give a comparable damn about 'the principle of
the thing' ('deficient superego
')
Roy Schafer offers us a way to look at the apparent difference
in male and female moral and ego development, insofar as it is linked
to the superego. He reads Freud's account as implying that men have
"more" superego than women and takes issue with the il logic, in terms
of psychoanalytic propositions, of such a notion.
But, taken as a whole, differences between men and women
in ego functioning are qualitative, corresponding to
modes of functioning rather than amounts . Contrary to
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Schafer's point brings into focus the fact that the relationship between
superego formation, ego development, and gender identity is in a more
general sense problematic. Some of the difficulty comes down to the
elusive distinction between a strong superego and one that is overly
harsh. To say that men are a_ priori more firm morally and more highly
developed intellectually because of a 'stronger' superego is almost
self-contradictory. When you consider, as pointed out above, the extent
to which anxiety enters into the establishing a boy's superego, it is
difficult not to be suspicious of the supposed 'strength' in question.
The overly stringent superego
may be subversive of people's achievements, their love
and even their moral codes, for like any harsh and
arbitrary authority, it continuously incites rebellion,
hatred, and self-destructiveness.
. . . Whatever superego
does contribute toward eventual morality requires
considerable tempering before that morality can be
secured, and certainly superego cannot temper itself; it
cannot achieve its own independence of its emotional
origins.
It follows that Freud may have drawn exactly the wrong
conclusion from his theory. ... If, on account of her
different constellations of castration concerns, a girl
does not develop the implacable superego that a boy does,
then at least in this respect she might be better suited
than a boy to develop a moral code that is enlightened,
realistic, and consistently committed to some conventional
form of civilized interaction among people. 32
Since Freud's comments on the female superego are so sparse it
is impossible to know much of what he believed to be the motivation
of its genesis or the contents of its identifications. In the absence
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of both the threat (castration anxiety) and the bribery (narcissistic
identification with father's genital superiority) of the boy's Oedipus
complex, what motivates a woman to develop a superego at all?
Clearly Freud's accounts of moral and ego development are
tenuous in the same respects as his mapping of phallic sexual develop-
ment. And yet, the Oedipal phenomenon serves as the underpinning for
Freud's developmental paradigm; without it we have no theoretical
explanation for attaining a sense of gender identity, sexual
orientation, moral code, or integrative ego capacities. In order to
retain what is essential in his account, and to more clearly demarcate
what an alternate, or amplified, account would have to provide, let us
try to discern more concretely where he went wrong. What are the
themes which thread through the apparently disparate inconsistencies
of his notion of female personality, and how do they reflect back on
his theory of psychosexual development?
A Critical Appraisal
In all the problems one encounters in Freud's theories on
women and men, perhaps most striking--for it is so uncharacteri stic--
is the inescapable impression that he has seriously oversimplified
human experience. Certainly the idealization of male and devaluation
of female Oedipal resolution represents a restricted view of both
the possibilities and actualities of psychosexual development. What
lies at the center of this reductionism is Freud's underestimation of
preoedipal experience--for boys as well as for girls.
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While most theorists, including Freud in his last works
,
33
turn to preoedipal object relations for solutions to some of the
questions about the girl's Oedipal struggles, none has consistently
applied this insight to male development. Dorothy Dinnerstein'
s
compelling evocation of childhood in The Mermaid and the Minotaur
comes closest to exploring the little boy's early ties to his mother,
but her vantage point is only intermittently psychoanalytic in any
strict sense. Given that female inferiority is predicated on male
superiority, revision of the theory of female personality hinges on
finding a set of constructs which more adequately account for both
male and female development.
Furthermore, to the extent that preoedipal factors are used to
round out the girl's early history, they threaten to introduce an
oversimplification all their own. To assign principal significance
in the resolution of female sexuality to preoedipal factors is once
again to beg the question of phallic sexuality for the little girl.
If we trap her in unresolvable preoedipal tangles, (i.e., arrest her
development at that stage), then we do not have to account for further
developments in her sexuality. Freud, too, succumbs to this easy way
out, despite his insistence that, though early factors contribute
to the form of the Oedipus complex, (i.e., envy of the breast or womb
as predeterminants of penis envy), the crisis in phallic sexuality and
the entry into triangular object relations stand on their own to form
a central developmental crisis, a major turning point in the child's
life. It is as if Freud's unwillingness to deal with the complexity and
intensity of the boy's attachment to his mother makes him willing to
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eternally abandon the little girl to that matrix of feeling.
Freud's idealization of male ego and superego development
rests on the thoroughness with which the little boy is presumed to
abandon his Oedipal passion for mother. In this conflict, his passion
suddenly appears to put up not much of a fight. Freud, who fought a
lifelong battle for the recognition of that passion, did not, in the
end, give it full weight.
That Freud was not prepared to think about mothers very
ar is.
.
. evident from how little he said directly aboutthem and about relationships with them, and, correspondingly,
how little he said about how they appear in the trans-
ference, the resistance and the formation of the ego and
superego systems.
. . . Consequently Freud dealt with the
feminine trends in men chiefly in terms of the two factors
of castration and passive homosexuality. ... It seems that
he knew the father and the castrate in himself and other men
but not the mother and the woman. 34
Wollheim, in discussing similar issues, links this blind spot in re-
lation to women to "Freud's inability to accept in practice what he
never tired of proclaiming in theory: mankind's essential bisexuality.
And indeed, while Freud had difficulty accepting bisexuality in men,
he discounted it altogether in women. In "Analysis Terminable and
Interminable" he declares that treatment "is most difficult when trying
to persuade a woman to abandon her wish for a penis or convince a man
that passive attitudes are sometimes indispensable."^ That is,
women must, at all costs, be dissuaded from psychological bisexuality,
while men must be cajoled to embrace it.
Implicit in Freud's parallel, if asymmetrical, construction here
is the notion that feminine is to be equated with passive and masculine
with active. Now Freud had explicitly argued against this equation in
35
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the New Introductory Lecture entitled
"Femininity." Once again,
however, it appears that Freud was not able to maintain ailegiance to
own, most difficult (i.e., ego alien) precepts. On closer
scrutiny, in fact, it appears that the distinction between active and
Passive is at the heart of Freud's account of Oedipal resolution, and
that his distortion of their meaning-his inability to hold to a
psychoanalytic conception of activity and passivity-is at the heart
of the failure in his account of psychosexual development. The
necessity of imputing to girls the achievement of passive, vaginal
sexuality causes Freud to stretch the logical limits of his theory
beyond what they can bear. It is in service of the little girl's
predestined (due to her procreative role) route to passive sexuality
that Freud must ascribe to penis envy the significance that he does,
and that he becomes willing to provide a nonsexual account of how the
girl's sexuality develops through the phallic period.
Furthermore, following Schafer, I would have to add that a
truly psychoanalytic understanding of the terms active and passive
seriously undermines their viability as descriptors of mental events
at all; no psychic phenomenon is purely active or passive. In the
first place, though instinctual aims may be passive, by virtue of
attaining satisfaction through the subject being acted upon rather
than acting, instinctual drives themselves are by definition active:
the overall sexual experience cannot be summed up as simply passive.
In the second place, one must not forget the regularity with which
the instinctual drives undergo transformation back and forth between
active and passive, nor the universal unconscious identification which
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links the two. The masochist is both beating and being beaten. In
the third place, one cannot presume that a preponderance of passive
aim results in a passive ego-in relation to id, superego, or
environment. For the ego is, by definition, actively synthesizing,
implementing instinctual drives as well as warding them off. (This
remains true whether the subjective experience, i.e., the ego's
concept of itself, is one of passivity.) In the fourth place, it
follows that one cannot speak of purely passive object relations, for
the ego, consciously and unconsciously, actively structures relation-
ships, even if the subject appears to be weak, helpless, or dependent.
Schafer summarizes the way these problems in definition may
affect the picture of female personality which Freud sketched:
. • • when Freud generalized about women's passivity, he
neglected such factors as unconscious identification with
the partner in a significant relationship. These are
factors which he had been the very one to establish through
his psychoanalytic method.
. . . Freud repeatedly demon-
strated how extraordinarily subtle and complex the inter-
weaving of passive and active themes can be in any one
person's life, from which it follows that one-sided or
simple characterizations of any significant project as
active or passive hardly make sense, once one knows a
given person and situation well enough. Yet Freud was
not deterred from generalizing on the basis of such simple
characterizations.
To hold active/passive as a central organizing concept will inevitably
result in an oversimplified account of psychosexual development. The
active/passive opposition undermines rather than enhances the concept
of bisexuality; limits rather than opens up the range of identifications,
projections, and introjections--in relation to both mother and father—
we would expect to encounter during the Oedipal period; and tends to
imply that sexual aim, and therefore gender identity, is determined by
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procreative role (which in turn determines social role).
What does seem clear is that severing the unconscious link
between active and passive is central to the oversimplification in
Freud's account of sexual and ego development. The experiencing of
active vs. passive instinctual aims in relation to the parents is a key
component of the Oedipus complex. The vicissitudes of sexual instinct
in relation to activity and passivity are certainly tied to the
development of the ego and to the ego's concept of itself. The
Freudian account, however, does not make full enough use of the
complex, bisexual identifications, introjections, and projections
that accompany the turbulence of this developmental era. And, to
come full circle, this failure is linked with Freud's general neglect
of the role of the mother in the Oedipal resolution.
To complete the picture, it is necessary to point out that
Freud shortchanged mothers not only in his simplified description of
the child's dilemma, but also in his relative disinterest in their
own subjective experience. In the developmental account he provides
for the little girl he inextricably links her eventual motherhood with
passive sexuality and passive personal ity--despite the fact that he
argues, again in the New Introductory Lectures, against circumscribing
maternal responsibilities within a passive modality. Penis envy seems
hardly adequate to convey the richness and complexity of the desire
for a child, though we hold to Freud's view that procreative impulses
are not inborn but acquired. And penis envy is certainly not sufficient
to account for the acquisition in women of the psychological capaci ty
to mother.
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It would appear that Freud's assessment of the role of
.other-
hood infl uenced his understanding of the nature of female sexuality;
once he had linked women's sexuality with passivity the notorious
depiction of female personality and character was all but inevitable
Now Freud did not by any means invent this portrait of female
personality. The female ego does often have a concept of itself as
passive; women do often adopt passive modes of behavior and relation-
ship. However, where we would have expected Freud to explore the
pervasive conflicts both men and women have around active/passive
trends, suddenly he closes off the discussion with the presumption of
female passivity. Assuming passivity as normatively tied to female
sexuality and refusing to consider its defensive properties, Freud
closes off the possibility of tracing passive-or active-self-
concept as a secondary gain of pathological defenses.
In the world of adult relation there are many circumstanrps
prevail
1C
but
n
the
a
def°
c
?
ntro1/ nd a9ainst whi ch cannot, inition of oneself in these circum-
stances as passive and helpless (or as prevailing and in
control) is an individual choice based on preferred forms
f th^
Se> se f" consolatl
'
on
’ self-punishment, and so
Freud fails to consider the role that cultural advantage may play in
the male/female division of the properties of activity and passivity,
despite his avowal that we must beware in this of underestimating
the influence of social customs, which similarly force women into
passive situations."
In this distortion of the meaning of activity and passivity lies
the beginning of an amplified account of psychosexual development— an
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amplified Freudian account. For it cannot be stressed too strongly
that regardless of the negative interpretations Freud put forth of
the female character, regardless of certain limitations in his
developmental account, there is nothing inherently denigrating to
women in his overall paradigm of psychosexual development
. If we
interpret the rather strict division of activity/passivity along sex-
linked lines as defensive— as highly conflictual and unresolved—
a
whole range of unexplored unconscious material opens up.
The modern analyst has to recognize [the woman's] role
not as passivity, but as a desperate form of activity--
a drastic inhibition required to play this inactivated
part. . . . Yet although Freud the clinician was ever
alert to the many forms unconscious activity takes in the
lives of women, Freud the theoretician, when dealing with
the development of sexual identity, named this inhibition
passivity and made it the crux of femininity. 38
An open-ended perspective on active/passive instinctual trends
gives renewed life to the psychoanalytic concept of bisexuality; offers
the possibility of reinstating clitoral sexuality and reassessing the
properties of vaginal sexuality as they are developed from the phallic
through the genital phases; necessitates increased attention to the
integration of aggressive as well as sexual drives in accounting for
psychosexual development (and this last is perhaps the most seriously
neglected aspect of sex-linked differences in male and female
development, given the role that violence plays in men's and women's
lives). This new vantage point would challenge our traditional under-
standing of both the external, role-related behaviors and internal
subjective experience of motherhood, and would also return the child's
psychical experience of mother to the center of Oedipal struggle,
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gender identity, and moral development. Paradoxically, disrupting
the equation between "mother" and "passive" not only gives renewed
importance to motherhood, it also lends support to the possibility
of women being less tied to mothering than a traditional account
would. A less rigid perspective on activity/passivity would also
generate a more complex understanding of male development and
pathology than what we now have. It would provide a framework in
which to re-view the actualities of male and female achievements
(moral and intellectual) and it would open up a far wider range of
accomplishments and sublimations to which both men and women might
normatively aspire.
Most importantly, this shift in focus is essentially compatible
with the fundamental principles and method of psychoanalysis. In
Wollheim's terms
... if this kind of account of feminine sexual develop-
ment would presuppose much more working over of the
constitutive elements than Freud himself proposes in his
official account, it exhibits the same general theoretical
eatures as the latter. For it is still an account which
bases itself on no more than biological considerations
and how they are internally represented, and which is
at the same time strong enough to sustain a theory of
ego development.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP
Thus far, the opportunities present in educating young
counselor/activists have been lost. Students have been encouraged to
believe in the miracles of increased quantity (whether of skills,
clients, humanism, or personal growth); or to espouse a therapy more
political than psychological and therefore not therapy at all; or to
disbelieve in therapy altogether and to engage in other forms of
social action.
Sisterhood can work insidiously in the classroom as well as in
the therapy session. It is reflected in a preference for nonhierarchic-
al structures, equalization of student-teacher relations, an emphasis
on sharing what is known rather than exploring what is unknown. This
completes a circle, returning to the humanistic matrix which has
already proved to be of questionable value to an education leading to
critical thinking. The humanistic style is lent further validity
in marxist circles for its superficial amenability with socialist
forms—ownership of the means of production, demystification of "class"
relations, reappropriation of personal power.
Because of her particular vulnerability to the "impostor complex,"
the undergraduate woman may find counselor education built on humanistic
psychology, mechanistic marxism, or even feminist therapy to subvert
rather than enhance her development as a feminist and as a mental health
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professional. It is a shaky self-confidence which emerges from such
mutual admiration as may pass for education in the humanistic mode.
Real or imagined failures may be the result of women graduating without
having mastered the skills and discipline of scholarship, perhaps
unable to conceptualize clearly and argue persuasively on the issues
of their professional domain.
It is in Women's Studies that popular psychology can be shown
most clearly to undermine the goals of feminism. It may be the case,
as one critic has argued, that women are now drawn to psychology in
the first place because "socialization" has cultivated their feeling
capacities while stunting development of other competencies.
Women, in a sense, already are too expressive. Their
"innate" emotionalism and expressiveness lie at the core
of the very stereotypes they now wish to overturn. So
the emphasis on feelings could backfire, locking women
even more completely into the circumscribed pattern from
which they seek escape.'
An education which underscores this imbalance perpetuates, rather than
elucidates, the roots of women's oppression.
Regardless of whether educators and students have thus far opted
for humanistic, laboratory, or feminist/radical therapy
In each case the failure is threefold: 1) failure to under-
stand the existing system as one of intentions, and de-
structive intensions, rather than institutions, behavior
or styles; 2) failure to understand the full range of what
it means to be a person and thus the systematic destruction
of the person; and 3) failure to understand activity,
political work, the self, in terms of process. 2
Such understanding must begin with ourselves, as teachers and clinicians.
This will entail a willingness to view our own experiences in the
world, in our practices, our training and especially in academic life,
with a more critical eye.
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This dissertation represents a beginning of that re-examination—
an attempt to look at current educational and psychological practices
and to see them in the context of the theories on which they are built.
This exploration has, of necessity, gone far afield from its original
starting point— counselor education— in its pursuit of the theoretical
roots of a sound pedagogical strategy. The search for a theory of
mind which could speak to the interface of feminism and psychology led
to psychoanalysis. Since Freudian theory has traditionally been
anathema to feminists, it then became necessary to demonstrate that
the theoretical paradigm is not unsympathetic to women-- to critique
those specific content areas which indeed are biased and damaging. In
the process, a number of areas were highlighted which contribute to
an understanding of the direction in which Women's Studies must move
with regards to counseling and psychology.
How then may it be possible to tie together the disparate
themes raised throughout? How may we bring a theoretical exploration
of general psychology and of psychosexual development back to bear on
the problems inherent in teaching counseling in a Women's Studies
program? In other words, what are the internal links between psycho-
analysis and social theory— in particular, feminism—which can be used
to structure a pedagogical approach?
In the Introduction I suggested that the failure of the women's
movement to produce a viable definition of feminism has undermined both
Women's Studies curriculum and feminist therapy. I also argued that
a complex theory of subectivity was an essential requirement for an
adequate definition of feminism. (Furthermore, given the particular
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angle of its social criticism, feminism must focus more attention
than other political analyses might on sexual identity as a central
aspect of subjectivity, and of our social formations.) It may be useful,
in this light, to return to the five elements set forth in the Intro-
duction as constituting the rudiments of a theory of human nature:
the nature of thought and the relation between thought and action; a
concept of mind/body relationship; an assessment of human needs; the
relation of individual to society; and the ethical responsibilities
of psychological theorists and mental healers. These themes have
implicitly threaded throughout the exposition of the previous
chapters. At all points I have endeavored to demonstrate that the
psychoanalytic theory of subjectivity (including its basic notions of
psychosexual development), as seen through its address to these five
criteria, can offer to feminism a radical social analysis. Freud
provides a mode of understanding and a critique of the internal
experience of men and women, the relations between the sexes, the trans-
formation of personal relations to social structures, in turn the
influence of society on individual development, and finally, the trans-
mission and institutionalization of personal and social relations
across generations.
It is beyond the scope of this research to make a definitive
statement about the extent to which a psychological theory can serve
as the basis for a political theory. Still, a notion of feminism
which aims at a radical transformation of society requires this complex
depiction of human nature, with its internal links to political theory,
in order to project a reasonable and viable agenda for social change.
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Women's Studies represents one arm of that endeavor, and a program in
counseling and psychology would confrontthe problem on several fronts.
In my view, the purpose of a Women's Studies program is to situate
a liberal arts education in a context which will enhance the powers of
feminist political analysis in order to alter the quality of students'
life experience and to prepare them to work more effectively to trans-
form their social world. An educational program can address these
problems in many ways. The most significant of these are:
To.redress the historical imbalance in women's education by re-
discovering neglected women artists and theorists and by focusing on
areas within the traditional academic disciplines that illumine the
problematic aspects of women's social existence.
2. To begin to clarify the relationship between feminist theory and
action in order to prepare students for meaningful activity outside
the university. "Action" in this context refers to both political
work and to career/employment; indeed, the possibility of overlap
between those two remains problematic and in need of clarification,
in the field of counseling as elsewhere.
3. To provide a setting in which women students can explore the issues
around working together as a committed political group.
4. To examine the internal connections between academic disciplines in
order to make explicit the political content in seemingly "neutral"
areas of discourse.
5. To work toward a definition of "research" which is more compatible
with feminist theory; to establish feminist scholarship, particularly
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feminist research and theory development, as a priority within the
academy and within the women's movement.
It is perhaps the task of highlighting a theory of moral and
ethical values which can serve as a focus through which to integrate
the variety of issues under discussion here: political theory,
pedagogical responsibility, psychological theory, the role of the
healing professions, the personal and social experience-or mere
endurance of gender and all that pertains to gender difference. It
is in fact the differing vantage points of psychology and political
philosophy on the genesis of a theory of moral and ethical values
that is the heart of the contradiction between political and psycho-
logical endeavors. And the debate over which school of psychology
is most value-influenced or which school's Weltanschauung is most
appropriate for a given political analysis, has been, until now, the
basis of the choice of theory to be used for program development,
political or pedagogical.
The question becomes then, what does the psychoanalytic theory
of moral development, which in turn forms the ethical base of its
treatment methodology, have to offer to feminism and feminist educa-
tion? In fact, the ethical stance which informs psychoanalysis is
the source of its great contribution to political theory and at the
same time its most serious problematic for political activity. For
psychoanalysis does not, in theory or practice, profess a Wei tanschauung .
This restraint straddles the line between a commitment to ethical
responsibility and a position of theoretical and practical amorality.
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I would like here to juxtapose feminist education with three
different and interrelated areas of morality and ethics within psycho-
analysis: its theory of moral development, its position vis-a-vis
society's valuation of abnormal vs. normal, the ethics of its treat-
ment method.
Psychoanalysis holds that the genesis of morality lies in the
early parent-child relationship. "The origin of value then is the
need of the helpless met by the constant fulfillment of the trust-
worthy. As opposed to theories which believe persons to be innately
moral, or conversely, believe person's morality to be controlled solely
by social institutions such as church or state, psychoanalysis sees
morality and ethics as inevitable but only developmental ly acquired
achievements
.
In the light of psychoanalysis, moral valuation and
moral conduct are necessary attributes of "natural"
man. To have firmly established this, not only in the
form of apercus but through painstaking and systematic
observations and in the form of a well-reasoned theory
is perhaps the most important contribution Freud has
made to the study of moral behavior.
5
The nature of our psychic and biological apparatus requires and provides
the possibility for this achievement, yet it remains a process that
each individual must undergo to enter the human community and partake
of "culture." As Erikson puts it:
The ethical core which is built into all of us phylo-
genetically must evolve in each of us ontogenetical ly--
g
that is, through the mediation of the generational process."
Now clearly the origins of moral i ty--the genesis in each of us
of the concepts "good" and "bad," "ought" and "ought not"— is an
important consideration for any political theory. Because the social
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arrangements between men and women are so often cooperative, the
oppression of women so often denied by members of both sexes, hypo-
theses regarding moral valuations and moral conduct represent an
essential component of feminist theory. By what route do we come to
differentially value men and women? Psychoanalysis locates this
process within the universal, early instinctual struggles of the child
and states that "the transmitting mechanism of value is the child's
identification with the adult generation ." 7 This dialectical hypothesis
affords a perspective which may both explicate and at the same time
critique the development of cultural values, whereas "intellectual
constructions of ethical systems which neglect the psychological forces
that actually determine moral behavior are likely to impede both the
stability and the power of these systems ."8 It is well known that
Freud believed the civilizing process exacted too high a price in the
form of instinctual renunciations
.
9
Yet the Freudian theory of moral
development does not go nearly as far as it might in its critique of
society, and in certain ways a feminist analysis may serve as a
corrective.
As set forth in Chapters III, IV, and V, the primary period
for the acquisition of moral standards is during the resolution of the
Oedipal complex. I argued in Chapters IV and V that Freud's theory
of psychosexual development is built on a presumption of asymmetry
between men's and women's moral capacities. As a result of this pre-
sumption, the theoretical constructs regarding both psychosexual and
moral development are highly flawed. The presumption of male moral
superiority would appear to be traceable in the first place to a de-
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fensive assessment of the "typical" masculine moral sensibility as
highly evolved, when in fact there are persuasive interpretations which
argue that it is arrested at the anal and phallic developmental levels.^
This alternative viewpoint may contribute to our understanding of
why the superego has remained such a confused concept in analytic
literature. Does superego contribute to morality or undermine it?
Erikson suggests a distinction between morality and ethical values
which may clarify the problem:
The first requirement for a psychoanalytic study of
moral values and ethics, then, is the epigenetic point
of view.
. . . Developmental!^ speaking, we must, then,
differentiate between an earlier, moral conscience and a
later ethical sense. What psychoanalysis graphically calls
our super-ego.
. . is the ready recipient of prohibitions
driven into us in childhood by frowning faces and mortal
threats, if not beaten into us by physical puni shment--and
this even before we can possibly understand the meaning
of it all. In later life this remains our most moral-
istic side.
. . .
Morality and ethics thus must evolve in each person in
a step-by-step development through ever differentiated and
insightful stages. Even as each earlier stage lives on
in all the later ones, each later stage can represent a
re-integration of all earlier ones on a higher level. But
this also implies a continuing and inexorable dynamic
conflict between the earlier and most primitive, and the
later, more mature values in each person--and in all
communi ties J
1
While I would quarrel strongly with his emphasis on external
influence over conflicted internal fantasy as the source of the
superego's harshness, Erikson's distinction between the moral and the
ethical remains provocative. As I suggested above, it may well be that
the theory of psychosexual development which requires that unequal
moral powers be attributed to men and women is what stands in the way
of psychoanalysis evolving not only a theory of moral values but also
184
one of integrated ethical standards. In this regard psychoanalysis
and feminism stand to make important contributions to one another in
further theoretical developments. An ongoing attempt to clarify society's
mode of valuation stands as an integral aspect of feminist scholarship
and therefore of Women's Studies.
In the specific context of feminist counselor education, the
significance of this issue deepens. For here we must scrutinize the
attitude which teachers adopt and encourage in students regarding the
position of mental healers vis-a-vis culture and its prevailing values.
One of Freud's great contributions to the science of psychology— an
inevitable corollary of his theory of the unconscious mind
--was to
securely locate psychopathology on a continuum with "normality."
Erikson underscores this when he states that, "Patients, in other
words, are those members of a given society who—for a variety of
etiological reasons—are most inactivated by inner conflicts shared
12by all." This 'dialectical' approach stands in contradistinction
to unidirectional theories which see patients as inherently defective
(the conservative viewpoint), or as having suffered from extraordinary
social deprivations and abuse—outside the range of what society
generally inflicts (the liberal viewpoint).
The Freudian perspective on normal i ty/abnormal ity represents the
second moral or ethical aspect of psychoanalysis which I would like to
consider.
It then appears that some of the dominant neuroses and
psychoses of any given period of history contain an
inverted revolt against the values of the existing order;
and that we, the mental healers, by taking the dominant
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symptoms seriously (rather than decrying, suppressing,
or punishing them)
,
accept some validity in that challenge.
In establishing diagnostic and prognostic criteria.
. . and
in postulating an etiology and prescribing a cure for
their symptoms, a new therapeutic style also postulates
what seems normative and essential in human nature; and
it helps to prescribe what men [sic] owe to each other and
what they must avoid doing to each other. Whatever the
healing professions advocate, then, is always part of a
central struggle of their times and whether "avowed" or
not, become ethical intervention.^
Again, psychoanalysis and feminism have much to offer one another, where
Freudian theory provides an ethical posture and feminist analysis adds
a lens through which to shape diagnosis of women's suffering. To
name but a few examples, this might include a re-examination of the
painful inhibition that has been heretofore diagnosed as "normal"
female passivity; a serious and compassionate assessment of the some-
times spurious diagnosis of hysterical personality; a willingness to
recognize the paralyzing and destructive effects of the eating dis-
orders, rapidly becoming the female symptom, though considered a
legitimate diagnostic category only in extreme and "bizarre" cases.
Ethical problems in psychological diagnosis and assessment
reflect back on the first set of issues raised, that is, the genesis
of moral values.
If we do not recognize, if we deny in ourselves, the psycho-
logical nature of moral valuation, not only distortions of
our authentic codes and directions will result, but also the
picture of the reality we evaluate will be often distorted--
in our case the picture of what we empirically know about the
characteristics of what we call healthy and sick. 14
And for clarification of the psychological distortions of what is de-
signated healthy and sick in men and women, we must turn once again
to problems which have thus far been built into the theory of psycho-
sexual development.
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If, as feminists and therapists, we accept these ethical responsi
bilities, then we also take on a range of responsibilities—and
problems
--in the teaching of counseling.
For we cannot claim any more merely to heal clients in
and climes, and to enlighten students and readers,thout directly intervening in the process by which values
are formed and transmitted in society. Rather than denythis fact, we had better find the proper frameworks forteaching the tenets of psychoanalysis both in the context
of clinical training and in that of humanist enlighten-
ment. To search in each framework for a style which
enlarges and trains ethical consciousness even as it
reveals the workings of the unconscious.
.
.15
Students of the mind, particularly those who claim to locate
psychology within a broader view of culture as a whole, must recognize
the commitment to, and develop the capacity for an avowal of their
moral valuations and an awareness of the route by which they came
to hold those values. While psychoanalysis cannot provide a
Weltanschauung
,
its ethos includes a rigorous examination of individual
and society's moral values and ability to live up to them. Perhaps
one of the major problems this research raises and cannot yet solve
is the manner in which the tools of psychoanalytic insight can be
extrapolated from the treatment process and applied in the classroom
or within a political community. Chapter I critiques the place that
self-exploration has come to occupy in the academy. Though self-
knowledge is, by my own terms, a crucial aspect of feminist education
in the healing arts, a definition of the role that it may productively
play in a university setting remains elusive. And though consciousness
raising may indeed mean little without an adequate notion of the un-
conscious (as I argued in Chapters II and III), the introduction of
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techniques which touch on unconscious phenomena i
than a therapeutic setting remains a delicate and
n a political rather
a highly problematic
project.
The subject of self-knowledge brings me to the third and final
aspect of psychoanalysis and moral values to be discussed here, and
that is the ethical principles implicit in its approach to treatment.
Following on what has just been discussed, this is a difficult topic
since a model for applying the method outside of advanced clinical
training and the actual treatment setting hasn't been and may never be
developed. Yet the principles in question are central to the evolu-
tion, in individuals and in groups, of politically and ethically
enlightened consciousness; though the application of method remains
elusive, the application of principles cannot be abandoned.
Psychoanalysis aims at the enhanced autonomy of the individual,
achieved through expanded self-knowledge which is accompanied by
resolution of unconscious instinctual conflict. "Where Id was, there
Ego shall be." However, there is no simple, clear cut link between
increased integration of the ego functions and enhanced moral stature.
Psychoanalysis has of course been criticized, and in many instances
(particularly since Freud's death and particularly in this country),
rightly so, for failing to live up to its own ethical fiat. Its
inability and/or reluctance to arbitrate the relationship between
"health" and morality may pose an even more serious limitation on its
usefulness for political theory.
. . .it is obvious that there are many neurotics who are
"highly moral" and many, sometimes the same ones, who are
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socially useful, while there are many "healthy" people
who are neither the one nor the other—contrary to the
expectations of the representatives of a health ethicsJ 6
Beyond the tension between "health" and morality, it is also true
that conflict-free, "rational action can be used in the service of
both morally positively and morally negatively valued aims. "17
This presents another potential intersection of psychology and
social theory. Firstly, an application of feminist analysis may
clarify the notion of "health," where health and rationality appear
to coincide. For instance, many theorists, in critiquing male ego
development, reflected a different picture of rationality in relation
to the other ego functions, particularly repressed or split off
aspects of the ego which might mediate "objective," "rational" considera-
tions through other, perhaps affect-influenced psychic experiences.
And secondly, a historical analysis is bound to bring the entire
question of mental health into relativistic perspective.
Though we inevitably encounter limits as to the extent that
psychoanalytically achieved self-knowledge abuts on moral questions,
or the extent to which increased energies available to the ego will
be directed toward the community, still these same limits protect the
possibility of the deep psychic changes which may make possible a new
order of social relations. The psychoanalytic limits may be easier to
live with than at first seems possible; easier to live with, once
again, than the boundless but empty promise of liberal utopianism.
To say that it is a long way from the clarification of
ethical principles to moral conduct is to state the
obvious. But I should think that a clear and systematic
awareness of actual moral motivations could affect moral
action, too. Furthermore, a truer insight into the
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inner implications of an action will often lead to a r*
balanrp^h°t
mot1v^°"S~even without a change in the
.
e
?-
0^ necessity lead to changes in the field oftheir application to moral action. 18
If the specific techniques of psychoanalysis-interpretation of the
transference relationship as a route to resolution of infantile
instinctual confl ict-proves of limited applicability, it may be the
hemeneutic principle in itself that is to be profitably extrapolated
from the psychoanalytic method. The interpretive method and the theory
of the unconscious mind are inextricable. The commitment to revealing
successive layers of meaning, to demystification of life's surface
appearance, is tied to the analytic belief that we have barely begun
to discover the workings of the mind, barely begun to understand the
question of gender identity and the relations between the sexes. A
perspective informed by both psychoanalysis and feminist social theory
can help to determine what is to be studied now and how; that is, it
can help to establish the priorities for continued research, and to
establish a mode of scholarship that is appropriate to the issues
under consideration.
Women's Studies presents the opportunity for interdisci pi inary
education in the highest sense, not merely multi- or parallel disciplin-
ary, not remedial education for a neglected minority. It can present
a truly cohesive examination of our social formations and their
political underpinnings. As such, it stands to mount a radical critique
that cuts across lines of race, class, and sex. Feminist education
which takes seriously its ethical and political responsibilities is both
intensely personal and inherently social, an education which leads not
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only to knowledge and enlightenment but also to reform and finally
to revolution.
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